Learning as a Nonlinear Line of Attraction for Pattern Association, Classification and Recognition

Development of a mathematical model for learning a nonlinear line of attraction is presented in this dissertation, in contrast to the conventional recurrent neural network model in which the memory is stored in an attractive fixed point at discrete location in state space. A nonlinear line of attraction is the encapsulation of attractive fixed points scattered in state space as an attractive nonlinear line, describing patterns with similar characteristics as a family of patterns. It is usually of prime imperative to guarantee the convergence of the dynamics of the recurrent network for associative learning and recall. We propose to alter this picture. That is, if the brain remembers by converging to the state representing familiar patterns, it should also diverge from such states when presented by an unknown encoded representation of a visual image. The conception of the dynamics of the nonlinear line attractor network to operate between stable and unstable states is the second contribution in this dissertation research. These criteria can be used to circumvent the plasticity-stability dilemma by using the unstable state as an indicator to create a new line for an unfamiliar pattern. This novel learning strategy utilizes stability (convergence) and instability (divergence) criteria of the designed dynamics to induce self-organizing behavior. The self-organizing behavior of the nonlinear line attractor model can manifest complex dynamics in an unsupervised manner. The third contribution of this dissertation is the introduction of the concept of manifold of color perception. The fourth contribution of this dissertation is the development of a nonlinear dimensionality reduction technique by embedding a set of related observations into a low-dimensional space utilizing the result attained by the learned memory matrices of the nonlinear line attractor network. Development of a system for affective states computation is also presented in this dissertation. This system is capable of extracting the user\u27s mental state in real time using a low cost computer. It is successfully interfaced with an advanced learning environment for human-computer interaction

Cassirer and structuralism of perception: an application of group theory to Gestalt psychology

Ernst Cassirer's task was to set up an account of perception as objective judgement. We can trace Cassirer's view of perception through three different accounts each of which aimed to give an answer of how perceptual judgements can be possible. These three accounts started from (1900-1923) where he presented his view depending on Functional- Relational analysis of perceptual experience. The second account started from (1923-1933) where he presented his view of perception depending on symbolic analysis of perceptual experience, and finally the third account started from (1933-1945) where the analysis of perceptual phenomena has been made depending on his apprehension of Group Theory. The main target of Cassirer in the third account was to show that there is similarity between geometry and perception with respect to the ways both of these two disciplines build up their objects. Having the same logical base, Cassirer claimed that there is similarity between geometrical determination of the object and perceptual determination of the experienced object. For Cassirer, this similarity is what allows an application of "group theory" to perception. As a result of that claim, Cassirer shifted mathematical terms such as "invariance", "frame of reference" and "transformation" from the province of geometry and reused them in the field of perception for setting up what he called psychology of thought. This thesis discusses Cassirer's first two accounts and focuses on the third account by giving examples of how the mathematical concept of "group" can be used as an analogy to provide an intrinsic explanation of the nature of the objects and their characteristics one experiences during the perceptual situation. The explanations of the perceptual phenomena represented in the perceptual experience, as given by Cassirer, based on Gestalt psychology, reflected this understanding. The ample examples created by the Gestalt psychologists and used by Cassirer indicated how both understood the object of perceptual experience as constructed and not as a thing or hic et nunc. I will show that in these three accounts, there are non-physical elements, which defined here as structural elements, involved in the perceptual experience. By the virtue of these non-physical elements, perceptual judgements are possible. Cassirer and the Gestalt psychologists emphasized that these structural elements are presupposed in every perceptual experience and this understanding will lead to the claim that both Cassirer and the Gestaltists presupposed the constructive unity of mind based on a transcendental analysis of the nature of mind and its cognitive processes

Développement d'un cadre mathématique pour une théorie sensorimotrice de l'expérience sensorielle

Many neurophysiological theories of sensory experience assume that experience is mysteriously generated by specific cortical mechanisms. Other approaches claim that data on sensory experience can be explained from the structure of the rules governing sensory changes produced by various motor actions. The goal of this thesis is to develop a mathematical framework enabling to grasp symetry properties of such rules. In the case of a simplified perceptual system, we show that such an approach leads to distinguish categories of perceptual contexts, and changes of such contexts that coincide with various data on sensory experience, notably on spatiality sensation and the structure of our judgments on color similarities.Plusieurs théories neurophysiologiques de l'expérience sensorielle supposent que l'expérience est une chose mystérieuse produite par des mécanismes corticaux spécifiques. D'autres approches prétendent expliquer le discours que nous tenons sur nos expériences sensorielles à partir de la structure de nos fonctionnements sensorimoteurs, en particulier à partir de la dépendance induites par nos différents systèmes perceptifs entre nos commandes motrices et nos stimulations sensorielles. Le but de cette thèse est de développer un cadre mathématique permettant d'appréhender certaines propriétés de symétries de ces dépendances. En considérant le cas d'un système perceptif simplifié, nous montrons que cette approche conduit à distinguer différentes catégories de situations perceptives, et de changements de situations, qui coïncident avec diverses données sur notre expérience sensorielle, notamment sur la sensation de spatialité et sur la structure de nos jugements de similarité des couleurs

Repositioning Neuroaesthetics Through Contemporary Art

Neuroaesthetics has tended to privilege neuroscientific understandings of art, eliding centuries of art historical research on perception and culture. Instead, this dissertation extends neuroaesthetic research to examine the specific social, sensorial and perceptual processes occurring as artworks are encountered in exhibition contexts. How does neuroaesthetic perception operate in contemporary artworks? What modes of cognitive address are involved? How can neuroaesthetic engagement facilitate embodied knowledges? This dissertation first inquires into the neuroaesthetic literature in order to establish its neuroscientific foundations, and then advances a perceptual standpoint stemming from art and art history. Drawing from feminist theories of embodiment, I reposition neuroaesthetics to incorporate art historical inquiries into body and mind through direct engagement with art. I argue that such a revised neuroaesthic perception must take into account post-humanist troublings of nature/culture dichotomies. I also suggest that the paradigm for embodied perception that has emerged from both cognitive neuroscience and affect theory can expand neuroaesthetic understanding. My investigation has led me to first-hand experience as a research subject of neuroscience experiments, which show that current fMRI contexts in fact delimit the perception of art and inhibit possible neuroaesthetic significance. Instead, I undertake neuroaesthetic research in exhibition contexts where self-reflexive awareness facilitates insights into perception and cognition that are inaccessible within the epistemological conditions of neuroscience labs. The first case study examines how an installation by the FASTWÜRMS collective reveals cognitive processes of abduction by inviting navigation through an infinitely complex web of objects and images. Turning from association to visual cognition, I consider how Olafur Eliasson’s immersive light installations manipulate colour perception thereby facilitating critical awareness of techno-mediated environments. Third, my analysis of a conceptual work by Kristin Lucas explores how the performance of digital and legal technology invites embodied transformations. Finally, I examine how the affective tensions produced in a video by Omer Fast activate an awareness of intersubjective communication that corresponds with recent neuroscientific developments in mirror-neuron theory. By taking contemporary artworks as its focus, the dissertation extends neuroaesthetic inquiry to demonstrate contextual understandings of how the cognitive processes of art constitute physiological engagements between body, brain and world

Spatial Displays and Spatial Instruments

The conference proceedings topics are divided into two main areas: (1) issues of spatial and picture perception raised by graphical electronic displays of spatial information; and (2) design questions raised by the practical experience of designers actually defining new spatial instruments for use in new aircraft and spacecraft. Each topic is considered from both a theoretical and an applied direction. Emphasis is placed on discussion of phenomena and determination of design principles

First-Person Investigations of Consciousness

This dissertation defends the reliability of first-person methods for studying consciousness, and applies first-person experiments to two philosophical problems: the experience of size and of the self. In chapter 1, I discuss the motivations for taking a first-person approach to consciousness, the background assumptions of the dissertation and some methodological preliminaries. In chapter 2, I address the claim that phenomenal judgements are far less reliable than perceptual judgements (Schwitzgebel, 2011). I argue that the main errors and limitations in making phenomenal judgements are due to domain-general factors, which are shared in the formation of perceptual judgements. Phenomenal judgements may still be statistically less reliable than perceptual judgements, though I provide reasons for thinking that Schwitzgebel (2011) overstates the case for statistical unreliability. I also provide criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable phenomenal judgements, hence defending phenomenal judgements against general introspective scepticism. Having identified the main errors in making phenomenal judgements, in chapter 3, I discuss how first-person experiments can be used to control for these errors. I provide examples, and discuss how they overcome attentional and conceptual errors, minimise biases, and exhibit high intersubjective reliability. In chapter 4, I investigate size experience. I use first-person experiments and empirical findings to argue that distant things looking smaller cannot be explained as an awareness of instantiated objective properties (visual angle or retinal image size). I also discuss how an awareness of uninstantiated objective properties cannot adequately account for the phenomenal character of size experience. This provides support for a subjectivist account of variance in size experience. In chapter 5, I investigate the sense of self. I distinguish between a weak sense of self (for-me-ness) and a strong sense of self in which there is a polarity between subject and object. I use first-person experiments from Douglas Harding to demonstrate an explicit strong sense of self, specifically when I point at where others see my face. I also argue that this sense of self is not explained by inference, thoughts, feelings, imagination nor the viewpoint. Rather, it is part of the structure of experience that I seem to be looking from here. Even if there is a sense of self, there may be no self. The question of chapter 6 is whether there can be a direct experience of the self. I argue that to function as a bearer of experience the subject must be single and lack sensory qualities in itself. I use Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the visual gap where I cannot see my head. I argue that it conforms to the above criteria, and hence is a candidate for being the subject. This finding, in conjunction with the fact that I seem to be looking from the same location, provides prima facie evidence for the reality of the subject. I hold then that contrary to Hume and most philosophers since, that there can be a direct self-experience, if one knows which direction to attend