5,272 research outputs found
The Road Ahead for Networking: A Survey on ICN-IP Coexistence Solutions
In recent years, the current Internet has experienced an unexpected paradigm
shift in the usage model, which has pushed researchers towards the design of
the Information-Centric Networking (ICN) paradigm as a possible replacement of
the existing architecture. Even though both Academia and Industry have
investigated the feasibility and effectiveness of ICN, achieving the complete
replacement of the Internet Protocol (IP) is a challenging task.
Some research groups have already addressed the coexistence by designing
their own architectures, but none of those is the final solution to move
towards the future Internet considering the unaltered state of the networking.
To design such architecture, the research community needs now a comprehensive
overview of the existing solutions that have so far addressed the coexistence.
The purpose of this paper is to reach this goal by providing the first
comprehensive survey and classification of the coexistence architectures
according to their features (i.e., deployment approach, deployment scenarios,
addressed coexistence requirements and architecture or technology used) and
evaluation parameters (i.e., challenges emerging during the deployment and the
runtime behaviour of an architecture). We believe that this paper will finally
fill the gap required for moving towards the design of the final coexistence
architecture.Comment: 23 pages, 16 figures, 3 table
DDoS-Capable IoT Malwares: comparative analysis and Mirai Investigation
The Internet of Things (IoT) revolution has not only carried the astonishing promise to interconnect a whole generation of traditionally “dumb” devices, but also brought to the Internet the menace of billions of badly protected and easily hackable objects. Not surprisingly, this sudden flooding of fresh and insecure devices fueled older threats, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. In this paper, we first propose an updated and comprehensive taxonomy of DDoS attacks, together with a number of examples on how this classification maps to real-world attacks. Then, we outline the current situation of DDoS-enabled malwares in IoT networks, highlighting how recent data support our concerns about the growing in popularity of these malwares. Finally, we give a detailed analysis of the general framework and the operating principles of Mirai, the most disruptive DDoS-capable IoT malware seen so far
Preventing DDoS using Bloom Filter: A Survey
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) is a menace for service provider and
prominent issue in network security. Defeating or defending the DDoS is a prime
challenge. DDoS make a service unavailable for a certain time. This phenomenon
harms the service providers, and hence, loss of business revenue. Therefore,
DDoS is a grand challenge to defeat. There are numerous mechanism to defend
DDoS, however, this paper surveys the deployment of Bloom Filter in defending a
DDoS attack. The Bloom Filter is a probabilistic data structure for membership
query that returns either true or false. Bloom Filter uses tiny memory to store
information of large data. Therefore, packet information is stored in Bloom
Filter to defend and defeat DDoS. This paper presents a survey on DDoS
defending technique using Bloom Filter.Comment: 9 pages, 1 figure. This article is accepted for publication in EAI
Endorsed Transactions on Scalable Information System
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting - A review of malware C2 techniques, detection and defences
In this survey, we first briefly review the current state of cyber attacks,
highlighting significant recent changes in how and why such attacks are
performed. We then investigate the mechanics of malware command and control
(C2) establishment: we provide a comprehensive review of the techniques used by
attackers to set up such a channel and to hide its presence from the attacked
parties and the security tools they use. We then switch to the defensive side
of the problem, and review approaches that have been proposed for the detection
and disruption of C2 channels. We also map such techniques to widely-adopted
security controls, emphasizing gaps or limitations (and success stories) in
current best practices.Comment: Work commissioned by CPNI, available at c2report.org. 38 pages.
Listing abstract compressed from version appearing in repor
OnionBots: Subverting Privacy Infrastructure for Cyber Attacks
Over the last decade botnets survived by adopting a sequence of increasingly
sophisticated strategies to evade detection and take overs, and to monetize
their infrastructure. At the same time, the success of privacy infrastructures
such as Tor opened the door to illegal activities, including botnets,
ransomware, and a marketplace for drugs and contraband. We contend that the
next waves of botnets will extensively subvert privacy infrastructure and
cryptographic mechanisms. In this work we propose to preemptively investigate
the design and mitigation of such botnets. We first, introduce OnionBots, what
we believe will be the next generation of resilient, stealthy botnets.
OnionBots use privacy infrastructures for cyber attacks by completely
decoupling their operation from the infected host IP address and by carrying
traffic that does not leak information about its source, destination, and
nature. Such bots live symbiotically within the privacy infrastructures to
evade detection, measurement, scale estimation, observation, and in general all
IP-based current mitigation techniques. Furthermore, we show that with an
adequate self-healing network maintenance scheme, that is simple to implement,
OnionBots achieve a low diameter and a low degree and are robust to
partitioning under node deletions. We developed a mitigation technique, called
SOAP, that neutralizes the nodes of the basic OnionBots. We also outline and
discuss a set of techniques that can enable subsequent waves of Super
OnionBots. In light of the potential of such botnets, we believe that the
research community should proactively develop detection and mitigation methods
to thwart OnionBots, potentially making adjustments to privacy infrastructure.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure
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