8,894 research outputs found
HitFraud: A Broad Learning Approach for Collective Fraud Detection in Heterogeneous Information Networks
On electronic game platforms, different payment transactions have different
levels of risk. Risk is generally higher for digital goods in e-commerce.
However, it differs based on product and its popularity, the offer type
(packaged game, virtual currency to a game or subscription service), storefront
and geography. Existing fraud policies and models make decisions independently
for each transaction based on transaction attributes, payment velocities, user
characteristics, and other relevant information. However, suspicious
transactions may still evade detection and hence we propose a broad learning
approach leveraging a graph based perspective to uncover relationships among
suspicious transactions, i.e., inter-transaction dependency. Our focus is to
detect suspicious transactions by capturing common fraudulent behaviors that
would not be considered suspicious when being considered in isolation. In this
paper, we present HitFraud that leverages heterogeneous information networks
for collective fraud detection by exploring correlated and fast evolving
fraudulent behaviors. First, a heterogeneous information network is designed to
link entities of interest in the transaction database via different semantics.
Then, graph based features are efficiently discovered from the network
exploiting the concept of meta-paths, and decisions on frauds are made
collectively on test instances. Experiments on real-world payment transaction
data from Electronic Arts demonstrate that the prediction performance is
effectively boosted by HitFraud with fast convergence where the computation of
meta-path based features is largely optimized. Notably, recall can be improved
up to 7.93% and F-score 4.62% compared to baselines.Comment: ICDM 201
Economic Concepts of Organic Certification
Certification is a key element in marketing organic food products. Based on economic theory, this report wants to illustrate the economic reasoning for certification. The intention is to provide a description of economic concepts, which is understandable for a wider audience. We are focusing on the basic economic literature.
Chapter 1 “Organic certification system” describes the current control system in the European Union. Why this is necessary, will then be explained based on a synopsis of economic literature. Of specific significance for organic certification and the CERTCOST project are the concepts of institutional economics and economics of crime. The relevant points of economic theory will be presented and discussed in chapter 2 “Theoretical framework”. Finally, the costs and benefits of organic certification will be illustrated in chapter 3 “Costs and benefits of organic certification”
Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model
This article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991, the United States legal regime has been moving away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational liability. Under this system, organizational liability for agent misconduct is dependant on whether or not the organization has exercised due care to avoid the harm in question, rather than under traditional agency principles of respondeat superior. Courts and agencies typically evaluate the level of care exercised by the organization by inquiring whether the organization had in place internal compliance structures ostensibly designed to detect and discourage such conduct. I argue, however, that any internal compliance-based organizational liability regime is likely to fail because courts and agencies lack sufficient information about the effectiveness of such structures. As a result, an internal compliance-based liability system encourages the implementation of largely cosmetic internal compliance structures that reduce legal liability without reducing the incidence of organizational misconduct. Furthermore, a review of the empirical literature on the effectiveness of internal compliance structures suggests that many organizations have adopted precisely this cosmetic approach to internal compliance. This leads to two potential problems: first, an underdeterrence of organizational misconduct and, second, a proliferation of costly but ineffective internal compliance structures
Systemic acquired critique of credit card deception exposure through machine learning
Artigo publicado em revista cientĂfica internacionalA wide range of recent studies are focusing on current issues of financial fraud, especially concerning cybercrimes. The reason behind this is even with improved security, a great amount of money loss occurs every year due to credit card fraud. In recent days, ATM fraud has decreased, while credit card fraud has increased. This study examines articles from five foremost databases. The literature review is designed using extraction by database, keywords, year, articles, authors, and performance measures based on data used in previous research, future research directions and purpose of the article. This study identifies the crucial gaps which ultimately allow research opportunities in this fraud detection process by utilizing knowledge from the machine learning domain. Our findings prove that this research area has become most dominant in the last ten years. We accessed both supervised and unsupervised machine learning techniques to detect cybercrime and management techniques which provide evidence for the effectiveness of machine learning techniques to control cybercrime in the credit card industry. Results indicated that there is room for further research to obtain better results than existing ones on the basis of both quantitative and qualitative research analysis.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing
Following a brief overview in Part I.A of the overall system to prevent money laundering, Part I.B describes the role of the private sector, which is to identify customers, create a profile of their legitimate activities, keep detailed records of clients and their transactions, monitor their transactions to see if they conform to their profile, examine further any unusual transactions, and report to the government any suspicious transactions. Part I.C continues the description of the preventive measures system by describing the government\u27s role, which is to assist the private sector in identifying suspicious transactions, ensure compliance with the preventive measures requirements, and analyze suspicious transaction reports to determine those that should be investigated.
Parts I.D and I.E examine the effectiveness of this system. Part I.D discusses successes and failures in the private sector\u27s role. Borrowing from theory concerning the effectiveness of private sector unfunded mandates, this Part reviews why many aspects of the system are failing, focusing on the subjectivity of the mandate, the disincentives to comply, and the lack of comprehensive data on client identification and transactions. It notes that the system includes an inherent contradiction: the public sector is tasked with informing the private sector how best to detect launderers and terrorists, but to do so could act as a road map on how to avoid detection should such information fall into the wrong hands. Part I.D discusses how financial institutions do not and cannot use scientifically tested statistical means to determine if a particular client or set of transactions is more likely than others to indicate criminal activity. Part I.D then turns to a discussion of a few issues regarding the impact the system has but that are not related to effectiveness, followed by a summary and analysis of how flaws might be addressed.
Part I.E continues by discussing the successes and failures in the public sector\u27s role. It reviews why the system is failing, focusing on the lack of assistance to the private sector in and the lack of necessary data on client identification and transactions. It also discusses how financial intelligence units, like financial institutions, do not and cannot use scientifically tested statistical means to determine probabilities of criminal activity. Part I concludes with a summary and analysis tying both private and public roles together.
Part II then turns to a review of certain current techniques for selecting income tax returns for audit. After an overview of the system, Part II first discusses the limited role of the private sector in providing tax administrators with information, comparing this to the far greater role the private sector plays in implementing preventive measures. Next, this Part turns to consider how tax administrators, particularly the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, select taxpayers for audit, comparing this to the role of both the private and public sectors in implementing preventive measures. It focuses on how some tax administrations use scientifically tested statistical means to determine probabilities of tax evasion. Part II then suggests how flaws in both private and public roles of implementing money laundering and terrorism financing preventive measures might be theoretically addressed by borrowing from the experience of tax administration. Part II concludes with a short summary and analysis that relates these conclusions to the preventive measures system.
Referring to the analyses in Parts I and II, Part III suggests changes to the current preventive measures standard. It suggests that financial intelligence units should be uniquely tasked with analyzing and selecting clients and transactions for further investigation for money laundering and terrorism financing. The private sector\u27s role should be restricted to identifying customers, creating an initial profile of their legitimate activities, and reporting such information and all client transactions to financial intelligence units
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