528 research outputs found
SGXIO: Generic Trusted I/O Path for Intel SGX
Application security traditionally strongly relies upon security of the
underlying operating system. However, operating systems often fall victim to
software attacks, compromising security of applications as well. To overcome
this dependency, Intel introduced SGX, which allows to protect application code
against a subverted or malicious OS by running it in a hardware-protected
enclave. However, SGX lacks support for generic trusted I/O paths to protect
user input and output between enclaves and I/O devices.
This work presents SGXIO, a generic trusted path architecture for SGX,
allowing user applications to run securely on top of an untrusted OS, while at
the same time supporting trusted paths to generic I/O devices. To achieve this,
SGXIO combines the benefits of SGX's easy programming model with traditional
hypervisor-based trusted path architectures. Moreover, SGXIO can tweak insecure
debug enclaves to behave like secure production enclaves. SGXIO surpasses
traditional use cases in cloud computing and makes SGX technology usable for
protecting user-centric, local applications against kernel-level keyloggers and
likewise. It is compatible to unmodified operating systems and works on a
modern commodity notebook out of the box. Hence, SGXIO is particularly
promising for the broad x86 community to which SGX is readily available.Comment: To appear in CODASPY'1
A Survey of Trustworthy Computing on Mobile & Wearable Systems
Mobile and wearable systems have generated unprecedented interest in recent years, particularly in the domain of mobile health (mHealth) where carried or worn devices are used to collect health-related information about the observed person. Much of the information - whether physiological, behavioral, or social - collected by mHealth systems is sensitive and highly personal; it follows that mHealth systems should, at the very least, be deployed with mechanisms suitable for ensuring confidentiality of the data it collects. Additional properties - such as integrity of the data, source authentication of data, and data freshness - are also desirable to address other security, privacy, and safety issues. Developing systems that are robust against capable adversaries (including physical attacks) is, and has been, an active area of research. While techniques for protecting systems that handle sensitive data are well-known today, many of the solutions in use today are not well suited for mobile and wearable systems, which are typically limited with respect to power, memory, computation, and other capabilities. In this paper we look at prior research on developing trustworthy mobile and wearable systems. To survey this topic we begin by discussing solutions for securing computing systems that are not subject to the type of strict constraints associated with mobile and wearable systems. Next, we present other efforts to design and implement trustworthy mobile and wearable systems. We end with a discussion of future directions
Towards a Trustworthy Thin Terminal for Securing Enterprise Networks
Organizations have many employees that lack the technical knowledge to securely operate their machines. These users may open malicious email attachments/links or install unverified software such as P2P programs. These actions introduce significant risk to an organization\u27s network since they allow attackers to exploit the trust and access given to a client machine. However, system administrators currently lack the control of client machines needed to prevent these security risks. A possible solution to address this issue lies in attestation. With respect to computer science, attestation is the ability of a machine to prove its current state. This capability can be used by client machines to remotely attest to their state, which can be used by other machines in the network when making trust decisions. Previous research in this area has focused on the use of a static root of trust (RoT), requiring the use of a chain of trust over the entire software stack. We would argue this approach is limited in feasibility, because it requires an understanding and evaluation of the all the previous states of a machine. With the use of late launch, a dynamic root of trust introduced in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) v1.2 specification, the required chain of trust is drastically shortened, minimizing the previous states of a machine that must be evaluated. This reduced chain of trust may allow a dynamic RoT to address the limitations of a static RoT. We are implementing a client terminal service that utilizes late launch to attest to its execution. Further, the minimal functional requirements of the service facilitate strong software verification. The goal in designing this service is not to increase the security of the network, but rather to push the functionality, and therefore the security risks and responsibilities, of client machines to the network€™s servers. In doing so, we create a platform that can more easily be administered by those individuals best equipped to do so with the expectation that this will lead to better security practices. Through the use of late launch and remote attestation in our terminal service, the system administrators have a strong guarantee the clients connecting to their system are secure and can therefore focus their efforts on securing the server architecture. This effectively addresses our motivating problem as it forces user actions to occur under the control of system administrators
On Making Emerging Trusted Execution Environments Accessible to Developers
New types of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) architectures like TrustLite
and Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) are emerging. They bring new features
that can lead to innovative security and privacy solutions. But each new TEE
environment comes with its own set of interfaces and programming paradigms,
thus raising the barrier for entry for developers who want to make use of these
TEEs. In this paper, we motivate the need for realizing standard TEE interfaces
on such emerging TEE architectures and show that this exercise is not
straightforward. We report on our on-going work in mapping GlobalPlatform
standard interfaces to TrustLite and SGX.Comment: Author's version of article to appear in 8th Internation Conference
of Trust & Trustworthy Computing, TRUST 2015, Heraklion, Crete, Greece,
August 24-26, 201
A Taxonomy for Attack Patterns on Information Flows in Component-Based Operating Systems
We present a taxonomy and an algebra for attack patterns on component-based
operating systems. In a multilevel security scenario, where isolation of
partitions containing data at different security classifications is the primary
security goal and security breaches are mainly defined as undesired disclosure
or modification of classified data, strict control of information flows is the
ultimate goal. In order to prevent undesired information flows, we provide a
classification of information flow types in a component-based operating system
and, by this, possible patterns to attack the system. The systematic
consideration of informations flows reveals a specific type of operating system
covert channel, the covert physical channel, which connects two former isolated
partitions by emitting physical signals into the computer's environment and
receiving them at another interface.Comment: 9 page
Intel TDX Demystified: A Top-Down Approach
Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) is a new architectural extension in the
4th Generation Intel Xeon Scalable Processor that supports confidential
computing. TDX allows the deployment of virtual machines in the
Secure-Arbitration Mode (SEAM) with encrypted CPU state and memory, integrity
protection, and remote attestation. TDX aims to enforce hardware-assisted
isolation for virtual machines and minimize the attack surface exposed to host
platforms, which are considered to be untrustworthy or adversarial in the
confidential computing's new threat model. TDX can be leveraged by regulated
industries or sensitive data holders to outsource their computations and data
with end-to-end protection in public cloud infrastructure.
This paper aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of TDX to potential
adopters, domain experts, and security researchers looking to leverage the
technology for their own purposes. We adopt a top-down approach, starting with
high-level security principles and moving to low-level technical details of
TDX. Our analysis is based on publicly available documentation and source code,
offering insights from security researchers outside of Intel
Hardware IPC for a TrustZone-assisted Hypervisor
Dissertação de mestrado em Engenharia Eletrónica Industrial e ComputadoresIn this modern era ruled by technology and the IoT (Internet of Things),
embedded systems have an ubiquitous presence in our daily lives. Although they
do differ from each other in their functionalities and end-purpose, they all share the
same basic requirements: safety and security. Whether in a non-critical system
such as a smartphone, or a critical one, like an electronic control unit of any
modern vehicle, these requirements must always be fulfilled in order to accomplish
a reliable and trust-worthy system.
One well-established technology to address this problem is virtualization. It
provides isolation by encapsulating each subsystem in separate Virtual-Machines
(VMs), while also enabling the sharing of hardware resources. However, these
isolated subsystems may still need to communicate with each other. Inter-Process
Communication is present in most OSes’ stacks, representing a crucial part of
it, which allows, through a myriad of different mechanisms, communication be-
tween tasks. In a virtualized system, Inter-Partition Communication mechanisms
implement the communication between the different subsystems referenced above.
TrustZone technology has been in the forefront of hardware-assisted security
and it has been explored for virtualization purposes, since natively it provides sep-
aration between two execution worlds while enforcing, by design, different privi-
lege to these execution worlds. LTZVisor, an open-source lightweight TrustZone-
assisted hypervisor, emerged as a way of providing a platform for exploring how
TrustZone can be exploited to assist virtualization. Its IPC mechanism, TZ-
VirtIO, constitutes a standard virtual I/O approach for achieving communication
between the OSes, but some overhead is caused by the introduction of the mech-
anism. Hardware-based solutions are yet to be explored with this solution, which
could bring performance and security benefits while diminishing overhead.
Attending the reasons mentioned above, hTZ-VirtIO was developed as a way
to explore the offloading of the software-based communication mechanism of the
LTZVisor to hardware-based mechanisms.Atualmente, onde a tecnologia e a Internet das Coisas (IoT) dominam a so-
ciedade, os sistemas embebidos são omnipresentes no nosso dia-a-dia, e embora
possam diferir entre as funcionalidades e objetivos finais, todos partilham os mes-
mos requisitos básicos. Seja um sistema não crítico, como um smartphone, ou
um sistema crítico, como uma unidade de controlo de um veículo moderno, estes
requisitos devem ser cumpridos de maneira a se obter um sistema confiável.
Uma tecnologia bem estabelecida para resolver este problema é a virtualiza-
ção. Esta abordagem providencia isolamento através do encapsulamento de sub-
sistemas em máquinas virtuais separadas, além de permitir a partilha de recursos
de hardware. No entanto, estes subsistemas isolados podem ter a necessidade de
comunicar entre si. Comunicação entre tarefas está presente na maioria das pilhas
de software de qualquer sistema e representa uma parte crucial dos mesmos. Num
sistema virtualizado, os mecanismos de comunicação entre-partições implementam
a comunicação entre os diferentes subsistemas mencionados acima.
A tecnologia TrustZone tem estado na vanguarda da segurança assistida por
hardware, e tem sido explorada na implementação de sistemas virtualizados, visto
que permite nativamente a separação entre dois mundos de execução, e impondo
ao mesmo tempo, por design, privilégios diferentes a esses mundos de execução. O
LTZVisor, um hypervisor em código-aberto de baixo overhead assistido por Trust-
Zone, surgiu como uma forma de fornecer uma plataforma que permite a explo-
ração da TrustZone como tecnologia de assistência a virtualização. O TZ-VirtIO,
mecanismo de comunicação do LTZVisor, constitui uma abordagem padrão de
E/S virtuais, para permitir comunicação entre os sistemas operativos. No entanto,
a introdução deste mecanismo provoca sobrecarga sobre o hypervisor. Soluções
baseadas em hardware para o TZ-VirtIO ainda não foram exploradas, e podem
trazer benefícios de desempenho e segurança, e diminuir a sobrecarga.
Atendendo às razões mencionadas acima, o hTZ-VirtIO foi desenvolvido como
uma maneira de explorar a migração do mecanismo de comunicação baseado em
software do LTZVisor para mecanismos baseados em hardware
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