Security in Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs)

Major research domains in the WLAN security include: access control & data frame protection, lightweight authentication and secure handoff. Access control standard like IEEE 802.11i provides flexibility in user authentication but on the other hand fell prey to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. For Protecting the data communication between two communicating devices—three standard protocols i.e., WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy), TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol) and AES-CCMP (Advanced Encryption Standard—Counter mode with CBC-MAC protocol) are used. Out of these, AES-CCMP protocol is secure enough and mostly used in enterprises. In WLAN environment lightweight authentication is an asset, provided it also satisfies other security properties like protecting the authentication stream or token along with securing the transmitted message. CAPWAP (Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points), HOKEY (Hand Over Keying) and IEEE 802.11r are major protocols for executing the secure handoff. In WLANs, handoff should not only be performed within time limits as required by the real time applications but should also be used to transfer safely the keying material for further communication. In this chapter, a comparative study of the security mechanisms under the above-mentioned research domains is provided

Fast Authentication in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks

The growing diffusion of wireless devices is leading to an increasing demand for mobility and security. At the same time, most applications can only tolerate short breaks in the data flow, so that it is a challenge to find out mobility and authentication methods able to cope with these constraints. This paper aims to propose an authentication scheme which significantly shortens the authentication latency and that can be deployed in a variety of wireless environments ranging from common Wireless LANs (WLANs) to satellite-based access networks

Model checking medium access control for sensor networks

We describe verification of S-MAC, a medium access control protocol designed for wireless sensor networks, by means of the PRISM model checker. The S-MAC protocol is built on top of the IEEE 802.11 standard for wireless ad hoc networks and, as such, it uses the same randomised backoff procedure as a means to avoid collision. In order to minimise energy consumption, in S-MAC, nodes are periodically put into a sleep state. Synchronisation of the sleeping schedules is necessary for the nodes to be able to communicate. Intuitively, energy saving obtained through a periodic sleep mechanism will be at the expense of performance. In previous work on S-MAC verification, a combination of analytical techniques and simulation has been used to confirm the correctness of this intuition for a simplified (abstract) version of the protocol in which the initial schedules coordination phase is assumed correct. We show how we have used the PRISM model checker to verify the behaviour of S-MAC and compare it to that of IEEE 802.11

Developing a Systematic Process for Mobile Surveying and Analysis of WLAN security

Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), familiarly known as Wi-Fi, is one of the most used wireless networking technologies. WLANs have rapidly grown in popularity since the release of the original IEEE 802.11 WLAN standard in 1997. We are using our beloved wireless internet connection for everything and are connecting more and more devices into our wireless networks in every form imaginable. As the number of wireless network devices keeps increasing, so does the importance of wireless network security. During its now over twenty-year life cycle, a multitude of various security measures and protocols have been introduced into WLAN connections to keep our wireless communication secure. The most notable security measures presented in the 802.11 standard have been the encryption protocols Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). Both encryption protocols have had their share of flaws and vulnerabilities, some of them so severe that the use of WEP and the first generation of the WPA protocol have been deemed irredeemably broken and unfit to be used for WLAN encryption. Even though the aforementioned encryption protocols have been long since deemed fatally broken and insecure, research shows that both can still be found in use today. The purpose of this Master’s Thesis is to develop a process for surveying wireless local area networks and to survey the current state of WLAN security in Finland. The goal has been to develop a WLAN surveying process that would at the same time be efficient, scalable, and easily replicable. The purpose of the survey is to determine to what extent are the deprecated encryption protocols used in Finland. Furthermore, we want to find out in what state is WLAN security currently in Finland by observing the use of other WLAN security practices. The survey process presented in this work is based on a WLAN scanning method called Wardriving. Despite its intimidating name, wardriving is simply a form of passive wireless network scanning. Passive wireless network scanning is used for collecting information about the surrounding wireless networks by listening to the messages broadcasted by wireless network devices. To collect our research data, we conducted wardriving surveys on three separate occasions between the spring of 2019 and early spring of 2020, in a typical medium-sized Finnish city. Our survey results show that 2.2% out of the located networks used insecure encryption protocols and 9.2% of the located networks did not use any encryption protocol. While the percentage of insecure networks is moderately low, we observed during our study that private consumers are reluctant to change the factory-set default settings of their wireless network devices, possibly exposing them to other security threats

IEEE 802.11 i Security and Vulnerabilities

Despite using a variety of comprehensive preventive security measures, the Robust Secure Networks (RSNs) remain vulnerable to a number of attacks. Failure of preventive measures to address all RSN vulnerabilities dictates the need for enhancing the performance of Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDSs) to detect all attacks on RSNs with less false positive and false negative rates

A multichannel relay MAC protocol for IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/109605/1/dac2526.pd

Security technologies for wireless access to local area networks

In today’s world, computers and networks are connected to all life aspects and professions. The amount of information, personal and organizational, spread over the network is increasing exponentially. Simultaneously, malicious attacks are being developed at the same speed, which makes having a secure network system a crucial factor on every level and in any organization. Achieving a high protection level has been the goal of many organizations, such as the Wi-Fi Alliance R , and many standards and protocols have been developed over time. This work addresses the historical development of WLAN security technologies, starting from the oldest standard, WEP, and reaching the newly released standard WPA3, passing through the several versions in between,WPA, WPS, WPA2, and EAP. Along with WPA3, this work addresses two newer certificates, Enhanced OpenTM and Easy ConnectTM. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of the previous standards is also presented, detailing their security mechanisms, flaws, attacks, and the measures they have adopted to prevent these attacks. Focusing on the new released WPA3, this work presents a deep study on both WPA3 and EAP-pwd. The development of WPA3 had the objective of providing strong protection, even if the network’s password is considered weak. However, this objective was not fully accomplished and some recent research work discovered design flaws in this new standard. Along with the above studies, this master thesis’ work builds also a network for penetration testing using a set of new devices that support the new standard. A group of possible attacks onWi-Fi latest security standards was implemented on the network, testing the response against each of them, discussing the reason behind the success or the failure of the attack, and providing a set of countermeasures applicable against these attacks. Obtained results show that WPA3 has overcome many of WPA2’s issues, however, it is still unable to overcome some major Wi-Fi vulnerabilities.No mundo de hoje, os computadores e as redes estão conectados praticamente a todos os aspectos da nossa vida pessoal e profissional. A quantidade de informações, pessoais e organizacionais, espalhadas pela rede está a aumentar exponencialmente. Simultaneamente, também os ataques maliciosos estão a aumentar à mesma velocidade, o que faz com que um sistema de rede seguro seja um fator crucial a todos os níveis e em qualquer organização. Alcançar altos níveis de proteção tem sido o objetivo de trabalho de muitas organizações, como a Wi-Fi Alliance R , tendo muitos standards e protocolos sido desenvolvidos ao longo do tempo. Este trabalho aborda o desenvolvimento histórico das tecnologias de segurança para WLANs, começando pelo standard mais antigo, WEP, e acabando no recém-chegado WPA3, passando pelas várias versões intermedias, WPA, WPS, WPA2 e EAP. Juntamente com o WPA3, este trabalho aborda os dois certificados mais recentes, Enhanced OpenTM e Easy ConnectTM. Além disso, também é apresentada uma análise comparativa dos standards anteriores, detalhando os seus principais mecanismos de segurança, falhas, ataques a que são susceptíveis e medidas adotadas para evitar esses ataques. Quanto ao novo WPA3 e EAP-pwd, este trabalho apresenta um estudo aprofundado sobre os seus modos "Personal" e "Enterprise". O desenvolvimento do WPA3 teve por objetivo fornecer proteção forte, mesmo que a password de rede seja considerada fraca. No entanto, esse objetivo não foi totalmente alcançado e alguma investigação realizada recentemente detectou falhas de desenho nesse novo padrão. Juntamente com os estudo dos standards acima referidos, o trabalho realizado para esta tese de mestrado também constrói uma rede para testes de penetração usando um conjunto de novos dispositivos que já suportam o novo standard. São aplicados vários ataques aos mais recentes padrões de segurança Wi-Fi, é testada a sua resposta contra cada um deles, é discutindo o motivo que justifica o sucesso ou a falha do ataque, e são indicadas contramedidas aplicáveis a esses ataques. Os resultados obtidos mostram que o WPA3 superou muitos dos problemas do WPA2 mas que, no entanto, ainda é incapaz de superar algumas das vulnerabilidades presentes nas redes Wi-Fi.First, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to those who gave me the possibility to complete my study and get my Master degree, the Aga Khan Foundation, who has supported me financiall