The Neutral as Lie Detector: You Can\u27t Judge Participants by Their Demeanor

As mediators we are often faced with sharply conflicting stories. One of the advantages of mediation is that we sometimes can solve the underlying problem without determining who did what, to whom, and when. Indeed, experience has shown that mediation is not a good process for finding the truth because it has none of the tools (such as testimony under oath) used for this purpose in the judicial system. Still, mediators often spend a good deal of time and effort trying to determine who is telling the truth

Perjury by Omission

“Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?” There are few legal phrases that the layperson can repeat verbatim; this is one of them. But how many people truly understand the nuances and ramifications of testifying under oath? Many assume that if they do not provide the “whole truth” under oath, they will face a perjury charge. However, perjury is a charge often threatened but rarely used. The offense requires that the defendant willfully and knowingly make a false statement, under oath, regarding a material fact.The federal perjury statute does not contemplate a scenario in which a defendant (or declarant, deponent, witness, or interviewee) withholds truthful information in an attempt to mislead the questioner and alter the outcome of a judicial proceeding — in sum, not telling the “whole truth.” But, in Bronston v. United States, the Supreme Court considered just this situation, holding that the language of the federal perjury statute does not contemplate a defendant who intentionally omits material information. Instead, the Court broadly ruled that “literally truthful” answers are categorically forbidden from being the basis of perjury. The Court placed the burden on the questioner to elicit the desired answer from a witness when confronted with a literally truthful, yet unresponsive and misleading answer. Such an onus suggests that all questioners possess the abilities of a mind reader.This Article demonstrates that the Bronston Court created unforeseen consequences. Currently, a sophisticated defendant can dodge a perjury charge by providing a literally true answer while omitting pertinent information. Sometimes, these answers communicate a lie, but as long as they are literally truthful under the Bronston Court’s broad interpretation, a defendant could never face a perjury charge. Congress can fill the holes of this decision by amending the federal perjury statutes to criminalize those who intentionally give incomplete or misleading responses regarding material information under oath

Perjury by Omission

“Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?” There are few legal phrases that the layperson can repeat verbatim; this is one of them. But how many people truly understand the nuances and ramifications of testifying under oath? Many assume that if they do not provide the “whole truth” under oath, they will face a perjury charge. However, perjury is a charge often threatened but rarely used. The offense requires that the defendant willfully and knowingly make a false statement, under oath, regarding a material fact. The federal perjury statute does not contemplate a scenario in which a defendant (or declarant, deponent, witness, or interviewee) withholds truthful information in an attempt to mislead the questioner and alter the outcome of a judicial proceeding—in sum, not telling the “whole truth.” But, in Bronston v. United States, the Supreme Court considered just this situation, holding that the language of the federal perjury statute does not contemplate a defendant who intentionally omits material information. Instead, the Court broadly ruled that “literally truthful” answers are categorically forbidden from being the basis of perjury. The Court placed the burden on the questioner to elicit the desired answer from a witness when confronted with a literally truthful, yet unresponsive and misleading answer. Such an onus suggests that all questioners possess the abilities of a mind reader. This Article demonstrates that the Bronston Court created unforeseen consequences. Currently, a sophisticated defendant can dodge a perjury charge by providing a literally true answer while omitting pertinent information. Sometimes, these answers communicate a lie, but as long as they are literally truthful under the Bronston Court’s broad interpretation, a defendant could never face a perjury charge. Congress can fill the holes of this decision by amending the federal perjury statutes to criminalize those who intentionally give incomplete or misleading responses regarding material information under oath

As God as my witness: a contemporary analysis of theology\u27s presence in the courtroom as it relates to the oath or affirmation requirement within the Florida rules of evidence

The existence of the oath in the courtroom can be traced back thousands of years throughout history, but the use, meaning, and effect of the oath in law has changed dramatically. The oath as we know it was once a powerful truth-telling instrument that our ancestors used to call upon a higher power. It was the belief of many that the oath itself was not sworn to man or state, but rather directly to a deity. The oath has since then evolved as a result of ever changing beliefs, fueled by increasing tolerance, shaping the oath into more of a tradition, and less of an edict. For centuries, theorists have attempted to determine whether an oath in court is actually effective at accomplishing its goal. The intent of this thesis is to examine the origin of the oath all the way up to the present day. It will be through a comprehensive study of federal law, state law, case law, articles, and publications that we will better understand the oath as a truth-telling instrument that in recent times has lost its effect. From there, it will be possible to better form a solution to a problem that plagues our courtrooms: perjury, or the act of lying under oath. This thesis will seek to establish the best way for our community to actively work towards ensuring the integrity and effectiveness of our judicial system

Referenda under Oath

Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a design commonly promoted in nonmarket valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis that people who sign an oath are as likely to vote for the public good (e.g., wind energy R&D) in a hypothetical referenda as in a real one. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab.Dichotomous Choice Mechanism; Hypothetical bias; Oath; Preference revelation

You Can\u27t Handle the Truth! Trial Juries and Credibility

Every now and again, we get a look, usually no more than a glimpse, at how the justice system really works. What we see—before the sanitizing curtain is drawn abruptly down—is a process full of human fallibility and error, sometimes noble, more often unfair, rarely evil but frequently unequal. The central question, vital to our adjudicative model, is: How well can we expect a jury to determine credibility through the ordinary adversary processes of live testimony and vigorous impeachment? The answer, from all I have been able to see is: not very well

Preference Elicitation under Oath

Eliciting sincere preferences for non-market goods remains a challenge due to hypothetical bias - the so-called gap between hypothetical monetary values and real economic commitments. The gap arises because people either overstate hypothetical values or understate real commitments or a combination of both. Herein we examine whether the traditional real-world institution of the solenn oath can improve preference elicitation. Applying the social psychology theory on the oath as a truth-telling-commitment device, we ask our bidders to swear on their honour to give honest answers prior to participating in an incentive-compatible second-price auction. Results from our induced valuation testbed treatments suggest the oath-only auctions outperform all other auctions (real, hypothetical, and real-with-oath). In our homegrown valuation treatments eliciting preferences for dolphin protection, the oath-only design induced people to treat as binding both their budget constraint (i.e., lower values on the high end of the value distribution) and participation constraint (i.e., positive values rather than zero bids used to opt out of auction). Our oath-only results are robust to extra training on the auction and to consequential wording about the reason for the oath.Oath, commitment, Vickrey auction, hypothetical bias, induced values, homegrown values.

You Can\u27t Handle the Truth! Trial Juries and Credibility

Every now and again, we get a look, usually no more than a glimpse, at how the justice system really works. What we see—before the sanitizing curtain is drawn abruptly down—is a process full of human fallibility and error, sometimes noble, more often unfair, rarely evil but frequently unequal. The central question, vital to our adjudicative model, is: How well can we expect a jury to determine credibility through the ordinary adversary processes of live testimony and vigorous impeachment? The answer, from all I have been able to see is: not very well