Irresolvable Disagreement, Objectivist Antirealism and Logical Revision

Meta-ethical realism faces the serious epistemological problem of how to explain our epistemic access to moral reality. In the face of this challenge many are sceptical about non-naturalist realism. Nonetheless, there is good reason to acknowledge moral objectivity: morality shows all the signs of a truth-apt discourse but doesn’t exhibit the typical relativity inducing features. This suggests a middle-ground position, a theory that embraces the virtues of realism but does avoid its vices: objectivist antirealism. In this paper, I’ll discuss, mainly following Crispin Wright’s account of moral truth as superassertibility, a promising version of objectivist antirealism and show how to cope with notorious problems, notably those arising from the thought that moral disagreement might be possible in which nobody is guilty of a cognitive shortcoming, which contradicts the antirealist claim that moral truth is not beyond our epistemic reach. The solution is to deny the possibility of cognitively faultless moral disagreement by arguing that cognitively blameless thinkers either agree or stay agnostic and, therefore, never disagree about any moral proposition. Since assuming an agnostic stance on the part of such thinkers contradicts the antirealist’s conception of truth—even within the limits of intuitionistic logic—I’ll propose an alternative logical revision for the moral discourse: a three-valued logic with epistemically construed truth-values

In vivo wear of CAD-CAM composite versus lithium disilicate full coverage first-molar restorations: a pilot study over 2 years

OBJECTIVES To present a digital approach to measure and compare material wear behavior of antagonistic first molar restorations made of an experimental CAD/CAM composite (COMP) and lithium disilicate ceramic (LS2) in patients with reconstructed vertical dimension of occlusion (VDO) after generalized hard tissue loss. METHODS A total of 12 patients underwent complete full jaw rehabilitation with full occlusal coverage restorations made either of COMP or LS2. The first molar restorations (n = 48) were chosen for wear examination. At annual recall appointments, polyether impressions were taken, and resulting plaster casts were digitalized using a laboratory scanner. Mean observation period was 371 days for first and 769 days for second year. The resulting 96 datasets were analyzed by superimposition of 3-D datasets using an iterative best-fit method. Based on the superimposition data, the wear rates of the occlusal contact areas (OCAs) were calculated. RESULTS For antagonistic restorations made of COMP, the average wear rate was 24.8 ± 13.3μm/month, while for LS2, it was 9.5 ± 4.3μm/month in first year, with significant~differences (p < 0.0001) between the materials. In second year, monthly wear rates decreased significantly for both materials: COMP (16.2 ± 10.7μm/month) and LS2 (5.5 ± 3.3μm/month). Statistical comparison between wear time showed significant differences for both materials: COMP p < 0.037 and LS2 p < 0.001. A logarithmic fit (COMP R2 = 0.081; LS2 R2 = 0.038) of the data was calculated to estimate the wear progression. SIGNIFICANCE In patients with reconstructed VDO, restorations made of LS2 show a more stable wear behavior than ones out of experimental CAD/CAM composite. In cases of complete rehabilitation, load bearing CAD/CAM-composite restorations should be critically considered for application due to their occlusal wear behavior. However, when choosing a restorative material, not only the functional occlusal stability should be taken into account but also the prospect of minimally invasive treatment with maximum preservation of natural tooth structures

Truth as correspondence reconsidered.

Doctoral Degree. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.Contemporary philosophical investigations of truth (especially in the analytical philosophical tradition) treat the concept as a “thin concept”, and so reduce truth discourses to conceptual analysis of intentional signs (concepts, propositions) or analysis of the truth predicate by considering its logical, semantic and anaphoric function in sentences (or propositions). This reductive conception of truth neglects the importance of the conscious and intentional act of the subject and thus results in an explosion of deflationary theories, and even the quest for the elimination of truth. Contrary to the views that consider truth as a “thin” concept, I argue that a robust substantive conception of truth as correspondence is essential if we are to account for the importance of truth in philosophy and daily human existence. To account for such an understanding of truth, a philosophical investigation of truth must be explored within a wider context of the human quest for knowledge and self-transcendence. Such examination requires an explicit articulation of the cognitional theory on which a conception of truth is founded. This is because a philosopher’s conception of truth is influenced by the cognitional theory that he or she subscribes to. In other words, a philosophical investigation of truth that aims at adequate exposition must account for the conscious and intentional acts of the human subject, since the importance of the role of the knowing subject in the quest for knowledge and truth cannot be underestimated. To account for the role of the subject and the importance of foundational cognitional theory, the conception of truth as correspondence that is defended in this thesis is based on a comprehensive tripartite (experiencing, understanding and judging) cognitional structure. Moreover, an explicit examination of the cognitional theory on which a theory of truth is based is vital to establish the relation between knowledge, truth, objectivity and being (reality)

Pragmatism and the Price of Truth

Like William James before him, Huw Price has influentially argued that truth has a normative role to play in our thought and talk. I agree. But Price also thinks that we should regard truth-conceived of as property of our beliefs-as something like a metaphysical myth. Here I disagree. In this paper, I argue that reflection on truth's values pushes us in a slightly different direction, one that opens the door to certain metaphysical possibilities that even a Pricean pragmatist can love

Mind-Dependence, Irrealism and Superassertibility

Dans la section 1, j’explique pourquoi une conception Dummet-tienne du réalisme n’a de pertinence que dans certains cas particuliers. Dans la section 2, j’indique qu’il est raisonnable de penser que Crispin Wright soutient que la vérité de certains jugements dépend de notre capacité de la connaître (si et) seulement si leur vérité consiste dans le fait qu’ils sont superassertables. Dans la section 3, je souligne qu’insister, avec Dummett et Wright, sur la connaissabilité, nous empêche de voir qu’il y a d’autres formes légitimes de réalisme. Je propose une réfutation de la thèse attribuée à Wright dans la section 2, ce qui m’amène à suggérer que c’est une erreur de penser que la question du réalisme concerne essentiellement la nature de la vérité.In section 1, I explain why a specifically Dummettian conception of realism will be relevant only in a restricted range of cases. In section 2, I suggest that Crispin Wright could be read as holding that the truth of certain judgements depends on our capacity to know it (if and) only if their being true consists in their being superassertible. In section 3, I point out that insisting on knowability, as both Dummett and Wright do, prevents one from seeing that their are other legitimate forms of realism. I argue against the claim attributed to Wright in section 2, which leads me to suggest that it is a mistake to construe the realism debates as being essentially concerned with the nature of truth