1,569 research outputs found

    SafeWeb: A Middleware for Securing Ruby-Based Web Applications

    Get PDF
    Web applications in many domains such as healthcare and finance must process sensitive data, while complying with legal policies regarding the release of different classes of data to different parties. Currently, software bugs may lead to irreversible disclosure of confidential data in multi-tier web applications. An open challenge is how developers can guarantee these web applications only ever release sensitive data to authorised users without costly, recurring security audits. Our solution is to provide a trusted middleware that acts as a “safety net” to event-based enterprise web applications by preventing harmful data disclosure before it happens. We describe the design and implementation of SafeWeb, a Ruby-based middleware that associates data with security labels and transparently tracks their propagation at different granularities across a multi-tier web architecture with storage and complex event processing. For efficiency, maintainability and ease-of-use, SafeWeb exploits the dynamic features of the Ruby programming language to achieve label propagation and data flow enforcement. We evaluate SafeWeb by reporting our experience of implementing a web-based cancer treatment application and deploying it as part of the UK National Health Service (NHS)

    Sound and Precise Malware Analysis for Android via Pushdown Reachability and Entry-Point Saturation

    Full text link
    We present Anadroid, a static malware analysis framework for Android apps. Anadroid exploits two techniques to soundly raise precision: (1) it uses a pushdown system to precisely model dynamically dispatched interprocedural and exception-driven control-flow; (2) it uses Entry-Point Saturation (EPS) to soundly approximate all possible interleavings of asynchronous entry points in Android applications. (It also integrates static taint-flow analysis and least permissions analysis to expand the class of malicious behaviors which it can catch.) Anadroid provides rich user interface support for human analysts which must ultimately rule on the "maliciousness" of a behavior. To demonstrate the effectiveness of Anadroid's malware analysis, we had teams of analysts analyze a challenge suite of 52 Android applications released as part of the Auto- mated Program Analysis for Cybersecurity (APAC) DARPA program. The first team analyzed the apps using a ver- sion of Anadroid that uses traditional (finite-state-machine-based) control-flow-analysis found in existing malware analysis tools; the second team analyzed the apps using a version of Anadroid that uses our enhanced pushdown-based control-flow-analysis. We measured machine analysis time, human analyst time, and their accuracy in flagging malicious applications. With pushdown analysis, we found statistically significant (p < 0.05) decreases in time: from 85 minutes per app to 35 minutes per app in human plus machine analysis time; and statistically significant (p < 0.05) increases in accuracy with the pushdown-driven analyzer: from 71% correct identification to 95% correct identification.Comment: Appears in 3rd Annual ACM CCS workshop on Security and Privacy in SmartPhones and Mobile Devices (SPSM'13), Berlin, Germany, 201

    I know what leaked in your pocket: uncovering privacy leaks on Android Apps with Static Taint Analysis

    Get PDF
    Android applications may leak privacy data carelessly or maliciously. In this work we perform inter-component data-flow analysis to detect privacy leaks between components of Android applications. Unlike all current approaches, our tool, called IccTA, propagates the context between the components, which improves the precision of the analysis. IccTA outperforms all other available tools by reaching a precision of 95.0% and a recall of 82.6% on DroidBench. Our approach detects 147 inter-component based privacy leaks in 14 applications in a set of 3000 real-world applications with a precision of 88.4%. With the help of ApkCombiner, our approach is able to detect inter-app based privacy leaks

    Preventing SQL Injection through Automatic Query Sanitization with ASSIST

    Full text link
    Web applications are becoming an essential part of our everyday lives. Many of our activities are dependent on the functionality and security of these applications. As the scale of these applications grows, injection vulnerabilities such as SQL injection are major security challenges for developers today. This paper presents the technique of automatic query sanitization to automatically remove SQL injection vulnerabilities in code. In our technique, a combination of static analysis and program transformation are used to automatically instrument web applications with sanitization code. We have implemented this technique in a tool named ASSIST (Automatic and Static SQL Injection Sanitization Tool) for protecting Java-based web applications. Our experimental evaluation showed that our technique is effective against SQL injection vulnerabilities and has a low overhead.Comment: In Proceedings TAV-WEB 2010, arXiv:1009.330

    MobileAppScrutinator: A Simple yet Efficient Dynamic Analysis Approach for Detecting Privacy Leaks across Mobile OSs

    Get PDF
    Smartphones, the devices we carry everywhere with us, are being heavily tracked and have undoubtedly become a major threat to our privacy. As "tracking the trackers" has become a necessity, various static and dynamic analysis tools have been developed in the past. However, today, we still lack suitable tools to detect, measure and compare the ongoing tracking across mobile OSs. To this end, we propose MobileAppScrutinator, based on a simple yet efficient dynamic analysis approach, that works on both Android and iOS (the two most popular OSs today). To demonstrate the current trend in tracking, we select 140 most representative Apps available on both Android and iOS AppStores and test them with MobileAppScrutinator. In fact, choosing the same set of apps on both Android and iOS also enables us to compare the ongoing tracking on these two OSs. Finally, we also discuss the effectiveness of privacy safeguards available on Android and iOS. We show that neither Android nor iOS privacy safeguards in their present state are completely satisfying
    corecore