Controlled Matching Game for Resource Allocation and User Association in WLANs

In multi-rate IEEE 802.11 WLANs, the traditional user association based on the strongest received signal and the well known anomaly of the MAC protocol can lead to overloaded Access Points (APs), and poor or heterogeneous performance. Our goal is to propose an alternative game-theoretic approach for association. We model the joint resource allocation and user association as a matching game with complementarities and peer effects consisting of selfish players solely interested in their individual throughputs. Using recent game-theoretic results we first show that various resource sharing protocols actually fall in the scope of the set of stability-inducing resource allocation schemes. The game makes an extensive use of the Nash bargaining and some of its related properties that allow to control the incentives of the players. We show that the proposed mechanism can greatly improve the efficiency of 802.11 with heterogeneous nodes and reduce the negative impact of peer effects such as its MAC anomaly. The mechanism can be implemented as a virtual connectivity management layer to achieve efficient APs-user associations without modification of the MAC layer

Cross-layer design for OFDMA wireless networks with finite queue length based on game theory

This thesis was submitted for the award of Doctor of Philosophy and was awarded by Brunel University London.In next generation wireless networks such as 4G- LTE and WiMax, the demand for high data rates, the scarcity of wireless resources and the time varying channel conditions has led to the adoption of more sophisticated and robust techniques in PHY such as orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) and the corresponding access technique known as orthogonal frequency division multiplexing access (OFDMA). Cross-layer schedulers have been developed in order to describe the procedure of resource allocation in OFDMA wireless networks. The resource allocation in OFDMA wireless networks has received great attention in research, by proposing many different ways for frequency diversity exploitation and system’s optimization. Many cross-layer proposals for dynamic resource allocation have been investigated in literature approaching the optimization problem from different viewpoints i.e. maximizing total data rate, minimizing total transmit power, satisfying minimum users’ requirements or providing fairness amongst users. The design of a cross-layer scheduler for OFDMA wireless networks is the topic of this research. The scheduler utilizes game theory in order to make decisions for subcarrier and power allocation to the users with the main concern being to maintain fairness as well as to maximize overall system’s performance. A very well known theorem in cooperative game theory, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), is employed and solved in a close form way, resulting in a Pareto optimal solution. Two different cases are proposed. The first one is the symmetric NBS (S-NBS) where all users have the same weight and therefore all users have the same opportunity for resources and the second one, is the asymmetric NBS (A-NBS), where users have different weights, hence different priorities where the scheduler favours users with higher priorities at expense of lower priority users. As MAC layer is vital for cross-layer, the scheduler is combined with a queuing model based on Markov chain in order to describe more realistically the incoming procedure from the higher layers

Game Theory and Microeconomic Theory for Beamforming Design in Multiple-Input Single-Output Interference Channels

In interference-limited wireless networks, interference management techniques are important in order to improve the performance of the systems. Given that spectrum and energy are scarce resources in these networks, techniques that exploit the resources efficiently are desired. We consider a set of base stations operating concurrently in the same spectral band. Each base station is equipped with multiple antennas and transmits data to a single-antenna mobile user. This setting corresponds to the multiple-input single-output (MISO) interference channel (IFC). The receivers are assumed to treat interference signals as noise. Moreover, each transmitter is assumed to know the channels between itself and all receivers perfectly. We study the conflict between the transmitter-receiver pairs (links) using models from game theory and microeconomic theory. These models provide solutions to resource allocation problems which in our case correspond to the joint beamforming design at the transmitters. Our interest lies in solutions that are Pareto optimal. Pareto optimality ensures that it is not further possible to improve the performance of any link without reducing the performance of another link. Strategic games in game theory determine the noncooperative choice of strategies of the players. The outcome of a strategic game is a Nash equilibrium. While the Nash equilibrium in the MISO IFC is generally not efficient, we characterize the necessary null-shaping constraints on the strategy space of each transmitter such that the Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal. An arbitrator is involved in this setting which dictates the constraints at each transmitter. In contrast to strategic games, coalitional games provide cooperative solutions between the players. We study cooperation between the links via coalitional games without transferable utility. Cooperative beamforming schemes considered are either zero forcing transmission or Wiener filter precoding. We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the core of the coalitional game with zero forcing transmission is not empty. The core solution concept specifies the strategies with which all players have the incentive to cooperate jointly in a grand coalition. While the core only considers the formation of the grand coalition, coalition formation games study coalition dynamics. We utilize a coalition formation algorithm, called merge-and-split, to determine stable link grouping. Numerical results show that while in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime noncooperation between the links is efficient, at high SNR all links benefit in forming a grand coalition. Coalition formation shows its significance in the mid SNR regime where subset link cooperation provides joint performance gains. We use the models of exchange and competitive market from microeconomic theory to determine Pareto optimal equilibria in the two-user MISO IFC. In the exchange model, the links are represented as consumers that can trade goods within themselves. The goods in our setting correspond to the parameters of the beamforming vectors necessary to achieve all Pareto optimal points in the utility region. We utilize the conflict representation of the consumers in the Edgeworth box, a graphical tool that depicts the allocation of the goods for the two consumers, to provide closed-form solution to all Pareto optimal outcomes. The exchange equilibria are a subset of the points on the Pareto boundary at which both consumers achieve larger utility then at the Nash equilibrium. We propose a decentralized bargaining process between the consumers which starts at the Nash equilibrium and ends at an outcome arbitrarily close to an exchange equilibrium. The design of the bargaining process relies on a systematic study of the allocations in the Edgeworth box. In comparison to the exchange model, a competitive market additionally defines prices for the goods. The equilibrium in this economy is called Walrasian and corresponds to the prices that equate the demand to the supply of goods. We calculate the unique Walrasian equilibrium and propose a coordination process that is realized by the arbitrator which distributes the Walrasian prices to the consumers. The consumers then calculate in a decentralized manner their optimal demand corresponding to beamforming vectors that achieve the Walrasian equilibrium. This outcome is Pareto optimal and lies in the set of exchange equilibria. In this thesis, based on the game theoretic and microeconomic models, efficient beamforming strategies are proposed that jointly improve the performance of the systems. The gained results are applicable in interference-limited wireless networks requiring either coordination from the arbitrator or direct cooperation between the transmitters

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Strategic Resource Allocation Mechanisms in Edge and Fog Computing

With the rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT), cloud-centric application management raises questions related to quality of service for real-time applications. Fog and edge computing (FEC) provide a complement to the cloud by filling the gap between cloud and IoT. Resource management on multiple resources from distributed and administrative FEC nodes is a key challenge to ensure the quality of end-user’s experience. To improve resource utilisation and system performance, researchers have been proposed many fair allocation mechanisms for resource management. Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF), a resource allocation policy for multiple resource types, meets most of the required fair allocation characteristics. However, DRF is suitable for centralised resource allocation without considering the effects (or feedbacks) of large-scale distributed environments like multi-controller software defined networking (SDN). Nash bargaining from micro-economic theory or competitive equilibrium equal incomes (CEEI) are well suited to solving dynamic optimisation problems proposing to ‘proportionately’ share resources among distributed participants. Although CEEI’s decentralised policy guarantees load balancing for performance isolation, they are not faultproof for computation offloading. The thesis aims to propose a hybrid and fair allocation mechanism for rejuvenation of decentralised SDN controller deployment. We apply multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) with robustness against adversarial controllers to enable efficient priority scheduling for FEC. Motivated by software cybernetics and homeostasis, weighted DRF is generalised by applying the principles of feedback (positive or/and negative network effects) in reverse game theory (GT) to design hybrid scheduling schemes for joint multi-resource and multitask offloading/forwarding in FEC environments. In the first piece of study, monotonic scheduling for joint offloading at the federated edge is addressed by proposing truthful mechanism (algorithmic) to neutralise harmful negative and positive distributive bargain externalities respectively. The IP-DRF scheme is a MARL approach applying partition form game (PFG) to guarantee second-best Pareto optimality viii | P a g e (SBPO) in allocation of multi-resources from deterministic policy in both population and resource non-monotonicity settings. In the second study, we propose DFog-DRF scheme to address truthful fog scheduling with bottleneck fairness in fault-probable wireless hierarchical networks by applying constrained coalition formation (CCF) games to implement MARL. The multi-objective optimisation problem for fog throughput maximisation is solved via a constraint dimensionality reduction methodology using fairness constraints for efficient gateway and low-level controller’s placement. For evaluation, we develop an agent-based framework to implement fair allocation policies in distributed data centre environments. In empirical results, the deterministic policy of IP-DRF scheme provides SBPO and reduces the average execution and turnaround time by 19% and 11.52% as compared to the Nash bargaining or CEEI deterministic policy for 57,445 cloudlets in population non-monotonic settings. The processing cost of tasks shows significant improvement (6.89% and 9.03% for fixed and variable pricing) for the resource non-monotonic setting - using 38,000 cloudlets. The DFog-DRF scheme when benchmarked against asset fair (MIP) policy shows superior performance (less than 1% in time complexity) for up to 30 FEC nodes. Furthermore, empirical results using 210 mobiles and 420 applications prove the efficacy of our hybrid scheduling scheme for hierarchical clustering considering latency and network usage for throughput maximisation.Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University, Bauchi (Tetfund, Nigeria

Difference games and policy evaluation: A conceptual framework

Economics

A comparative study of game theoretic and evolutionary models for software agents

Most of the existing work in the study of bargaining behaviour uses techniques from game theory. Game theoretic models for bargaining assume that players are perfectly rational and that this rationality in common knowledge. However, the perfect rationality assumption does not hold for real-life bargaining scenarios with humans as players, since results from experimental economics show that humans find their way to the best strategy through trial and error, and not typically by means of rational deliberation. Such players are said to be boundedly rational. In playing a game against an opponent with bounded rationality, the most effective strategy of a player is not the equilibrium strategy but the one that is the best reply to the opponent's strategy. The evolutionary model provides a means for studying the bargaining behaviour of boundedly rational players. This paper provides a comprehensive comparison of the game theoretic and evolutionary approaches to bargaining by examining their assumptions, goals, and limitations. We then study the implications of these differences from the perspective of the software agent developer