Paracomplete logics which are dual to the paraconsistent logics L3A and L3B

In 2016 Beziau, introduce a more restricted concept of paraconsistency, namely the genuine paraconsistency. He calls genuine paraconsistent logic those logic rejecting φ, ¬φ |- ψ and |- ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ). In that paper the author analyzes, among the three-valued logics, which of these logics satisfy this property. If we consider multiple-conclusion consequence relations, the dual properties of those above mentioned are: |- φ, ¬φ, and ¬(ψ ∨ ¬ψ) |- . We call genuine paracomplete logics those rejecting the mentioned properties. We present here an analysis of the three-valued genuine paracomplete logics

What is a Paraconsistent Logic?

Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that reject the classical principle, usually dubbed Explosion, that a contradiction implies everything. However, the received view about paraconsistency focuses only the inferential version of Explosion, which is concerned with formulae, thereby overlooking other possible accounts. In this paper, we propose to focus, additionally, on a meta-inferential version of Explosion, i.e. which is concerned with inferences or sequents. In doing so, we will offer a new characterization of paraconsistency by means of which a logic is paraconsistent if it invalidates either the inferential or the meta-inferential notion of Explosion. We show the non-triviality of this criterion by discussing a number of logics. On the one hand, logics which validate and invalidate both versions of Explosion, such as classical logic and Asenjo–Priest’s 3-valued logic LP. On the other hand, logics which validate one version of Explosion but not the other, such as the substructural logics TS and ST, introduced by Malinowski and Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij, which are obtained via Malinowski’s and Frankowski’s q- and p-matrices, respectively

Negation and Dichotomy

The present contribution might be regarded as a kind of defense of the common sense in logic. It is demonstrated that if the classical negation is interpreted as the minimal negation with n = 2 truth values, then deviant logics can be conceived as extension of the classical bivalent frame. Such classical apprehension of negation is possible in non- classical logics as well, if truth value is internalized and bivalence is replaced by bipartition

The critics of paraconsistency and of many-valuedness and the geometry of oppositions

In 1995 Slater argued both against Priest’s paraconsistent system LP (1979) and against paraconsistency in general, invoking the fundamental opposition relations ruling the classical logical square. Around 2002 Béziau constructed a double defence of paraconsistency (logical and philosophical), relying, in its philosophical part, on Sesmat’s (1951) and Blanche’s (1953) “logical hexagon”, a geometrical, conservative extension of the logical square, and proposing a new (tridimensional) “solid of opposition”, meant to shed new light on the point raised by Slater. By using n-opposition theory (NOT) we analyse Beziau’s anti-Slater move and show both its right intuitions and its technical limits. Moreover, we suggest that Slater’s criticism is much akin to a well-known one by Suszko (1975) against the conceivability of many-valued logics. This last criticism has been addressed by Malinowski (1990) and Shramko and Wansing (2005), who developed a family of tenable logical counter-examples to it: trans-Suszkian systems are radically many-valued. This family of new logics has some strange logical features, essentially: each system has more than one consequence operator. We show that a new, deeper part of the aforementioned geometry of logical oppositions (NOT), the “logical poly-simplexes of dimension m”, generates new logical-geometrical structures, essentially many-valued, which could be a very natural (and intuitive) geometrical counterpart to the “strange”, new, non-Suszkian logics of Malinowski, Shramko and Wansing. By a similar move, the geometry of opposition therefore sheds light both on the foundations of paraconsistent logics and on those of many-valued logics

A conventional expansion of first-order Belnap-Dunn logic

This paper concerns an expansion of first-order Belnap-Dunn logic named $\mathrm{BD}^{\supset,\mathsf{F}}$. Its connectives and quantifiers are all familiar from classical logic and its logical consequence relation is closely connected to the one of classical logic. Results that convey this close connection are established. Classical laws of logical equivalence are used to distinguish the four-valued logic $\mathrm{BD}^{\supset,\mathsf{F}}$ from all other four-valued logics with the same connectives and quantifiers whose logical consequence relation is as closely connected to the logical consequence relation of classical logic. It is shown that several interesting non-classical connectives added to Belnap-Dunn logic in its studied expansions are definable in $\mathrm{BD}^{\supset,\mathsf{F}}$. It is also established that $\mathrm{BD}^{\supset,\mathsf{F}}$ is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. A sequent calculus proof system that is sound and complete with respect to the logical consequence relation of $\mathrm{BD}^{\supset,\mathsf{F}}$ is presented.Comment: 28 pages, revision of version v2 with adaptation of Appendix B to terminology and notations of arXiv:2303.0526

Borderline vs. unknown: comparing three-valued representations of imperfect information

International audienceIn this paper we compare the expressive power of elementary representation formats for vague, incomplete or conflicting information. These include Boolean valuation pairs introduced by Lawry and González-Rodríguez, orthopairs of sets of variables, Boolean possibility and necessity measures, three-valued valuations, supervaluations. We make explicit their connections with strong Kleene logic and with Belnap logic of conflicting information. The formal similarities between 3-valued approaches to vagueness and formalisms that handle incomplete information often lead to a confusion between degrees of truth and degrees of uncertainty. Yet there are important differences that appear at the interpretive level: while truth-functional logics of vagueness are accepted by a part of the scientific community (even if questioned by supervaluationists), the truth-functionality assumption of three-valued calculi for handling incomplete information looks questionable, compared to the non-truth-functional approaches based on Boolean possibility–necessity pairs. This paper aims to clarify the similarities and differences between the two situations. We also study to what extent operations for comparing and merging information items in the form of orthopairs can be expressed by means of operations on valuation pairs, three-valued valuations and underlying possibility distributions

Paraconsistency properties in degree-preserving fuzzy logics

Paraconsistent logics are specially tailored to deal with inconsistency, while fuzzy logics primarily deal with graded truth and vagueness. Aiming to find logics that can handle inconsistency and graded truth at once, in this paper we explore the notion of paraconsistent fuzzy logic. We show that degree-preserving fuzzy logics have paraconsistency features and study them as logics of formal inconsistency. We also consider their expansions with additional negation connectives and first-order formalisms and study their paraconsistency properties. Finally, we compare our approach to other paraconsistent logics in the literature. © 2014, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.All the authors have been partially supported by the FP7 PIRSES-GA-2009-247584 project MaToMUVI. Besides, Ertola was supported by FAPESP LOGCONS Project, Esteva and Godo were supported by the Spanish project TIN2012-39348-C02-01, Flaminio was supported by the Italian project FIRB 2010 (RBFR10DGUA_02) and Noguera was suported by the grant P202/10/1826 of the Czech Science Foundation.Peer reviewe