Off-peak truck deliveries at container terminals: the 'Good Night' program in Israel

Purpose – Avoiding truck congestion and peaks in landside activity is one of the challenges to container terminal managers. The spreading of truck arrivals at terminals can be facilitated by widening the opening hours of terminals at the landside. Israel’s Ministry of Transport has instituted the “Good Night Program”, involving monetary incentives for importers and exporters who deliver containers to ports at night. Design/methodology/approach – This paper aims to quantitatively examine the market utility resulting from shifting traffic from daytime to nighttime, and analyzes customer considerations regarding nighttime transportation. Findings – The external utility found in the traffic-economics model is quite similar to the economic incentive given to customers. Therefore, a significant increase of the incentive is not feasible. Originality/value – Furthermore, it seems that an incentive method by itself is not effective enough, and does not motivate customers to act and find creative solutions to the obstacles they face. To achieve a considerable change in nighttime transport to Israeli ports, more effective methods should be examined

Network Neutrality and the Evolution of the Internet

In order to create incentives for Internet traffic providers not to discriminate with respect to certain applications on the basis of network capacity requirements, the concept of market driven network neutrality is introduced. Its basic characteristics are that all applications are bearing the opportunity costs of the required traffic capacities. An economic framework for market driven network neutrality in broadband Internet is provided, consisting of congestion pricing and quality of service differentiation. However, network neutrality regulation with its reference point of the traditional TCP would result in regulatory micromanagement of traffic network management. --Broadband Internet,network neutrality,quality of service differentiation,congestion pricing,interclass externality pricing,interconnection agreements

Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges

Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation. In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally, we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201

Network neutrality and the evolution of the internet

In order to create incentives for Internet traffic providers not to discriminate with respect to certain applications on the basis of network capacity require-ments, the concept of market driven network neutrality is introduced. Its basic characteristics are that all applications are bearing the opportunity costs of the required traffic capacities. An economic framework for market driven network neutrality in broadband Internet is provided, consisting of congestion pricing and quality of service differentiation. However, network neutrality regulation with its reference point of the traditional TCP would result in regulatory micro-management of traffic network management. --

A Sharing- and Competition-Aware Framework for Cellular Network Evolution Planning

Mobile network operators are facing the difficult task of significantly increasing capacity to meet projected demand while keeping CAPEX and OPEX down. We argue that infrastructure sharing is a key consideration in operators' planning of the evolution of their networks, and that such planning can be viewed as a stage in the cognitive cycle. In this paper, we present a framework to model this planning process while taking into account both the ability to share resources and the constraints imposed by competition regulation (the latter quantified using the Herfindahl index). Using real-world demand and deployment data, we find that the ability to share infrastructure essentially moves capacity from rural, sparsely populated areas (where some of the current infrastructure can be decommissioned) to urban ones (where most of the next-generation base stations would be deployed), with significant increases in resource efficiency. Tight competition regulation somewhat limits the ability to share but does not entirely jeopardize those gains, while having the secondary effect of encouraging the wider deployment of next-generation technologies