1,194 research outputs found
TARANET: Traffic-Analysis Resistant Anonymity at the NETwork layer
Modern low-latency anonymity systems, no matter whether constructed as an
overlay or implemented at the network layer, offer limited security guarantees
against traffic analysis. On the other hand, high-latency anonymity systems
offer strong security guarantees at the cost of computational overhead and long
delays, which are excessive for interactive applications. We propose TARANET,
an anonymity system that implements protection against traffic analysis at the
network layer, and limits the incurred latency and overhead. In TARANET's setup
phase, traffic analysis is thwarted by mixing. In the data transmission phase,
end hosts and ASes coordinate to shape traffic into constant-rate transmission
using packet splitting. Our prototype implementation shows that TARANET can
forward anonymous traffic at over 50~Gbps using commodity hardware
Evaluation of Anonymized ONS Queries
Electronic Product Code (EPC) is the basis of a pervasive infrastructure for
the automatic identification of objects on supply chain applications (e.g.,
pharmaceutical or military applications). This infrastructure relies on the use
of the (1) Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology to tag objects in
motion and (2) distributed services providing information about objects via the
Internet. A lookup service, called the Object Name Service (ONS) and based on
the use of the Domain Name System (DNS), can be publicly accessed by EPC
applications looking for information associated with tagged objects. Privacy
issues may affect corporate infrastructures based on EPC technologies if their
lookup service is not properly protected. A possible solution to mitigate these
issues is the use of online anonymity. We present an evaluation experiment that
compares the of use of Tor (The second generation Onion Router) on a global
ONS/DNS setup, with respect to benefits, limitations, and latency.Comment: 14 page
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Traffic Analysis Attacks and Defenses in Low Latency Anonymous Communication
The recent public disclosure of mass surveillance of electronic communication, involving powerful government authorities, has drawn the public's attention to issues regarding Internet privacy. For almost a decade now, there have been several research efforts towards designing and deploying open source, trustworthy and reliable systems that ensure users' anonymity and privacy. These systems operate by hiding the true network identity of communicating parties against eavesdropping adversaries. Tor, acronym for The Onion Router, is an example of such a system. Such systems relay the traffic of their users through an overlay of nodes that are called Onion Routers and are operated by volunteers distributed across the globe. Such systems have served well as anti-censorship and anti-surveillance tools. However, recent publications have disclosed that powerful government organizations are seeking means to de-anonymize such systems and have deployed distributed monitoring infrastructure to aid their efforts.
Attacks against anonymous communication systems, like Tor, often involve trac analysis. In such attacks, an adversary, capable of observing network traffic statistics in several different networks, correlates the trac patterns in these networks, and associates otherwise seemingly unrelated network connections. The process can lead an adversary to the source of an anonymous connection. However, due to their design, consisting of globally distributed relays, the users of anonymity networks like Tor, can route their traffic virtually via any network; hiding their tracks and true identities from their communication peers and eavesdropping adversaries. De-anonymization of a random anonymous connection is hard, as the adversary is required to correlate traffic patterns in one network link to those in virtually all other networks. Past research mostly involved reducing the complexity of this process by rst reducing the set of relays or network routers to monitor, and then identifying the actual source of anonymous traffic among network connections that are routed via this reduced set of relays or network routers to monitor. A study of various research efforts in this field reveals that there have been many more efforts to reduce the set of relays or routers to be searched than to explore methods for actually identifying an anonymous user amidst the network connections using these routers and relays. Few have tried to comprehensively study a complete attack, that involves reducing the set of relays and routers to monitor and identifying the source of an anonymous connection. Although it is believed that systems like Tor are trivially vulnerable to traffic analysis, there are various technical challenges and issues that can become obstacles to accurately identifying the source of anonymous connection. It is hard to adjudge the vulnerability of anonymous communication systems without adequately exploring the issues involved in identifying the source of anonymous traffic.
We take steps to ll this gap by exploring two novel active trac analysis attacks, that solely rely on measurements of network statistics. In these attacks, the adversary tries to identify the source of an anonymous connection arriving to a server from an exit node. This generally involves correlating traffic entering and leaving the Tor network, linking otherwise unrelated connections. To increase the accuracy of identifying the victim connection among several connections, the adversary injects a traffic perturbation pattern into a connection arriving to the server from a Tor node, that the adversary wants to de-anonymize. One way to achieve this is by colluding with the server and injecting a traffic perturbation pattern using common traffic shaping tools. Our first attack involves a novel remote bandwidth estimation technique to conrm the identity of Tor relays and network routers along the path connecting a Tor client and a server by observing network bandwidth fluctuations deliberately injected by the server. The second attack involves correlating network statistics, for connections entering and leaving the Tor network, available from existing network infrastructure, such as Cisco's NetFlow, for identifying the source of an anonymous connection. Additionally, we explored a novel technique to defend against the latter attack. Most research towards defending against traffic analysis attacks, involving transmission of dummy traffic, have not been implemented due to fears of potential performance degradation. Our novel technique involves transmission of dummy traffic, consisting of packets with IP headers having small Time-to-Live (TTL) values. Such packets are discarded by the routers before they reach their destination. They distort NetFlow statistics, without degrading the client's performance. Finally, we present a strategy that employs transmission of unique plain-text decoy traffic, that appears sensitive, such as fake user credentials, through Tor nodes to decoy servers under our control. Periodic tallying of client and server logs to determine unsolicited connection attempts at the server is used to identify the eavesdropping nodes. Such malicious Tor node operators, eavesdropping on users' traffic, could be potential traffic analysis attackers
Mockingbird: Defending Against Deep-Learning-Based Website Fingerprinting Attacks with Adversarial Traces
Website Fingerprinting (WF) is a type of traffic analysis attack that enables
a local passive eavesdropper to infer the victim's activity, even when the
traffic is protected by a VPN or an anonymity system like Tor. Leveraging a
deep-learning classifier, a WF attacker can gain over 98% accuracy on Tor
traffic. In this paper, we explore a novel defense, Mockingbird, based on the
idea of adversarial examples that have been shown to undermine machine-learning
classifiers in other domains. Since the attacker gets to design and train his
attack classifier based on the defense, we first demonstrate that at a
straightforward technique for generating adversarial-example based traces fails
to protect against an attacker using adversarial training for robust
classification. We then propose Mockingbird, a technique for generating traces
that resists adversarial training by moving randomly in the space of viable
traces and not following more predictable gradients. The technique drops the
accuracy of the state-of-the-art attack hardened with adversarial training from
98% to 42-58% while incurring only 58% bandwidth overhead. The attack accuracy
is generally lower than state-of-the-art defenses, and much lower when
considering Top-2 accuracy, while incurring lower bandwidth overheads.Comment: 18 pages, 13 figures and 8 Tables. Accepted in IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security (TIFS
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Approximating a Global Passive Adversary Against Tor
We present a novel, practical, and effective mechanism for identifying the IP address of Tor clients. We approximate an almost-global passive adversary (GPA) capable of eavesdropping anywhere in the network by using LinkWidth, a novel bandwidth-estimation technique. LinkWidth allows network edge-attached entities to estimate the available bandwidth in an arbitrary Internet link without a cooperating peer host, router, or ISP. By modulating the bandwidth of an anonymous connection (e.g., when the destination server or its router is under our control), we can observe these fluctuations as they propagate through the Tor network and the Internet to the end-user's IP address. Our technique exploits one of the design criteria for Tor (trading off GPA-resistance for improved latency/bandwidth over MIXes) by allowing well-provisioned (in terms of bandwidth) adversaries to effectively become GPAs. Although timing-based attacks have been demonstrated against non-timing-preserving anonymity networks, they have depended either on a global passive adversary or on the compromise of a substantial number of Tor nodes. Our technique does not require compromise of any Tor nodes or collaboration of the end-server (for some scenarios). We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in tracking the IP address of Tor users in a series of experiments. Even for an underprovisioned adversary with only two network vantage points, we can identify the end user (IP address) in many cases
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