30,227 research outputs found

    Perspectives for Cyber Strategists on Law for Cyberwar

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    The proliferation of martial rhetoric in connection with the release of thousands of pages of sensitive government documents by the WikiLeaks organization underlines how easily words that have legal meanings can be indiscriminately applied to cyber events in ways that can confuse decision makers and strategists alike. The WikiLeaks phenomenon is but the latest in a series of recent cyber-related incidents––ranging from cyber crises in Estonia and Georgia to reports of the Stuxnet cyberworm allegedly infecting Iranian computers––that have contributed to a growing perception that “cyberwar” is inevitable, if not already underway. All of this generates a range of legal questions, with popular wisdom being that the law is inadequate or lacking entirely. Lt Gen Keith B. Alexander, the first commander of US Cyber Command, told Congress at his April 2010 confirmation hearings that there was a “mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies.” Likewise, Jeffrey Addicott, a highly respected cyber-law authority, asserts that “international laws associated with the use of force are woefully inadequate in terms of addressing the threat of cyberwarfare.” This article takes a somewhat different tact concerning the ability of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) to address cyber issues. Specifically, it argues that while there is certainly room for improvement in some areas, the basic tenets of LOAC are sufficient to address the most important issues of cyberwar. Among other things, this article contends that very often the real difficulty with respect to the law and cyberwar is not any lack of “law,” per se, but rather in the complexities that arise in determining the necessary facts which must be applied to the law to render legal judgments

    Proportionality and its Applicability in the Realm of Cyber Attacks

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    With an ever-increasing reliance on State cyber-attacks, the need for an international treaty governing the actions of Nation-States in the realm of cyberwarfare has never been greater. States now have the ability to cause unprecedented civilian loss with their cyber actions. States can destroy financial records, disrupt stock markets, manipulate cryptocurrency, shut off nuclear reactors, turn off power grids, open dams, and even shut down air traffic control systems with the click of a mouse. This article argues that any cyber-attack launched with a reasonable expectation to inflict “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects,” must be subject to the existing laws of proportionality. This article further examines the broader concept of proportionality, and the difficulties associated with applying a proportionality analysis to an offensive cyber-strike. This paper asserts that the ambiguities and complexities associated with applying the law of proportionality—in its current state and within a cyber context—will leave civilian populations vulnerable to the aggressive cyber actions of the world’s cyber powers. Consequently, this article stresses the necessity of developing a proportionality standard within a unified international cyberwarfare convention and asserts that such a standard is required in order to prevent the creation of a pathway towards lethal cyber aggressions unrestrained by the laws of war

    Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice

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    The term dual-use characterizes technologies that can have both military and civilian applications. What is the state of current efforts to control the spread of these powerful technologies—nuclear, biological, cyber—that can simultaneously advance social and economic well-being and also be harnessed for hostile purposes? What have previous efforts to govern, for example, nuclear and biological weapons taught us about the potential for the control of these dual-use technologies? What are the implications for governance when the range of actors who could cause harm with these technologies include not just national governments but also non-state actors like terrorists? These are some of the questions addressed by Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice, the new publication released today by the Global Nuclear Future Initiative of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The publication's editor is Elisa D. Harris, Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland School of Public Affairs. Governance of Dual-Use Technologies examines the similarities and differences between the strategies used for the control of nuclear technologies and those proposed for biotechnology and information technology. The publication makes clear the challenges concomitant with dual-use governance. For example, general agreement exists internationally on the need to restrict access to technologies enabling the development of nuclear weapons. However, no similar consensus exists in the bio and information technology domains. The publication also explores the limitations of military measures like deterrence, defense, and reprisal in preventing globally available biological and information technologies from being misused. Some of the other questions explored by the publication include: What types of governance measures for these dual-use technologies have already been adopted? What objectives have those measures sought to achieve? How have the technical characteristics of the technology affected governance prospects? What have been the primary obstacles to effective governance, and what gaps exist in the current governance regime? Are further governance measures feasible? In addition to a preface from Global Nuclear Future Initiative Co-Director Robert Rosner (University of Chicago) and an introduction and conclusion from Elisa Harris, Governance of Dual-Use Technologiesincludes:On the Regulation of Dual-Use Nuclear Technology by James M. Acton (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)Dual-Use Threats: The Case of Biotechnology by Elisa D. Harris (University of Maryland)Governance of Information Technology and Cyber Weapons by Herbert Lin (Stanford University

    Nonparty Remote Electronic Access to Plea Agreements in the Second Circuit

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    Widespread electronic access to case files gives rise to security concerns previously unrealized in the era of paper records. As the United States Department of Justice noted, the emergence of a cottage industry of websites that republish court filings online for the purposes of witness intimidation, retaliation, and harassment poses a grave risk of harm to cooperating witnesses and defendants. Accordingly, the benefits associated with remote electronic availability and dissemination of judicial documents may come at a considerable cost. This Note describes the options that district courts within the Second Circuit could implement to mitigate these concerns. Part I of this Note outlines how electronic access to court filings has altered the traditional balance between disclosure and privacy, and addresses the concerns associated with providing electronic access to plea agreements. Part I also outlines the qualified rights of access to judicial documents under the common law and the First Amendment. Part II examines these qualified rights\u27 constraint on the operation of proposals that would that would limit nonparty remote access to court documents. Part III argues that electronic access to court filings should be governed by the same standards which regulate access to paper filings, and that the proper inquiry is whether certain sensitive documents ought to be included in the public record at all. This Note concludes that Courts can best maintain the public\u27s qualified rights of access to court filings based on process-oriented concerns, and simultaneously provide security to cooperators, by not filing plea agreements

    The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space

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    The world is on the precipice of a new arms race in outer space, as China, Russia, the United States, and others undertake dramatic new initiatives in anti-satellite weaponry. These accelerated competitive efforts at space control are highly destabilizing because developed societies have come to depend so heavily upon satellite services to support the entire civilian economy and the modern military apparatus; any significant threat or disruption in the availability of space assets would be massively, and possibly permanently, disruptive. International law regarding outer space developed with remarkable rapidity in the early years of the Space Age, but the process of formulating additional treaties and norms for space has broken down over the past several decades; no additional legal instruments have emerged that could cope with today’s rising threats. This Article therefore proposes three initiatives. Although none of them can suffice to solve the emerging problems, they could, perhaps, provide additional diplomacy, reinvigorating the prospects for rapprochement in space. Importantly, each of these three ideas has deep roots in other sectors of arms control, where they have served both to restore a measure of stability and to catalyze even more ambitious agreements in the longer term. The first proposal is for a declaratory regime of “no first use” of specified space weapons; this would do little to directly alter states’ capabilities for space warfare, but could serve as a “confidence-building measure,” to temper their most provocative rhetoric and practices. The second concept is a “limited test ban,” to interdict the most dangerous debris-creating developmental tests of new space weapons. Third is a suggestion for shared “space situational awareness,” which would create an international apparatus enabling all participants to enjoy the benefits of greater transparency, reducing the possibilities for secret malign or negligent behavior. In each instance, the Article describes the proposal and its variations, assesses its possible contributions to space security, and displays the key precedents from other arms-control successes. The Article concludes by calling for additional, further-reaching space diplomacy, in the hope that these relatively modest initial measures could provoke more robust subsequent negotiations
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