SODA-IIoT4CriticalNetworks: Keep your Trusted Gateway for sensitive infrastructure up-to-date with Blockchain

International audienceFounded on a trusted computing base EAL5+ certified and labelled “France Cybersecurity”, CrossingG ® meets the requirements of partitioning and filtering to which Information Systems of Vital Importance are subject.★Enable the controlled exchange between networks of different domains or levels of confidentiality. ★Neutralize attacks on sensitive or remote systems by controlling data flows.★Prevent data leak.★Code-designed with Bertin IT, SODA-IIoT4CriticalNetworks offers a secure way to update engine and rules

Sustainable Trusted Computing: A Novel Approach for a Flexible and Secure Update of Cryptographic Engines on a Trusted Platform Module

Trusted computing is gaining an increasing acceptance in the industry and finding its way to cloud computing. With this penetration, the question arises whether the concept of hardwired security modules will cope with the increasing sophistication and security requirements of future IT systems and the ever expanding threats and violations. So far, embedding cryptographic hardware engines into the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) has been regarded as a security feature. However, new developments in cryptanalysis, side-channel analysis, and the emergence of novel powerful computing systems, such as quantum computers, can render this approach useless. Given that, the question arises: Do we have to throw away all TPMs and lose the data protected by them, if someday a cryptographic engine on the TPM becomes insecure? To address this question, we present a novel architecture called Sustainable Trusted Platform Module (STPM), which guarantees a secure update of the TPM cryptographic engines without compromising the system’s trustworthiness. The STPM architecture has been implemented as a proof-of-concept on top of a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA platform, demonstrating the test cases with an update of the fundamental hash and asymmetric engines of the TPM

Hardware-based Security for Virtual Trusted Platform Modules

Virtual Trusted Platform modules (TPMs) were proposed as a software-based alternative to the hardware-based TPMs to allow the use of their cryptographic functionalities in scenarios where multiple TPMs are required in a single platform, such as in virtualized environments. However, virtualizing TPMs, especially virutalizing the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs), strikes against one of the core principles of Trusted Computing, namely the need for a hardware-based root of trust. In this paper we show how strength of hardware-based security can be gained in virtual PCRs by binding them to their corresponding hardware PCRs. We propose two approaches for such a binding. For this purpose, the first variant uses binary hash trees, whereas the other variant uses incremental hashing. In addition, we present an FPGA-based implementation of both variants and evaluate their performance

Deploying Virtual Machines on Shared Platforms

In this report, we describe mechanisms for secure deployment of virtual machines on shared platforms looking into a telecommunication cloud use case, which is also presented in this report. The architecture we present focuses on the security requirements of the major stakeholders’ part of the scenario we present. This report comprehensively covers all major security aspects including different security mechanisms and protocols, leveraging existing standards and state-of-the art wherever applicable. In particular, our architecture uses TCG technologies for trust establishment in the deployment of operator virtual machines on shared resource platforms. We also propose a novel procedure for securely launching and cryptographically binding a virtual machine to a target platform thereby protecting the operator virtual machine and its related credentials