127 research outputs found
PUF Modeling Attacks on Simulated and Silicon Data
We discuss numerical modeling attacks on several proposed strong physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Given a set of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of a Strong PUF, the goal of our attacks is to construct a computer algorithm which behaves indistinguishably from the original PUF on almost all CRPs. If successful, this algorithm can subsequently impersonate the Strong PUF, and can be cloned and distributed arbitrarily. It breaks the security of any applications that rest on the Strong PUF's unpredictability and physical unclonability. Our method is less relevant for other PUF types such as Weak PUFs. The Strong PUFs that we could attack successfully include standard Arbiter PUFs of essentially arbitrary sizes, and XOR Arbiter PUFs, Lightweight Secure PUFs, and Feed-Forward Arbiter PUFs up to certain sizes and complexities. We also investigate the hardness of certain Ring Oscillator PUF architectures in typical Strong PUF applications. Our attacks are based upon various machine learning techniques, including a specially tailored variant of logistic regression and evolution strategies. Our results are mostly obtained on CRPs from numerical simulations that use established digital models of the respective PUFs. For a subset of the considered PUFs-namely standard Arbiter PUFs and XOR Arbiter PUFs-we also lead proofs of concept on silicon data from both FPGAs and ASICs. Over four million silicon CRPs are used in this process. The performance on silicon CRPs is very close to simulated CRPs, confirming a conjecture from earlier versions of this work. Our findings lead to new design requirements for secure electrical Strong PUFs, and will be useful to PUF designers and attackers alike.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS 0923313)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS 0964641
Emerging physical unclonable functions with nanotechnology
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are increasingly used for authentication and identification applications as well as the cryptographic key generation. An important feature of a PUF is the reliance on minute random variations in the fabricated hardware to derive a trusted random key. Currently, most PUF designs focus on exploiting process variations intrinsic to the CMOS technology. In recent years, progress in emerging nanoelectronic devices has demonstrated an increase in variation as a consequence of scaling down to the nanoregion. To date, emerging PUFs with nanotechnology have not been fully established, but they are expected to emerge. Initial research in this area aims to provide security primitives for emerging integrated circuits with nanotechnology. In this paper, we review emerging nanotechnology-based PUFs
Modeling attacks on physical unclonable functions
We show in this paper how several proposed Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) can be broken by numerical modeling attacks. Given a set of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of a PUF, our attacks construct a computer algorithm which behaves indistinguishably from the original PUF on almost all CRPs. This algorithm can subsequently impersonate the PUF, and can be cloned and distributed arbitrarily. This breaks the security of essentially all applications and protocols that are based on the respective PUF. The PUFs we attacked successfully include standard Arbited PUFs and Ring Oscillator PUFs of arbitrary sizes, and XO Arbiter PUFs, Lightweight Secure PUFs, and Feed-Forward Arbiter PUFs of up to a given size and complexity. Our attacks are based upon various machine learning techniques including Logistic Regression and Evolution Strategies. Our work leads to new design requirements for secure electrical PUFs, and will be useful to PUF designers and attackers alike.Technische Universitat Munche
Slender PUF Protocol: A lightweight, robust, and secure authentication by substring matching
We introduce Slender PUF protocol, an efficient
and secure method to authenticate the responses
generated from a Strong Physical Unclonable Function
(PUF). The new method is lightweight, and suitable for
energy constrained platforms such as ultra-low power embedded
systems for use in identification and authentication
applications. The proposed protocol does not follow the
classic paradigm of exposing the full PUF responses (or
a transformation of the full string of responses) on the
communication channel. Instead, random subsets of the
responses are revealed and sent for authentication. The
response patterns are used for authenticating the prover
device with a very high probability.We perform a thorough
analysis of the method’s resiliency to various attacks
which guides adjustment of our protocol parameters for
an efficient and secure implementation. We demonstrate
that Slender PUF protocol, if carefully designed, will be
resilient against all known machine learning attacks. In
addition, it has the great advantage of an inbuilt PUF error
tolerance. Thus, Slender PUF protocol is lightweight and
does not require costly additional error correction, fuzzy
extractors, and hash modules suggested in most previously
known PUF-based robust authentication techniques. The
low overhead and practicality of the protocol are confirmed
by a set of hardware implementation and evaluations
Recommended from our members
On Improving Robustness of Hardware Security Primitives and Resistance to Reverse Engineering Attacks
The continued growth of information technology (IT) industry and proliferation of interconnected devices has aggravated the problem of ensuring security and necessitated the need for novel, robust solutions. Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have emerged as promising secure hardware primitives that can utilize the disorder introduced during manufacturing process to generate unique keys. They can be utilized as \textit{lightweight} roots-of-trust for use in authentication and key generation systems. Unlike insecure non-volatile memory (NVM) based key storage systems, PUFs provide an advantage -- no party, including the manufacturer, should be able to replicate the physical disorder and thus, effectively clone the PUF. However, certain practical problems impeded the widespread deployment of PUFs. This dissertation addresses such problems of (i) reliability and (ii) unclonability. Also, obfuscation techniques have proven necessary to protect intellectual property in the presence of an untrusted supply chain and are needed to aid against counterfeiting. This dissertation explores techniques utilizing layout and logic-aware obfuscation. Collectively, we present secure and cost-effective solutions to address crucial hardware security problems
FPGA-Based PUF Designs: A Comprehensive Review and Comparative Analysis
Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) have firmly established themselves as dynamic platforms for the implementation of physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Their intrinsic reconfigurability and profound implications for enhancing hardware security make them an invaluable asset in this realm. This groundbreaking study not only dives deep into the universe of FPGA-based PUF designs but also offers a comprehensive overview coupled with a discerning comparative analysis. PUFs are the bedrock of device authentication and key generation and the fortification of secure cryptographic protocols. Unleashing the potential of FPGA technology expands the horizons of PUF integration across diverse hardware systems. We set out to understand the fundamental ideas behind PUF and how crucially important it is to current security paradigms. Different FPGA-based PUF solutions, including static, dynamic, and hybrid systems, are closely examined. Each design paradigm is painstakingly examined to reveal its special qualities, functional nuances, and weaknesses. We closely assess a variety of performance metrics, including those related to distinctiveness, reliability, and resilience against hostile threats. We compare various FPGA-based PUF systems against one another to expose their unique advantages and disadvantages. This study provides system designers and security professionals with the crucial information they need to choose the best PUF design for their particular applications. Our paper provides a comprehensive view of the functionality, security capabilities, and prospective applications of FPGA-based PUF systems. The depth of knowledge gained from this research advances the field of hardware security, enabling security practitioners, researchers, and designers to make wise decisions when deciding on and implementing FPGA-based PUF solutions.publishedVersio
- …