Value of supplier's capacity information in a two-echelon supply chain

Cataloged from PDF version of article.In traditional supply chain models it is generally assumed that full information is available to all parties involved. Although this seems reasonable, there are cases where chain members are independent agents and possess different levels of information. In this study, we analyze a two-echelon, single supplier-multiple retailers supply chain in a single-period setting where the capacity of the supplier is limited. Embedding the lack of information about the capacity of the supplier in the model, we aim to analyze the reaction of the retailers, compare it with the full-information case, and assess the value of information and the effects of information asymmetry using game theoretic analysis. In our numerical studies, we conclude that the value of information is highly dependent on the capacity conditions and estimates of the retailers, and having information is not necessarily beneficial to the retailers

Value of supplier's capacity information in a two-echelon supply chain

In traditional supply chain models it is generally assumed that full information is available to all parties involved. Although this seems reasonable, there are cases where chain members are independent agents and possess different levels of information. In this study, we analyze a two-echelon, single supplier-multiple retailers supply chain in a single-period setting where the capacity of the supplier is limited. Embedding the lack of information about the capacity of the supplier in the model, we aim to analyze the reaction of the retailers, compare it with the full-information case, and assess the value of information and the effects of information asymmetry using game theoretic analysis. In our numerical studies, we conclude that the value of information is highly dependent on the capacity conditions and estimates of the retailers, and having information is not necessarily beneficial to the retailers

Asymmetric Information Mitigation in Supply Chain: A Systematic Literature Review

With the level of competition and consumer demand is changing rapidly, the speed and accuracy of the information flow in the supply chain increasingly necessary. Sharing of information between the parties in a supply chain plays an important role in improving the sustainability of a business, but imperfection information is inevitable because each party in the supply chain has a different objective. This condition increases the importance of a research on the mitigation of asymmetric information in the supply chain, therefore the purpose of this study was to conduct a review of previous studies related to overcoming the asymmetric information and map research trend on mitigating asymmetric information in the supply chain. We used systematic literature review (SLR) methods to analyze the data collected from Web of Science and Scopus database from 2005 to 2016. The results of this study can be used as a guide and a reference for further research related to overcoming the asymmetry of information in the supply chain in every industrial sector

Understanding Supply Chain Disruptions - Empirical Analysis of Supply Chain Structures

Firms have encountered an ever-increasing number of supply chain disruptions in the past decade, triggered by a wide range of natural and man-made causes. Supply chain risk management is thus an active research area, while the concerning topics mainly focused on the management at the immediate supplier level. In contrast, anecdotes reveal that shortages can oftentimes be traced back to the problems at sub-tier suppliers, i.e., tier-2 or more upstream suppliers. Further, the structure of a supply chain is not exogenously generated. For example, lack of incentives may discourage manufacturers from entering a market and create a highly concentrated industry that could be vulnerable to supply shocks and price manipulation. These two topics, the sub-tier supplier structure and impacts and the entry decisions of manufacturers are the two main themes of this thesis. More specifically, this thesis presents empirical results that improve our understanding of 1) risk propagation from sub-tier suppliers to the connected focal firms and 2) barriers to entry for manufacturers. The first part of the thesis considers the sub-tier suppliers and the network structure that connects the supply chain partners. It demonstrates the financial performance link between firms and their tier-2 suppliers respectively. It also establishes the intermediary effect of network concentration: when a firm’s tier-1 suppliers share tier-2 suppliers. The second part of the thesis focuses on the generic pharmaceutical industry plagued by the high concentration of firms in markets with expired patents. This chapter studies the key determinants of market entry decisions by generic firms and confirms the role of manufacturing process and regulatory environment. Policy simulation result shows the non-monotone relationship between the speed of the government review process and market concentration level.PHDBusiness AdministrationUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/146024/1/iriswang_1.pd

Efficient Contract Design in Multi-Principal Multi-Agent Supply Chains

We consider a general multi-principal multi-agent contracting game in a complete-information 4supply-chain setting and determine coordinating equilibrium transfer schedules in closed form.The resulting contracts manage to align incentives for decentralized decision-making and achieve first-best channel solutions. We allow for multidimensional actions and arbitrary payoff externalities between all members of the supply chain. For the coordinating contracts to exist it suffices that all payoff functions are continuous on the compact action sets in a general sense that accommodates discrete action sets. Our approach unifies and generalizes a significant portion of the extant supply-chain literature. It can be applied to a very large class of many-to-many supply-chain settings

A Game Theoretic Approach in Green Supply Chain Management

Common social issues are usually criticized considering the potential interrelationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and supply chain management. Companies and manufacturers in supply chain networks have been pressured by a growing concern for CSR from governments, organizations, and consumer, and have to bear at least some CSR under policies and regulations. However, naturally, members in a decentralized supply chain network make decisions to maximize their individual net profits. This thesis aims to allocate CSR to members in a non-integrated supply chain over time. Specifically, we formulate a model that crosses through multi-periods by a dynamic discreet Stackelberg game. We then apply control theory and calculus variations to obtain an equilibrium point at where both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken by Supply Chains are maximized. The findings of this thesis serve three subjects: supply chain management, social science, and game theory application

Coordinating Contracts in SCM: A Review of Methods and Literature

Supply chain coordination through contracts has been a burgeoning area of re- search in recent years. In spite of rapid development of research, there are only a few structured analyses of assumptions, methods, and applicability of insights in this field. The aim of this paper is to provide a systematic overview of coordinating contracts in supply chain through highlighting the main concepts, assumptions, methods, and present the state-of-the- art research in this field

Information Reliability in supply chains: The case of multiple retailers

En esta tesis doctoral abordamos el estudio relativo al intercambio de información sobre la demanda dentro de una cadena de suministro cuando las partes interactúan de una forma estratégica. Los distribuidores minoristas forman una agrupación y delegan la gestión del inventario (los pedidos y la asignación) a un planificador central benévolo (CP, por sus siglas en inglés). Cada uno de los minoristas debe enfrentarse a una demanda incierta y dispone de información privada sobre ella como consecuencia de su proximidad al mercado; nos centramos en determinar si entre los minoristas y el CP se produce un intercambio fiable de información sobre la demanda. En primer lugar estudiamos el impacto de diversos mecanismos de asignación sobre el comportamiento en materia de pedidos de los minoristas, cuando la cantidad de inventario total en el almacén central es fija. Los minoristas efectúan los pedidos después conocer de manera privada su demanda. Demostramos analíticamente que los minoristas comunicarán sus necesidades reales, es decir, sus demandas realizadas, de acuerdo a una norma de asignación uniforme pero no de acuerdo a otras normas comunes como, por ejemplo, la noma proporcional o lineal; posteriormente, estudiamos una configuración donde la cantidad de inventario agrupado no es fija, sino más bien una variable de decisión, determinada por el CP después de haber solicitado información de demanda prevista de los minoristas. Las asignación del inventario total, en este caso también, se efectúa después de conocerse las realizaciones de demanda final, pero las demandas finales son de conocimiento común. Entonces, los minoristas pueden influir su asignación solo a través de la cantidad de inventario total. Mediante modelos teóricos asociados a tácticas podemos ver que el reconocimiento de la verdad y la confianza no se encuentran en una situación de equilibrio. A continuación, en un entorno de laboratorio controlado que simula la configuración de la cadena de suministro objeto de consideración, estudiamos el impacto de a) la competencia por el inventario común y b) la incertidumbre del mercado sobre la distorsión de la información, la confianza y la eficacia de la cadena de suministro. Nuestros resultados sugieren que existe una confianza continua cuando los incentivos pecuniarios están alineados y cuando no lo están, lo que viene a desmentir los casos teóricos extremos de minoristas completamente dignos de confianza o que no son fiables en absoluto; incluso aunque la información no sea totalmente fiable, el valor de la comunicación es importante. En última instancia, estudiamos el impacto de la propiedad del inventario sobre las motivaciones de las partes implicadas de cara a compartir de manera honrada sus previsiones de demanda; los inventarios específicos tampoco inducen a decir la verdad. Comparamos los inventarios resultantes y los beneficios de acuerdo con la toma de decisiones a nivel local con información más precisa con respecto a la toma de decisiones centralizada, mediante la cual se logra la coordinación de los pedidos

An Investigation into Factors Affecting the Chilled Food Industry

With the advent of Industry 4.0, many new approaches towards process monitoring, benchmarking and traceability are becoming available, and these techniques have the potential to radically transform the agri-food sector. In particular, the chilled food supply chain (CFSC) contains a number of unique challenges by virtue of it being thought of as a temperature controlled supply chain. Therefore, once the key issues affecting the CFSC have been identified, algorithms can be proposed, which would allow realistic thresholds to be established for managing these problems on the micro, meso and macro scales. Hence, a study is required into factors affecting the CFSC within the scope of Industry 4.0. The study itself has been broken down into four main topics: identifying the key issues within the CFSC; implementing a philosophy of continuous improvement within the CFSC; identifying uncertainty within the CFSC; improving and measuring the performance of the supply chain. However, as a consequence of this study two further topics were added: a discussion of some of the issues surrounding information sharing between retailers and suppliers; some of the wider issues affecting food losses and wastage (FLW) on the micro, meso and macro scales. A hybrid algorithm is developed, which incorporates the analytic hierarchical process (AHP) for qualitative issues and data envelopment analysis (DEA) for quantitative issues. The hybrid algorithm itself is a development of the internal auditing algorithm proposed by Sueyoshi et al (2009), which in turn was developed following corporate scandals such as Tyco, Enron, and WorldCom, which have led to a decline in public trust. However, the advantage of the proposed solution is that all of the key issues within the CFSC identified can be managed from a single computer terminal, whilst the risk of food contamination such as the 2013 horsemeat scandal can be avoided via improved traceability

Coordinating Contracts in SCM: A Review of Methods and Literature

Supply chain coordination through contracts has been a burgeoning area of re- search in recent years. In spite of rapid development of research, there are only a few structured analyses of assumptions, methods, and applicability of insights in this field. The aim of this paper is to provide a systematic overview of coordinating contracts in supply chain through highlighting the main concepts, assumptions, methods, and present the state-of-the- art research in this field