Distributed Energy Trading: The Multiple-Microgrid Case

In this paper, a distributed convex optimization framework is developed for energy trading between islanded microgrids. More specifically, the problem consists of several islanded microgrids that exchange energy flows by means of an arbitrary topology. Due to scalability issues and in order to safeguard local information on cost functions, a subgradient-based cost minimization algorithm is proposed that converges to the optimal solution in a practical number of iterations and with a limited communication overhead. Furthermore, this approach allows for a very intuitive economics interpretation that explains the algorithm iterations in terms of "supply--demand model" and "market clearing". Numerical results are given in terms of convergence rate of the algorithm and attained costs for different network topologies.Comment: 24 pages, 8 figures; new version answering reviewers' comments; the paper is now accepted for publication in the IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics; the paper is now publishe

Online Convex Optimization for Sequential Decision Processes and Extensive-Form Games

Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games. State-of-the-art methods rely on minimizing regret locally at each decision point. In this work we derive a new framework for regret minimization on sequential decision problems and extensive-form games with general compact convex sets at each decision point and general convex losses, as opposed to prior work which has been for simplex decision points and linear losses. We call our framework laminar regret decomposition. It generalizes the CFR algorithm to this more general setting. Furthermore, our framework enables a new proof of CFR even in the known setting, which is derived from a perspective of decomposing polytope regret, thereby leading to an arguably simpler interpretation of the algorithm. Our generalization to convex compact sets and convex losses allows us to develop new algorithms for several problems: regularized sequential decision making, regularized Nash equilibria in extensive-form games, and computing approximate extensive-form perfect equilibria. Our generalization also leads to the first regret-minimization algorithm for computing reduced-normal-form quantal response equilibria based on minimizing local regrets. Experiments show that our framework leads to algorithms that scale at a rate comparable to the fastest variants of counterfactual regret minimization for computing Nash equilibrium, and therefore our approach leads to the first algorithm for computing quantal response equilibria in extremely large games. Finally we show that our framework enables a new kind of scalable opponent exploitation approach

Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link

We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" – both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.National Science Foundation (CCF-0820138, CSR-0720604, EFRI-0735974, CNS-0524477, and CNS-0520166); Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana and COLCIENCIAS–Instituto Colombiano para el Desarrollo de la Ciencia y la Tecnología “Francisco Jose ́ de Caldas”

DC Proximal Newton for Non-Convex Optimization Problems

We introduce a novel algorithm for solving learning problems where both the loss function and the regularizer are non-convex but belong to the class of difference of convex (DC) functions. Our contribution is a new general purpose proximal Newton algorithm that is able to deal with such a situation. The algorithm consists in obtaining a descent direction from an approximation of the loss function and then in performing a line search to ensure sufficient descent. A theoretical analysis is provided showing that the iterates of the proposed algorithm {admit} as limit points stationary points of the DC objective function. Numerical experiments show that our approach is more efficient than current state of the art for a problem with a convex loss functions and non-convex regularizer. We have also illustrated the benefit of our algorithm in high-dimensional transductive learning problem where both loss function and regularizers are non-convex