The External Tape Hypothesis: a Turing machine based approach to cognitive computation

The symbol processing or "classical cognitivist" approach to mental computation suggests that the cognitive architecture operates rather like a digital computer. The components of the architecture are input, output and central systems. The input and output systems communicate with both the internal and external environments of the cognizer and transmit codes to and from the rule governed, central processing system which operates on structured representational expressions in the internal environment. The connectionist approach, by contrast, suggests that the cognitive architecture should be thought of as a network of interconnected neuron-like processing elements (nodes) which operates rather like a brain. Connectionism distinguishes input, output and central or "hidden" layers of nodes. Connectionists claim that internal processing consists not of the rule governed manipulation of structured symbolic expressions, but of the excitation and inhibition of activity and the alteration of connection strengths via message passing within and between layers of nodes in the network. A central claim of the thesis is that neither symbol processing nor connectionism provides an adequate characterization of the role of the external environment in cognitive computation. An alternative approach, called the External Tape Hypothesis (ETH), is developed which claims, on the basis of Turing's analysis of routine computation, that the Turing machine model can be used as the basis for a theory which includes the environment as an essential part of the cognitive architecture. The environment is thought of as the tape, and the brain as the control of a Turing machine. Finite state automata, Turing machines, and universal Turing machines are described, including details of Turing's original universal machine construction. A short account of relevant aspects of the history of digital computation is followed by a critique of the symbol processing approach as it is construed by influential proponents such as Allen Newell and Zenon Pylyshyn among others. The External Tape Hypothesis is then developed as an alternative theoretical basis. In the final chapter, the ETH is combined with the notion of a self-describing Turing machine to provide the basis for an account of thinking and the development of internal representations

Implementation as Resemblance

This paper advertises a new account of computational implementation. According to the resemblance account, implementation is a matter of resembling a computational architecture. The resemblance account departs from previous theories by denying that computational architectures are exhausted by their formal, mathematical features. Instead, they are taken to be permeated with causality, spatiotemporality, and other non-mathematical features. I argue that this approach comports well with computer scientific practice, and offers a novel response to so-called triviality arguments

The Computability-Theoretic Content of Emergence

In dealing with emergent phenomena, a common task is to identify useful descriptions of them in terms of the underlying atomic processes, and to extract enough computational content from these descriptions to enable predictions to be made. Generally, the underlying atomic processes are quite well understood, and (with important exceptions) captured by mathematics from which it is relatively easy to extract algorithmic con- tent. A widespread view is that the difficulty in describing transitions from algorithmic activity to the emergence associated with chaotic situations is a simple case of complexity outstripping computational resources and human ingenuity. Or, on the other hand, that phenomena transcending the standard Turing model of computation, if they exist, must necessarily lie outside the domain of classical computability theory. In this article we suggest that much of the current confusion arises from conceptual gaps and the lack of a suitably fundamental model within which to situate emergence. We examine the potential for placing emer- gent relations in a familiar context based on Turing's 1939 model for interactive computation over structures described in terms of reals. The explanatory power of this model is explored, formalising informal descrip- tions in terms of mathematical definability and invariance, and relating a range of basic scientific puzzles to results and intractable problems in computability theory

Autopoietic-extended architecture: can buildings think?

To incorporate bioremedial functions into the performance of buildings and to balance generative architecture's dominant focus on computational programming and digital fabrication, this thesis first hybridizes theories of autopoiesis into extended cognition in order to research biological domains that include synthetic biology and biocomputation. Under the rubric of living technology I survey multidisciplinary fields to gather perspective for student design of bioremedial and/or metabolic components in generative architecture where generative not only denotes the use of computation but also includes biochemical, biomechanical, and metabolic functions. I trace computation and digital simulations back to Alan Turing's early 1950s Morphogenetic drawings, reaction-diffusion algorithms, and pioneering artificial intelligence (AI) in order to establish generative architecture's point of origin. I ask provocatively: Can buildings think? as a question echoing Turing's own "Can machines think?" Thereafter, I anticipate not only future bioperformative materials but also theories capable of underpinning strains of metabolic intelligences made possible via AI, synthetic biology, and living technology. I do not imply that metabolic architectural intelligence will be like human cognition. I suggest, rather, that new research and pedagogies involving the intelligence of bacteria, plants, synthetic biology, and algorithms define approaches that generative architecture should take in order to source new forms of autonomous life that will be deployable as corrective environmental interfaces. I call the research protocol autopoietic-extended design, theorizing it as an operating system (OS), a research methodology, and an app schematic for design studios and distance learning that makes use of in-field, e-, and m-learning technologies. A quest of this complexity requires scaffolding for coordinating theory-driven teaching with practice-oriented learning. Accordingly, I fuse Maturana and Varela's biological autopoiesis and its definitions of minimal biological life with Andy Clark's hypothesis of extended cognition and its cognition-to-environment linkages. I articulate a generative design strategy and student research method explained via architectural history interpreted from Louis Sullivan's 1924 pedagogical drawing system, Le Corbusier's Modernist pronouncements, and Greg Lynn's Animate Form. Thus, autopoietic-extended design organizes thinking about the generation of ideas for design prior to computational production and fabrication, necessitating a fresh relationship between nature/science/technology and design cognition. To systematize such a program requires the avoidance of simple binaries (mind/body, mind/nature) as well as the stationing of tool making, technology, and architecture within the ream of nature. Hence, I argue, in relation to extended phenotypes, plant-neurobiology, and recent genetic research: Consequently, autopoietic-extended design advances design protocols grounded in morphology, anatomy, cognition, biology, and technology in order to appropriate metabolic and intelligent properties for sensory/response duty in buildings. At m-learning levels smartphones, social media, and design apps source data from nature for students to mediate on-site research by extending 3D pedagogical reach into new university design programs. I intend the creation of a dialectical investigation of animal/human architecture and computational history augmented by theory relevant to current algorithmic design and fablab production. The autopoietic-extended design dialectic sets out ways to articulate opposition/differences outside the Cartesian either/or philosophy in order to prototype metabolic architecture, while dialectically maintaining: Buildings can think

Information Processing, Computation and Cognition

Computation and information processing are among the most fundamental notions in cognitive science. They are also among the most imprecisely discussed. Many cognitive scientists take it for granted that cognition involves computation, information processing, or both – although others disagree vehemently. Yet different cognitive scientists use ‘computation’ and ‘information processing’ to mean different things, sometimes without realizing that they do. In addition, computation and information processing are surrounded by several myths; first and foremost, that they are the same thing. In this paper, we address this unsatisfactory state of affairs by presenting a general and theory-neutral account of computation and information processing. We also apply our framework by analyzing the relations between computation and information processing on one hand and classicism and connectionism/computational neuroscience on the other. We defend the relevance to cognitive science of both computation, at least in a generic sense, and information processing, in three important senses of the term. Our account advances several foundational debates in cognitive science by untangling some of their conceptual knots in a theory-neutral way. By leveling the playing field, we pave the way for the future resolution of the debates’ empirical aspects

Artificial Brains and Hybrid Minds

The paper develops two related thought experiments exploring variations on an ‘animat’ theme. Animats are hybrid devices with both artificial and biological components. Traditionally, ‘components’ have been construed in concrete terms, as physical parts or constituent material structures. Many fascinating issues arise within this context of hybrid physical organization. However, within the context of functional/computational theories of mentality, demarcations based purely on material structure are unduly narrow. It is abstract functional structure which does the key work in characterizing the respective ‘components’ of thinking systems, while the ‘stuff’ of material implementation is of secondary importance. Thus the paper extends the received animat paradigm, and investigates some intriguing consequences of expanding the conception of bio-machine hybrids to include abstract functional and semantic structure. In particular, the thought experiments consider cases of mind-machine merger where there is no physical Brain-Machine Interface: indeed, the material human body and brain have been removed from the picture altogether. The first experiment illustrates some intrinsic theoretical difficulties in attempting to replicate the human mind in an alternative material medium, while the second reveals some deep conceptual problems in attempting to create a form of truly Artificial General Intelligence

Morphological Computing as Logic Underlying Cognition in Human, Animal, and Intelligent Machine

This work examines the interconnections between logic, epistemology, and sciences within the Naturalist tradition. It presents a scheme that connects logic, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and cognition, emphasizing scale-invariant, self-organizing dynamics across organizational tiers of nature. The inherent logic of agency exists in natural processes at various levels, under information exchanges. It applies to humans, animals, and artifactual agents. The common human-centric, natural language-based logic is an example of complex logic evolved by living organisms that already appears in the simplest form at the level of basal cognition of unicellular organisms. Thus, cognitive logic stems from the evolution of physical, chemical, and biological logic. In a computing nature framework with a self-organizing agency, innovative computational frameworks grounded in morphological/physical/natural computation can be used to explain the genesis of human-centered logic through the steps of naturalized logical processes at lower levels of organization. The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis of living agents is essential for understanding the emergence of human-level logic and the relationship between logic and information processing/computational epistemology. We conclude that more research is needed to elucidate the details of the mechanisms linking natural phenomena with the logic of agency in nature.Comment: 20 pages, no figure