Transparency effect in the emergence of monopolies in social networks

Power law degree distribution was shown in many complex networks. However, in most real systems, deviation from power-law behavior is observed in social and economical networks and emergence of giant hubs is obvious in real network structures far from the tail of power law. We propose a model based on the information transparency (transparency means how much the information is obvious to others). This model can explain power structure in societies with non-transparency in information delivery. The emergence of ultra powerful nodes is explained as a direct result of censorship. Based on these assumptions, we define four distinct transparency regions: perfect non-transparent, low transparent, perfect transparent and exaggerated regions. We observe the emergence of some ultra powerful (very high degree) nodes in low transparent networks, in accordance with the economical and social systems. We show that the low transparent networks are more vulnerable to attacks and the controllability of low transparent networks is harder than the others. Also, the ultra powerful nodes in the low transparent networks have a smaller mean length and higher clustering coefficients than the other regions.Comment: 14 Pages, 3 figure

The limits of open acess as a regulatory yardstick in the regulation of utilities in Latin America

This paper contends that the identification of a pro-competitive agenda in the process of regulatory reform undertaken in many developing countries, particularly in the field of utilities regulation, ultimately rests on the vision held by the authority about the sources of market failures. Conventional Industrial Organization theory assumes that the exercise of market power by incumbent firms limits the access of potential competitive entrants, and therefore, government regulation should curb such power. However, the existence of market “power” is an inference from conventional “equilibrium” thinking on markets and competition, where such power is associated with the static conditions of markets, away from the efficient equilibrium epitomized by the Perfect Competition model. By logical inference, an alternative “market process” view that regards markets as entities subject to constant disequilibrium should lead to alternative normative conclusions. Under this alternative view, exploring the role of rules and institutions is essential for the analysis of “efficient” market outcomes. Such efficiency is related to the capacity of market participants to coordinate their productive activities, and complementary entrepreneurial synergies. This paper outlines an alternative network competition perspective, focused on the integration of complementary capabilities, as a regulatory yardstick. This view balances the rights of incumbent firms to exploit their rights, and the possibilities of third parties to integrate into the network concerned on a non-discriminatory basis, thereby preserving the investments of incumbents on a more equitable basis. It also explores the experience of selected Latin American countries in the development of this network competition approach.

"The global telecommunications infrastructure: European Community (Union) telecommunications developments"

[From the Introduction]. Information, electronics, and telecommunication technologies promise to create communications networks of greatly expanded capacity capable of moving messages across interconnected wired and wireless systems almost anywhere in the world. Such global systems will profoundly affect the economic and social life of all countries. For those countries and economic sectors with a history of significant involvement in electronics, computers, multimedia, and telecommunications, early and timely deployment of state-of-the-art infrastructure may be a matter of prime importance. Many individual countries have made or are making changes intended to accelerate movement toward an information society, in large part because they recognize that a strategic competitive edge in the world economy will likely depend increasingly upon the availability, use, and exploitation of information. A major participant in the information race is the European Union (EU), formerly the European Community. The Commission of the European Union (Commission) has launched a strong push to adopt a common strategy for the creation of a European information society driven by a European information infrastructure. This strategy is aimed at bridging individual initiatives being pursued by EU Member States. [1. Member States now in the Union include the following: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the Union on January 1, 1995.1

The incomplete transformation of institutions of economic policy: from clientelism to competition?

Economic policy in Turkey has gone through significant amount of transformation in the last three decades. While Turkey used to be a closed economy governed by an import-substitution industrialization strategy, starting in the early 1980s it went through substantial liberalization and privatization, and the market mechanism has gained increased importance in the allocation o

Repositioning Armenian security and foreign policy within a region at risk

Richard Giragosia

Seeds of corruption - Do market institutions matter?

Ten years into the transition, corruption is so pervasive that it could jeopardize the best-intentioned reform efforts. The authors present an analytical framework for examining the role market institutions play in rent-seeking and illicit behavior. Using recently available data on the incidence of corruption, and on institutional development, they provide preliminary evidence on the link between the development of market institutions, and incentives for corruption. Virtually all of the indicators they examine appear to be important, but three are statistically significant: 1) the intensity of barriers to the entry of new business. 2) The effectiveness of the legal system. 3) The efficacy and competitiveness of services provided by infrastructure monopolies. The main lesson emerging from their analysis: a well established system of market institutions - clear and transparent rules, fully functioning checks and balances (including strong enforcement mechanisms), and a robust competitive environment - reduces opportunities for rent-seeking and hence incentives for corruption. Both the design, and effective implementation of such measures are important if a market system is to be effective. It is not enough, for example, to enact first-rate laws if they are not enforced. The local political economy greatly affects whether a given policy reform will curtail corruption. Especially important are the following factors in the political economy: a) the credibility of the government's commitment to carrying out announced reforms. B) The degree to which government officials are captured by the entities they regulate or oversee. C) the stability of the government itself. D) The political power of entrenched vested interests. Economists in the field of industrial organization, antitrust, and regulation have long recognized these factors as potent determinants of opportunistic behavior, corruption, and"capture"of government officials. Only now are they becoming conventional wisdom among specialists in economies in transition.Decentralization,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Legal Products,Governance Indicators,Legal Products,National Governance,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies

Capacity to Compete: Recent Trends in Access Regimes in Electricity and Natural Gas Networks

Ensuring access to a truly ‘European’ energy grid for every consumer and supplier in the European Union is a core objective of the single market project. From the first wave of liberalization directives up until the ‘draft’ framework guidelines of September 2010 on capacity allocation and congestion management being prepared by ERGEG on behalf of the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the objective of the access regime in both sector is similar: to creating capacity to compete. The objective of this paper is to review and compare from a legal point of view the evolution of the EU access regime in the electricity and gas sectors. We find strong similarities for two otherwise very different sectors, as well as an influence of the electricity regime on the gas regime. The sector-specific regulatory regime, supported by the use of competition law, organises a market design in both sectors based as much as possible on short-term capacity allocation with a liquid secondary trading platforms. The imposition of UIOLI mechanisms and an increased focus on firmness of capacity is certainly the way forward but implementation still is an issue. The right portfolio of capacity durations that are to be proposed by TSOs also remains an open question. The specific features of these two commodities result however in slightly different results in practice. In electricity, the development of market coupling initiatives creates new regulatory challenges but price convergence is now in sight. In gas, the progress has been slower and efficiently functioning spot markets are yet to emerge.access regime; electricity; gas; European Union; competition law; framework guidelines

Taming the Floods: Using an Intellectual History of Chinese Hydraulic Thought to Address Contemporary Issues in China’s Water Governance

China’s current hydraulic systems are in a state of atrophy, caused by sustained damage over centuries to infrastructure that has changed very little. Added to an already weak infrastructure is a relatively new crisis of water scarcity, which is forcing the Chinese government to allocate water resources between industry, agriculture, and people. As a state accustomed to water control without the context of scarcity, the state’s current governance structures are ill-equipped to solve the current crisis in sustainable fashion. The state is reluctant to approach non-traditional methods of water governance, and this resistance can be attributed to over two-thousand years of state authority over water control. This paper seeks to pose a challenge to the existing perception of modernism in Chinese hydraulic thought