Combinatorial Auction-Based Virtual Machine Provisioning And Allocation In Clouds

Current cloud providers use fixed-price based mechanisms to allocate Virtual Machine (VM) instances to their users. But economic theory states that when there are large amount of resources to be allocated to large number of users, auctions are the most efficient allocation mechanisms. Auctions achieve efficiency of allocation and also maximize the providers\u27 revenue, which a fixed-price based mechanism is unable to do. We argue that combinatorial auctions are best suited for the problem of VM provisioning and allocation in clouds, since they provide the users with the most flexible way to express their requirements. In combinatorial auctions, users bid for bundles of items rather than individual ones, therefore they are able to express whether the items they require are complementary to each other. The objective of this Ph.D. dissertation is to design, study, and implement combinatorial auction-based mechanisms for efficient provisioning and allocation of VM instances in clouds. The central hypothesis is that allocation efficiency and revenue maximization can be obtained by inducing users to fully express and truthfully report their preferences to the system. The rationale for our research is that, once efficient resource provisioning and allocation mechanisms that take into account the incentives of the users and cloud providers are developed and implemented, it will become more efficient to utilize cloud computing environments for solving challenging problems in business, science and engineering. In this dissertation, we present three combinatorial auction-based offline mechanisms to provision and allocation VM instances in clouds. We also present an online mechanism for dynamic provisioning of virtual machine instances in clouds. Finally, we designed an efficient bidding algorithm to assist users submitting bids to combinatorial auction-based mechanisms to execute parallel jobs the cloud. We outline our contribution and possible direction for future research in this field

Pricing the Cloud: An Auction Approach

Cloud computing has changed the processing and service modes of information communication technology and has affected the transformation, upgrading and innovation of the IT-related industry systems. The rapid development of cloud computing in business practice has spawned a whole new field of interdisciplinary, providing opportunities and challenges for business management research. One of the critical factors impacting cloud computing is how to price cloud services. An appropriate pricing strategy has important practical means to stakeholders, especially to providers and customers. This study addressed and discussed research findings on cloud computing pricing strategies, such as fixed pricing, bidding pricing, and dynamic pricing. Another key factor for cloud computing is Quality of Service (QoS), such as availability, reliability, latency, security, throughput, capacity, scalability, elasticity, etc. Cloud providers seek to improve QoS to attract more potential customers; while, customers intend to find QoS matching services that do not exceed their budget constraints. Based on the existing study, a hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism, which consists of subscription and dynamic auction design, is proposed and illustrated to cloud services. The results indicate that our hybrid pricing mechanism has potential to better allocate available cloud resources, aiming at increasing revenues for providers and reducing expenses for customers in practice

Auction-Based Efficient Online Incentive Mechanism Designs in Wireless Networks

Recently, wide use of mobile devices and applications, such as YouTube and Twitter, has facilitated every aspect of our daily lives. Meanwhile, it has also posed great challenges to enable resource-demanding users to successfully access networks. Thus, in order to enlarge network capacity and fully make use of vacant resources, new communication architectures emerge, such as D2D communications, edge computing, and crowdsourcing, all of which ask for involvement of end mobile users in assisting transmission, computation, or network management. However, end mobile users are not always willing to actively provide such sharing services if no reimbursements are provided as they need to consume their own computation and communication resources. Besides, since mobile users are not always stationary, they can opt-in and opt-out the network for their own convenience. Thus, an important practical characteristic of wireless networks, i.e., the mobility of mobile users cannot be ignored, which means that the demands of mobile users span over a period of time. As one of promising solutions, the online incentive mechanism design has been introduced in wireless networks in order to motivate the participation of more mobile users under a dynamic environment. In this thesis, with the analyses of each stakeholder's economic payoffs in wireless networks, the auction-based online incentive mechanisms are proposed to achieve resource allocations, participant selections, and payment determinations in two wireless networks, i.e., Crowdsensing and mobile edge computing. In particular, i) an online incentive mechanism is designed to guarantee Quality of Information of each arriving task in mobile crowdsensing networks, followed by an enhanced online strategy which could further improves the competitive ratio; ii) an online incentive mechanism jointly considering communication and computation resource allocations in collaborative edge computing networks is proposed based on the primal-dual theory; iii) to deal with the nonlinear issue in edge computing networks, an nonlinear online incentive mechanism under energy budget constraints of mobile users is designed based on the Maximal-in-Distributional Range framework; and iv) inspired by the recent development of deep learning techniques, a deep incentive mechanism with the budget balance of each mobile user is proposed to maximize the net revenue of service providers by leveraging the multi-task machine learning model. Both theoretical analyses and numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the designed mechanisms

Evolutionary Solutions and Internet Applications for Algorithmic Game Theory

The growing pervasiveness of the internet has created a new class of algorithmic problems: those in which the strategic interaction of autonomous, self-interested entities must be accounted for. So motivated, we seek to (1) use game theoretic models and techniques to study practical problems in load balancing, data streams and internet traffic congestion, and (2) demonstrate the usefulness of evolutionary game theory's adaptive learning model as an analytical and evaluative tool.First we consider the evolutionary game theory concept of stochastic stability, and propose the price of stochastic anarchy as an alternative to the price of anarchy for quantifying the cost of having no central authority. Unlike Nash equilibria, stochastically stable states are the result of natural dynamics of large populations of computationally bounded agents, and are resilient to small perturbations from ideal play. To illustrate the utility of stochastic stability, we study the load balancing game on related machines, which has an unbounded price of anarchy, even in the case of two jobs and two machines. We show that in contrast, even in the general case, the price of stochastic anarchy is bounded.Next, we propose auction-based mechanisms for admission control of continuous queries to a Data Stream Management System. When submitting a query, each user also submits a bid: how much she is willing to pay for her query to run. Our mechanisms must admit queries and set payments in a way that maximizes system revenue while incentivizing customers to use the system honestly. We propose several manipulation-resistant payment mechanisms and prove that one guarantees a profit close to a standard profit benchmark, and the others perform well experimentally.Finally, we study the long standing problem of congestion control at bottleneck routers on the internet. We examine the effectiveness of commonly-used queuing policies when each network endpoint is self-interested and has no information about the other endpoints' actions or preferences. By employing evolutionary game theory, we find that while bottleneck routers face heavy congestion at stochastically stable states under policies being currently deployed, a practical policy that was recently proposed yields fair and efficient conditions with no congestion

Geo-distributed Edge and Cloud Resource Management for Low-latency Stream Processing

The proliferation of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices is rapidly increasing the demands for efficient processing of low latency stream data generated close to the edge of the network. Edge Computing provides a layer of infrastructure to fill latency gaps between the IoT devices and the back-end cloud computing infrastructure. A large number of IoT applications require continuous processing of data streams in real-time. Edge computing-based stream processing techniques that carefully consider the heterogeneity of the computing and network resources available in the geo-distributed infrastructure provide significant benefits in optimizing the throughput and end-to-end latency of the data streams. Managing geo-distributed resources operated by individual service providers raises new challenges in terms of effective global resource sharing and achieving global efficiency in the resource allocation process. In this dissertation, we present a distributed stream processing framework that optimizes the performance of stream processing applications through a careful allocation of computing and network resources available at the edge of the network. The proposed approach differentiates itself from the state-of-the-art through its careful consideration of data locality and resource constraints during physical plan generation and operator placement for the stream queries. Additionally, it considers co-flow dependencies that exist between the data streams to optimize the network resource allocation through an application-level rate control mechanism. The proposed framework incorporates resilience through a cost-aware partial active replication strategy that minimizes the recovery cost when applications incur failures. The framework employs a reinforcement learning-based online learning model for dynamically determining the level of parallelism to adapt to changing workload conditions. The second dimension of this dissertation proposes a novel model for allocating computing resources in edge and cloud computing environments. In edge computing environments, it allows service providers to establish resource sharing contracts with infrastructure providers apriori in a latency-aware manner. In geo-distributed cloud environments, it allows cloud service providers to establish resource sharing contracts with individual datacenters apriori for defined time intervals in a cost-aware manner. Based on these mechanisms, we develop a decentralized implementation of the contract-based resource allocation model for geo-distributed resources using Smart Contracts in Ethereum