23 research outputs found
Robust Authenticated-Encryption: AEZ and the Problem that it Solves
With a scheme for \textit{robust} authenticated-encryption a user can select an arbitrary value and then encrypt a plaintext of any length into a ciphertext that\u27s characters longer. The scheme must provide all the privacy and authenticity possible for the requested~. We formalize and investigate this idea, and construct a well-optimized solution, AEZ, from the AES round function. Our scheme encrypts strings at almost the same rate as OCB-AES or CTR-AES (on Haswell, AEZ has a peak speed of about 0.7 cpb). To accomplish this we employ an approach we call \textit{prove-then-prune}: prove security and then instantiate with a \textit{scaled-down}
primitive (e.g., reducing rounds for blockcipher calls)
Disk Encryption: Do We Need to Preserve Length?
In the last one-and-a-half decade there has been a lot of activity towards development of cryptographic techniques for disk
encryption. It has been almost canonised that an encryption scheme suitable for the application of disk encryption must be
length preserving, i.e., it rules out the use of schemes like authenticated encryption where an authentication tag is also
produced as a part of the ciphertext resulting in ciphertexts being longer than the corresponding plaintexts. The notion of
a tweakable enciphering scheme (TES) has been formalised as the appropriate primitive for disk encryption and it has been argued
that they provide the maximum security possible for a tag-less scheme. On the other hand, TESs are less efficient than some
existing authenticated encryption schemes. Also TES cannot provide true authentication as they do not have authentication tags.
In this paper, we analyze the possibility of the use of encryption schemes where length expansion is produced for
the purpose of disk encryption. On the negative side, we argue that nonce based authenticated encryption schemes are not appropriate
for this application. On the positive side, we demonstrate that deterministic authenticated encryption (DAE) schemes may
have more advantages than disadvantages compared to a TES when used for disk encryption. Finally, we propose a new deterministic
authenticated encryption scheme called BCTR which is suitable for this purpose. We provide the full specification of BCTR, prove
its security and also report an efficient implementation in reconfigurable hardware. Our experiments suggests that BCTR performs
significantly better than existing TESs and existing DAE schemes
Tweakable HCTR: A BBB Secure Tweakable Enciphering Scheme
\textsf{HCTR}, proposed by Wang et al., is one of the most efficient candidates of tweakable enciphering schemes that turns an -bit block cipher into a variable input length tweakable block cipher. Wang et al. have shown that \textsf{HCTR} offers a cubic security bound against all adaptive chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext adversaries. Later in FSE 2008, Chakraborty and Nandi have improved its bound to , where is the total number of blocks queried and is the block size of the block cipher. In this paper, we propose \textbf{tweakable \textsf{HCTR}} that turns an -bit tweakable block cipher to a variable input length tweakable block cipher by replacing all the block cipher calls of \textsf{HCTR} with tweakable block cipher. We show that when there is no repetition of the tweak, tweakable \textsf{HCTR} enjoys the optimal security against all adaptive chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext adversaries. However, if the repetition of the tweak is limited, then the security of the construction remains close to the security bound in no repetition of the tweak case. Hence, it gives a graceful security degradation with the maximum number of repetition of tweaks
ZCZ - Achieving n-bit SPRP Security with a Minimal Number of Tweakable-block-cipher Calls
Strong Pseudo-random Permutations (SPRPs) are important for various applications. In general, it is desirable to base an SPRP on a single-keyed primitive for minimizing the implementation costs. For constructions built on classical block ciphers, Nandi showed at ASIACRYPT\u2715 that at least two calls to the primitive per processed message block are required for SPRP security, assuming that all further operations are linear. The ongoing trend of using tweakable block ciphers as primitive has already led to MACs or encryption modes with high security and efficiency properties. Thus, three interesting research questions are hovering in the domain of SPRPs: (1) if and to which extent the bound of two calls per block can be reduced with a tweakable block cipher, (2) how concrete constructions could be realized, and (3) whether full -bit security is achievable from primitives with -bit state size.
The present work addresses all three questions. Inspired by Iwata et al.\u27s ZHash proposal at CRYPTO\u2717, we propose the ZCZ (ZHash-Counter-ZHash) construction, a single-key variable-input-length SPRP based on a single tweakable block cipher whose tweak length is at least its state size. ZCZ possesses close to optimal properties with regards to both performance and security: not only does it require only asymptotically calls to the primitive for -block messages, but we also show that this figure is close to the minimum by an PRP distinguishing attack on any construction with tweak size of bits and fewer than calls to the same primitive. Moreover, it provides optimal -bit security for a primitive with -bit state and tweak size
Another Look at XCB
XCB is a tweakable enciphering scheme (TES) which was first proposed in 2004. The scheme was modified in 2007. We call these
two versions of XCB as XCBv1 and XCBv2 respectively. XCBv2 was later proposed as a standard for encryption of sector oriented
storage media in IEEE-std 1619.2 2010. There is no known proof of security for XCBv1 but the authors provided a concrete security bound for XCBv2 and
a ``proof\u27\u27 for justifying the bound. In this paper we show that XCBv2 is not secure as a TES by showing an easy distinguishing attack on it.
For XCBv2 to be secure, the message space should contain only messages whose lengths are multiples of the block length of the block cipher.
For such restricted message spaces also, the bound that the authors claim is not justified. We show this by pointing out some errors in the proof.
For XCBv2 on full block messages, we provide a new security analysis. The resulting bound that can be proved
is much worse than what has been claimed by the authors.
Further, we provide the first concrete security bound for XCBv1, which holds for all message lengths. In terms of known security bounds,
both XCBv1 and XCBv2 are worse compared to existing alternative TES
Authenticated Encryption with Small Stretch (or, How to Accelerate AERO)
Standard form of authenticated encryption (AE) requires the ciphertext to be expanded by
the nonce and the authentication tag. These expansions can be problematic
when messages are relatively short and communication cost is high.
To overcome the problem we propose a new form of AE scheme, MiniAE, which expands the ciphertext only by the single variable integrating nonce and tag.
An important feature of MiniAE is that it requires the receiver to be stateful not only for detecting replays but also for detecting forgery of any type.
McGrew and Foley already proposed a scheme having this feature, called AERO, however,
there is no formal security guarantee based on the provable security framework.
We provide a provable security analysis for MiniAE, and
show several provably-secure schemes using standard symmetric crypto primitives.
This covers a generalization of AERO, hence our results imply a provable security of AERO.
Moreover, one of our schemes has a similar structure as OCB mode of operation and enables rate-1 operation, i.e. only one blockcipher call to process one input block. This implies that the computation cost of MiniAE can be as small as encryption-only schemes
Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors
We present HBSH, a simple construction for tweakable length-preserving encryption which supports the fastest options for hashing and stream encryption for processors without AES or other crypto instructions, with a provable quadratic advantage bound. Our composition Adiantum uses NH, Poly1305, XChaCha12, and a single AES invocation. On an ARM Cortex-A7 processor, Adiantum decrypts 4096-byte messages at 10.6 cycles per byte, over five times faster than AES-256-XTS, with a constant-time implementation. We also define HPolyC which is simpler and has excellent key agility at 13.6 cycles per byte
Key Committing Security of AEZ and More
For an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) scheme, the key committing security refers to the security notion of whether the adversary can produce a pair of distinct input tuples, including the key, that result in the same output. While the key committing security of various nonce-based AEAD schemes is known, the security analysis of Robust AE (RAE) is largely unexplored. In particular, we are interested in the key committing security of AEAD schemes built on the Encode-then-Encipher (EtE) approach from a wide block cipher. We first consider AEZ v5, the classical and the first dedicated RAE that employs the EtE approach. We focus our analysis on the core part of AEZ to show our best attacks depending on the length of the ciphertext expansion. In the general case where the Tweakable Block Cipher (TBC) is assumed to be ideal, we show a birthday attack and a matching provable security result. AEZ adopts a simpler key schedule and the prove-then-prune approach in the full specification, and we show a practical attack against it by exploiting the simplicity of the key schedule. The complexity is 227, and we experimentally verify the correctness with a concrete example. We also cover two AEAD schemes based on EtE. One is built on Adiantum, and the other one is built on HCTR2, which are two wide block ciphers that are used in real applications. We present key committing attacks against these schemes when used in EtE and matching proofs for particular cases
How to Build Fully Secure Tweakable Blockciphers from Classical Blockciphers
This paper focuses on building a tweakable blockcipher from a classical blockcipher whose input and output wires all have a size of bits. The main goal is to achieve full security. Such a tweakable blockcipher was proposed by Mennink at FSE\u2715, and it is also the only tweakable blockcipher so far that claimed full security to our best knowledge. However, we find a key-recovery attack on Mennink\u27s proposal (in the proceeding version) with a complexity of about adversarial queries. The attack well demonstrates that Mennink\u27s proposal has at most security, and therefore invalidates its security claim. In this paper, we study a construction of tweakable blockciphers denoted as that is built on invocations of a blockcipher and additional simple XOR operations. As proven in previous work, at least two invocations of blockcipher with linear mixing are necessary to possibly bypass the birthday-bound barrier of security, we carry out an investigation on the instances of with , and find highly efficient tweakable blockciphers , , , that achieve provable security. Each of these tweakable blockciphers uses two invocations of a blockcipher, one of which uses a tweak-dependent key generated by XORing the tweak to the key (or to a secret subkey derived from the key). We point out the provable security of these tweakable blockciphers is obtained in the ideal blockcipher model due to the usage of the tweak-dependent key