Reasoning about Uncertain Information and Conflict Resolution through Trust Revision

Publisher PD

A Moorean Defense of the Omnivore?

Philosophers have offered several apparently powerful arguments against the permissibility of eating meat. However, the idea that it is okay to eat meat can seem like a bit of ethical common sense. This paper examines the attempt to adapt one of the most influential philosophical defenses of common sense –G. E. Moore’s case against the skeptic andthe idealist –in support of the omnivore. I first introduce and explain Moore’s argument against the skeptic. I then explain how that argument can be adapted to address two influential philosophical arguments against the omnivore, due to Tom Regan and James Rachels. The adapted Moorean arguments appear strikingly similar to the original. However, I argue that we should not simply assume that all Moorean arguments are created equal. Instead, I propose a set of principled criteria that can be used to test Moorean arguments on a case-by-case basis. Those criteria give the Moorean reason for optimism against the skeptic, but suggest that the Moorean’s case is much weaker against the ethical vegetarian. I conclude that the Moorean omnivore’s argument has potentially uncomfortable implications for all sides in debates about ethical vegetarianism, and illuminates important and neglected questions about the force of philosophical arguments in applied ethics

Balancing and integrating basic values in the development of organic regulations and standards: proposal for a procedure using case studies of conflicting areas

The basic aim of the report is to develop a procedure for the integration of the ethical value base of organic farming into standards and regulations. For this it is necessary to identify the core ethical value of organic production, consider their coherence and relate them to existing practice of organic food and farming. Ethical values are per se in need of interpretation. It is therefore also necessary to consider the process of decision-making, when aiming to achieve a coherent integration of such values in the structure of a standard or regulation. In line with the European Action Plan for organic food and farming from 2004 the Project EEC 2092/91 (Organic) Revision supports the idea that delegating a larger role to values and basic principles will help to harmonise the rules, provide room for flexibility in implementation and to simplify the European Regulation for organic production. It is important to include basic values in standards and regulations, because organic farming is value based and all actors/stakeholders have value expectations, including consumers who the regulation wants to protect. Standards and regulations form the basis of a virtual contract between the consumer and the producers. By following the practices set out in the standards, producers give a promise to the consumer to deliver on additional ethical values, beyond the legal minimum standards for conventional agriculture and food. The growing and globalised organic market and the involvement of large companies have resulted in renewed interest in the values and principles of organic farming. There has been concern that the organic food and farming sector is becoming more conventionalised, and has lost touch with its basic values. Thus it will no longer function effectively as a real alternative to general agriculture for consumers, producers and also for policy makers. The report analyses what core ethical value are associated with organic agriculture and should therefore be considered for inclusion in a regulation. This value base is contrasted with the existing Regulation (EEC) 2092/91 and with examples of current practice of organic agriculture in Europe. The implications of including ethical values in the structure of a regulation for decisionmaking are considered. Following on from the European Action Plan a process of total revision of the EU regulation on organic production is underway. A new European Regulation for organic production was adopted by the European Council of Ministers in June 2006 and will come into force in Jan 2009. The text of the near final proposal from December 2006 has been considered in several sections of the report. The report finishes with some conclusions and recommendations for the EU Commission and other standard setting bodies regarding the choice and roles of values in organic standard, the rules for decision-making processes in relation to integrating values, and regarding the ongoing revision of the organic regulation in Europe

Paradox Elimination in Dempster–Shafer Combination Rule with Novel Entropy Function: Application in Decision-Level Multi-Sensor Fusion

Multi-sensor data fusion technology in an important tool in building decision-making applications. Modified Dempster–Shafer (DS) evidence theory can handle conflicting sensor inputs and can be applied without any prior information. As a result, DS-based information fusion is very popular in decision-making applications, but original DS theory produces counterintuitive results when combining highly conflicting evidences from multiple sensors. An effective algorithm offering fusion of highly conflicting information in spatial domain is not widely reported in the literature. In this paper, a successful fusion algorithm is proposed which addresses these limitations of the original Dempster–Shafer (DS) framework. A novel entropy function is proposed based on Shannon entropy, which is better at capturing uncertainties compared to Shannon and Deng entropy. An 8-step algorithm has been developed which can eliminate the inherent paradoxes of classical DS theory. Multiple examples are presented to show that the proposed method is effective in handling conflicting information in spatial domain. Simulation results showed that the proposed algorithm has competitive convergence rate and accuracy compared to other methods presented in the literature

Conspiracy Theories and Evidential Self-Insulation

What are conspiracy theories? And what, if anything, is epistemically wrong with them? I offer an account on which conspiracy theories are a unique way of holding a belief in a conspiracy. Specifically, I take conspiracy theories to be self-insulating beliefs in conspiracies. On this view, conspiracy theorists have their conspiratorial beliefs in a way that is immune to revision by counter-evidence. I argue that conspiracy theories are always irrational. Although conspiracy theories involve an expectation to encounter some seemingly disconfirming evidence (allegedly planted by the conspirators), resistance to all counter- evidence cannot be justified on these grounds

Association of the CCR5 gene with juvenile idiopathic arthritis

The CC chemokine receptor 5 (CCR5) has been shown to be important in the recruitment of T-helper cells to the synovium, where they accumulate, drive the inflammatory process and the consequent synovitis and joint destruction. A 32 base-pair insertion/deletion variant (CCR5Δ32) within the gene leads to a frame shift and a nonfunctional receptor. CCR5Δ32 has been investigated for its association with juvenile idiopathic arthritis (JIA), with conflicting results. The aim of this study was to investigate whether CCR5Δ32 is associated with JIA in an UK population. CCR5Δ32 was genotyped in JIA cases (n=1054) and healthy controls (n=3129) and genotype and allele frequencies were compared. A meta-analysis of our study combined with previously published studies was performed. CCR5Δ32 was significantly associated with protection from developing JIA, in this UK data set (P(trend)=0.006, odds ratio (OR) 0.79 95% confidence interval (95% CI): 0.66-0.94). The meta-analysis of all published case-control association studies confirmed the protective association with JIA (P=0.001 OR 0.82 95% CI: 0.73-0.93). CCR5Δ32 is a functional variant determining the number of receptors on the surface of T cells, and it is hypothesized that the level of CCR5 expression could influence the migration of proinflammatory T cells into the synovium and thus susceptibility to JIA

Communal and Institutional Trust: Authority in Religion and Politics

Linda Zagzebski’s book on epistemic authority is an impressive and stimulating treatment of an important topic. 1 I admire the way she manages to combine imagination, originality and argumentative control. Her work has the further considerable merit of bringing analytic thinking and abstract theory to bear upon areas of concrete human concern, such as the attitudes one should have towards moral and religious authority. The book is stimulating in a way good philosophy should be -- provoking both disagreement and emulation. I agree with much of what she says, and have been instructed by it, but it will be of more interest and relevance here if I concentrate upon areas of disagreement. Perhaps they are better seen as areas, at least some of them, where her emphases suggest a position that seems to me untenable, but that she may not really intend. In that event, I will be happy to have provoked a clarification or the dispelling of my misunderstanding. My focus will be upon problems in her account of communal authority and autonomy, especially with respect to religious and political authority. Here my worry is that she places too much trust in trust and not enough in what I call selective mistrust