Correspondence Truth and Quantum Mechanics

The logic of a physical theory reflects the structure of the propositions referring to the behaviour of a physical system in the domain of the relevant theory. It is argued in relation to classical mechanics that the propositional structure of the theory allows truth-value assignment in conformity with the traditional conception of a correspondence theory of truth. Every proposition in classical mechanics is assigned a definite truth value, either 'true' or 'false', describing what is actually the case at a certain moment of time. Truth-value assignment in quantum mechanics, however, differs; it is known, by means of a variety of 'no go' theorems, that it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton 'uniqueness theorem' is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The conceptual implications of the resulting account are traced down and analyzed at length. In this light, the traditional conception of correspondence truth may be viewed as a species or as a limit case of the more generic proposed scheme of contextual correspondence when the non-explicit specification of a context of discourse poses no further consequences.Comment: 19 page

Popper's verisimilitude: The scientific journey from ignorance to truth

The question of truth is a broadly broached subject in Philosophy as it features along the entire historical and polemical growth of the discipline right from the time of the Ancients down to our Post-Modern era. Yet, the delimiting realization of being unable to register general success in our dogged attempts at truth and knowledge, mostly stares us blankly in the face, for matters on which philosophy endeavours to speculate on, are beyond the reach of definite knowledge.1 Our theories of the universe open up to modifications, refutations, and further propositions, evidencing a historical development in philosophical inquiry. This generally is the growth of our science, of our knowledge. This paper critically seeks to examine Popper’s notion of verisimilitude. It takes us through the scientist’s journey from ignorance to truth, and the difference between probability and verisimilitude. It addresses the relevance of the theory of content in understanding verisimilitude, under its distinctions as quantitative and qualitative. Finally, it discusses corroboration and the criteria for theory-choice

Truth, Inquiry, and the Prospect for Moral Knowledge

Recent pragmatists Cheryl J. Misak and Christopher Hookway extend and improve upon C. S. Pierce’s pragmatist ethics. Their work demonstrates that an objective, determinate truth value for morality is most successfully achieved not by a form of realism but by pragmatic consideration, which finds that truth-aimed committed beliefs lead to definite consequences. While explaining pragmatic ethics, the author believes that the important insight is the link offered between inquiry and truth. The pragmatist conception of experience opens the door to establish genuine moral knowledge once the fact/value dichotomy is dissolved—thanks in part to Quine. Although criticized on account of qualification and recalcitrant experience, the pragmatic-cognitivist project can explain away those concerns. A Piercian pragmatist ethics offers the only perspective that can accommodate the fact of pluralism without falling into relativism

A PRAGMATIC SURVEY OF HINDI IMPERATIVES

International audienceThe paper deals with different types of Hindi imperatives and aims at providing a pragmatic framework that can account for various ways of expressing commands. Although the paper is a sort of descriptive survey of Hindi imperatives, it indirectly argues, in particular, that any formal semantic theory which intends to study the phenomenon will have to take into account many of those elements of meaning of non-declarative sentences which cannot be properly dealt with in any truth-conditional analysis. A truth-conditional analysis of imperatives remains incomplete in that it does not have the necessary tools to study all the elements of meaning of imperative utterances. While a declarative sentence can be studied giving a characterization in which a sentence S is said to be true if its truth-conditions are met, an imperative sentence, in pragmatic terms, has two directional fits: first, an imperative sentence S can be thought to be true if its command is carried out by the hearer, and secondly, an imperative sentence S can be thought to be true if the speaker really intends that the hearer carry out the action. Nevertheless, none of the cases is potentially truth-conditional. They tend to be non-truth-conditional in that they carry the speaker's various commands rather than some definite state of affairs to which truth-values can be attached. The difference in meanings of various types of Hindi imperatives has been studied here in the light of pragmatic theories of meaning that take into account the speaker's intended meaning in making an imperative utterance

Epistemicism and the Liar

One well known approach to the soritical paradoxes is epistemicism, the view that propositions involving vague notions have definite truth values, though it is impossible in principle to know what they are. Recently, Paul Horwich has extended this approach to the liar paradox, arguing that the liar proposition has a truth value, though it is impossible to know which one it is. The main virtue of the epistemicist approach is that it need not reject classical logic, and in particular the unrestricted acceptance of the principle of bivalence and law of excluded middle. Regardless of its success in solving the soritical paradoxes, the epistemicist approach faces a number of independent objections when it is applied to the liar paradox. I argue that the approach does not offer a satisfying, stable response to the paradoxes—not in general, and not for a minimalist about truth like Horwich

A Local Deterministic Model of Quantum Spin Measurement

The conventional view, that Einstein was wrong to believe that quantum physics is local and deterministic, is challenged. A parametrised model, Q, for the state vector evolution of spin 1/2 particles during measurement is developed. Q draws on recent work on so-called riddled basins in dynamical systems theory, and is local, deterministic, nonlinear and time asymmetric. Moreover the evolution of the state vector to one of two chaotic attractors (taken to represent observed spin states) is effectively uncomputable. Motivation for this model arises from Penrose's speculations about the nature and role of quantum gravity. Although the evolution of Q's state vector is uncomputable, the probability that the system will evolve to one of the two attractors is computable. These probabilities correspond quantitatively to the statistics of spin 1/2 particles. In an ensemble sense the evolution of the state vector towards an attractor can be described by a diffusive random walk. Bell's theorem and a version of the Bell-Kochen_specker quantum entanglement paradox are discussed. It is shown that proving an inconsistency with locality demands the existence of definite truth values to certain counterfactual propositions. In Q these deterministic propositions are physically uncomputable and no non-algorithmic solution is either known or suspected. Adapting the mathematical formalist approach, the non-existence of definite truth values to such counterfactual propositions is posited. No inconsistency with experiment is found. Hence Q is not necessarily constrained by Bell's inequality.Comment: This paper has been accepted for publication in the Proceedings of the Royal Society of London (Proc.Roy.Soc.A) I will mail the paper's figures on request (write to [email protected]

The descriptive content of names as predicate modifiers

In this paper I argue that descriptive content associated with a proper name can serve as a truth-conditionally relevant adjunct and be an additional contribution of the name to the truth-conditions. Definite descriptions the so-and-so associated by speakers with a proper name can be used as qualifying prepositional phrases as so-and-so, so sentences containing a proper name NN is doing something could be understood as NN is doing something as NN (which means as so-and-so). Used as an adjunct, the descriptive content of a proper name expresses the additional circumstances of an action (a manner, reason, goal, time or purpose) and constitute a part of a predicate. I argue that qualifying prepositional phrases should be analyzed as predicate modifiers and propose a formal representation of modified predicates. The additional truth-conditional relevance of the descriptive content of a proper name helps to explain the phenomenon of the substitution failure of coreferential names in simple sentences

On the Truth Values of Definite Descriptions: Examining the Russell-Strawson Dialectic

A well-known critique of Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, offered by P.F. Strawson, is that a central tenet of Russell’s theory, the claim that any particular utterance of a sentence with a non-referring definite description will be either true or false, is mistaken. Strawson provides a similarly well-known argument in support of this claim which at least in part rests on an analysis of such utterances as implying or presupposing, rather than asserting, parts of the logically existential proposition that Russell takes such sentences to be. For Strawson, propositions such as ‘the x is p’ instead presuppose ‘there is an x’ rather than commit to the truth of that proposition. And fulfilling this presupposition is a necessary condition for any such proposition to have a truth value at all. In this paper, I aim to challenge Strawson’s analysis and will argue that (i) we ought to take such utterances to really be asserting the logically existential proposition Russell analyzes them as, and thus that (ii) the utterances of sentences with a non-referring definite description do have truth values. I argue that taking these sentences to be presupposing certain propositions, rather than asserting them, better takes into account certain principles about which utterances ought to be declared false by an agent given their knowledge of other propositions

The Synonymy Antinomy

Resolution of Frege's Puzzle by denying that synonym substitution in logical truths preserves sentence sense and explaining how logical form has semantic import. Intensional context substitutions needn't preserve truth, because intercepting doesn't preserve sentence meaning. Intercepting is nonuniformly substituting a pivotal term in syntactically secured truth. Logical sentences and their synonym interceptions share factual content. Semantic content is factual content in synthetic predications, but not logical sentences and interceptions. Putnam's Postulate entails interception nonsynonymy. Syntax and vocabulary explain only the factual content of synthetic predications; extrasentential reality explains their truth. Construction of logical factual content explains logical necessity. Terms retain objectual reference, but logical syntax preempts their function in explaining truth. Grasping the facts GG/gg assert entails understanding this. Understanding what GH states requires some recognition that GH must be true just because GmH, and GmH state an empirical fact. GH is standardly used to express that fact. Church's Test exposes puzzles. QMi sentences, and QTi sentences are metalogical necessities, true by syntax. Intercepting QMi creates empirical QM contingencies. Synonymy turns semantic contingencies into metalogical and lexical necessities. That transformation is syntactic, via the syntactic duality of definite descriptions. GmH is a contingent copredication, and a lexically necessary referential identity with rigidly codesignating indexicals. Metalogical sentences may be about expressional matter or what it expresses. GG has GG's semantic content, but the referent expression switches. Metalogical syntax secures truth by self-referential quotational indexing. Metalogically, referents are identified with intrasentential replica. Extrasentential identifications are metalogically irrelevan