Blockchain-based distributive auction for relay-assisted secure communications

Physical layer security (PLS) is considered as a promising technique to prevent information eavesdropping in wireless systems. In this context, cooperative relaying has emerged as a robust solution for achieving PLS due to multipath diversity and relatively lower transmission power. However, relays or the relay operators in the practical environment are unwilling for service provisioning unless they are incentivized for their cost of services. Thus, it is required to jointly consider network economics and relay cooperation to improve system efficiency. In this paper, we consider the problem of joint network economics and PLS using cooperative relaying and jamming. Based on the double auction theory, we model the interaction between transmitters seeking for a particular level of secure transmission of information and relay operators for suitable relay and jammer assignment, in a multiple source-destination networks. In addition, theoretical analyses are presented to justify that the proposed auction mechanism satisfies the desirable economic properties of individual rationality, budget balance, and truthfulness. As the participants in the traditional centralized auction framework may take selfish actions or collude with each other, we propose a decentralized and trustless auction framework based on blockchain technology. In particular, we exploit the smart contract feature of blockchain to construct a completely autonomous framework, where all the participants are financially enforced by smart contract terms. The security properties of the proposed framework are also discussed

An incentivized auction based group-selling approach for demand response management in V2G systems

Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) system with efficient demand response management (DRM) is critical to solve the problem of supplying electricity by utilizing surplus electricity available at electric vehicles (EVs). An incentivized DRM approach is studied to reduce the system cost and maintain the system stability. EVs are motivated with dynamic pricing determined by the group-selling-based auction. In the proposed approach, a number of aggregators sit on the first-level auction responsible to communicate with a group of EVs. EVs as bidders consider quality of energy (QoE) requirements, and report interests and decisions on the bidding process coordinated by the associated aggregator. Auction winners are determined based on the bidding prices and the amount of electricity sold by the EV bidders. We investigate the impact of the proposed mechanism on the system performance with maximum feedback power constraints of aggregators. The designed mechanism is proven to have essential economic properties. Simulation results indicate that the proposed mechanism can reduce the system cost and offer EVs significant incentives to participate in the V2G DRM operation

Applications of Game Theory and Microeconomics in Cognitive Radio and Femtocell Networks

Cognitive radio networks have recently been proposed as a promising approach to overcome the serious problem of spectrum scarcity. Other emerging concept for innovative spectrum utilization is femtocells. Femtocells are low-power and short-range wireless access points installed by the end-user in residential or enterprise environments. A common feature of cognitive radio and femtocells is their two-tier nature involving primary and secondary users (PUs, SUs). While this new paradigm enables innovative alternatives to conventional spectrum management and utilization, it also brings its own technical challenges. A main challenge in cognitive radio is the design of efficient resource (spectrum) trading methods. Game and microeconomics theories provide tools for studying the strategic interactions through rationality and economic benefits between PUs and SUs for effective resource allocation. In this thesis, we investigate some efficient game theoretic and microeconomic approaches to address spectrum trading in cognitive networks. We propose two auction frameworks for shared and exclusive use models. In the first auction mechanism, we consider the shared used model in cognitive radio networks and design a spectrum trading method to maximize the total satisfaction of the SUs and revenue of the Wireless Service Provider (WSP). In the second auction mechanism, we investigate spectrum trading via auction approach for exclusive usage spectrum access model in cognitive radio networks. We consider a realistic valuation function and propose an efficient concurrent Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism for non-identical channel allocation among r-minded bidders in two different cases. The realization of cognitive radio networks in practice requires the development of effective spectrum sensing methods. A fundamental question is how much time to allocate for sensing purposes. In the literature on cognitive radio, it is commonly assumed that fixed time durations are assigned for spectrum sensing and data transmission. It is however possible to improve the network performance by finding the best tradeoff between sensing time and throughput. In this thesis, we derive an expression for the total average throughput of the SUs over time-varying fading channels. Then we maximize the total average throughput in terms of sensing time and the number of SUs assigned to cooperatively sense each channel. For practical implementation, we propose a dynamical programming algorithm for joint optimization of sensing time and the number of cooperating SUs for sensing purpose. Simulation results demonstrate that significant improvement in the throughput of SUs is achieved in the case of joint optimization. In the last part of the thesis, we further address the challenge of pricing in oligopoly market for open access femtocell networks. We propose dynamic pricing schemes based on microeconomic and game theoretic approaches such as market equilibrium, Bertrand game, multiple-leader-multiple-follower Stackelberg game. Based on our approaches, the per unit price of spectrum can be determined dynamically and mobile service providers can gain more revenue than fixed pricing scheme. Our proposed methods also provide residential customers more incentives and satisfaction to participate in open access model.1 yea

Vehicle as a Service (VaaS): Leverage Vehicles to Build Service Networks and Capabilities for Smart Cities

Smart cities demand resources for rich immersive sensing, ubiquitous communications, powerful computing, large storage, and high intelligence (SCCSI) to support various kinds of applications, such as public safety, connected and autonomous driving, smart and connected health, and smart living. At the same time, it is widely recognized that vehicles such as autonomous cars, equipped with significantly powerful SCCSI capabilities, will become ubiquitous in future smart cities. By observing the convergence of these two trends, this article advocates the use of vehicles to build a cost-effective service network, called the Vehicle as a Service (VaaS) paradigm, where vehicles empowered with SCCSI capability form a web of mobile servers and communicators to provide SCCSI services in smart cities. Towards this direction, we first examine the potential use cases in smart cities and possible upgrades required for the transition from traditional vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) to VaaS. Then, we will introduce the system architecture of the VaaS paradigm and discuss how it can provide SCCSI services in future smart cities, respectively. At last, we identify the open problems of this paradigm and future research directions, including architectural design, service provisioning, incentive design, and security & privacy. We expect that this paper paves the way towards developing a cost-effective and sustainable approach for building smart cities.Comment: 32 pages, 11 figure

A survey on intelligent computation offloading and pricing strategy in UAV-Enabled MEC network: Challenges and research directions

The lack of resource constraints for edge servers makes it difficult to simultaneously perform a large number of Mobile Devices’ (MDs) requests. The Mobile Network Operator (MNO) must then select how to delegate MD queries to its Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) server in order to maximize the overall benefit of admitted requests with varying latency needs. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Artificial Intelligent (AI) can increase MNO performance because of their flexibility in deployment, high mobility of UAV, and efficiency of AI algorithms. There is a trade-off between the cost incurred by the MD and the profit received by the MNO. Intelligent computing offloading to UAV-enabled MEC, on the other hand, is a promising way to bridge the gap between MDs' limited processing resources, as well as the intelligent algorithms that are utilized for computation offloading in the UAV-MEC network and the high computing demands of upcoming applications. This study looks at some of the research on the benefits of computation offloading process in the UAV-MEC network, as well as the intelligent models that are utilized for computation offloading in the UAV-MEC network. In addition, this article examines several intelligent pricing techniques in different structures in the UAV-MEC network. Finally, this work highlights some important open research issues and future research directions of Artificial Intelligent (AI) in computation offloading and applying intelligent pricing strategies in the UAV-MEC network

Game theory for cooperation in multi-access edge computing

Cooperative strategies amongst network players can improve network performance and spectrum utilization in future networking environments. Game Theory is very suitable for these emerging scenarios, since it models high-complex interactions among distributed decision makers. It also finds the more convenient management policies for the diverse players (e.g., content providers, cloud providers, edge providers, brokers, network providers, or users). These management policies optimize the performance of the overall network infrastructure with a fair utilization of their resources. This chapter discusses relevant theoretical models that enable cooperation amongst the players in distinct ways through, namely, pricing or reputation. In addition, the authors highlight open problems, such as the lack of proper models for dynamic and incomplete information scenarios. These upcoming scenarios are associated to computing and storage at the network edge, as well as, the deployment of large-scale IoT systems. The chapter finalizes by discussing a business model for future networks.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio