Towards next generation coordination infrastructures

Coordination infrastructures play a central role in the engineering of multiagent systems. Since the advent of agent technology, research on coordination infrastructures has produced a significant number of infrastructures with varying features. In this paper, we review the the state-of-the-art coordination infrastructures with the purpose of identifying open research challenges that next generation coordination infrastructures should address. Our analysis concludes that next generation coordination infrastructures must address a number of challenges: (i) to become socially aware, by facilitating human interaction within a MAS; (ii) to assist agents in their decision making by providing decision support that helps them reduce the scope of reasoning and facilitates the achievement of their goals; and (iii) to increase openness to support on-line, fully decentralised design and execution. Furthermore, we identify some promising approaches in the literature, together with the research issues worth investigating, to cope with such challenges. © Cambridge University Press, 2015.The work presented in this paper has been partially funded by projects EVE (TIN2009-14702-C02-01), AT (CSD2007-0022), and the Generalitat of Catalunya grant 2009-SGR-1434Peer Reviewe

Towards next generation coordination infrastructures

Coordination infrastructures play a central role in the engineering of multiagent systems. Since the advent of agent technology, research on coordination infrastructures has produced a significant number of infrastructures with varying features. In this paper, we review the the state-of-the-art coordination infrastructures with the purpose of identifying open research challenges that next generation coordination infrastructures should address. Our analysis concludes that next generation coordination infrastructures must address a number of challenges: (i) to become socially aware, by facilitating human interaction within a MAS; (ii) to assist agents in their decision making by providing decision support that helps them reduce the scope of reasoning and facilitates the achievement of their goals; and (iii) to increase openness to support on-line, fully decentralised design and execution. Furthermore, we identify some promising approaches in the literature, together with the research issues worth investigating, to cope with such challenges

Governance-technology co-evolution and misalignment in the electricity industry

This paper explores some reasons why the alignment between governance and technology in infrastructures may be unstable or not easy to achieve. Focusing on the electricity industry, we claim that the decentralization of governance – an essential step towards a decentralized technical coordination - may be hampered by if deregulation magnifies behavioural uncertainties and asset specificities; and that in a technically decentralized system, political demand for centralized coordination may arise if the players are able to collude and lobby, and if such practices lead to higher electricity rates and lower efficiency. Our claims are supported by insights coming from approaches as diverse as transaction cost economics, the competence-based view of the firm, and political economy.Governance; Technology; Coherence; Competence; Transaction costs; Regulation.

OPTICON: EC Optical Infrared Coordination Network for Astronomy

OPTICON, the ICN Optical Infrared Coordination Network for Astronomy, brings together for the first time the operators of all Europe's medium to large optical-infrared telescopes, the largest corresponding data archives, and several user representatives. The OPTICON partners work with their communities to identify those major challenges for the future development of European optical-infrared astronomy which require Europe-wide collaboration. OPTICON sponsors and coordinates developments towards these goals, involving the entire astronomical community through workshops and meetings targeted towards these agreed common goals of general importance.Comment: to appear in Organizations and Strategies in Astronomy II, Ed. A. Heck, Kluwer Acad. Pub

Geospatial information infrastructures

Manual of Digital Earth / Editors: Huadong Guo, Michael F. Goodchild, Alessandro Annoni .- Springer, 2020 .- ISBN: 978-981-32-9915-3Geospatial information infrastructures (GIIs) provide the technological, semantic,organizationalandlegalstructurethatallowforthediscovery,sharing,and use of geospatial information (GI). In this chapter, we introduce the overall concept and surrounding notions such as geographic information systems (GIS) and spatial datainfrastructures(SDI).WeoutlinethehistoryofGIIsintermsoftheorganizational andtechnologicaldevelopmentsaswellasthecurrentstate-of-art,andreflectonsome of the central challenges and possible future trajectories. We focus on the tension betweenincreasedneedsforstandardizationandtheever-acceleratingtechnological changes. We conclude that GIIs evolved as a strong underpinning contribution to implementation of the Digital Earth vision. In the future, these infrastructures are challengedtobecomeflexibleandrobustenoughtoabsorbandembracetechnological transformationsandtheaccompanyingsocietalandorganizationalimplications.With this contribution, we present the reader a comprehensive overview of the field and a solid basis for reflections about future developments

The Diversity of Design of TSOs

International audienceIt is puzzling today to explain diversity and imperfection of actual transmission monopoly designs in competitive electricity markets. We argue that transmission monopoly in competitive electricity markets has to be analysed within a Wilson (2002) modular framework. Applied to the management of electricity flows, at least three modules make the core of transmission design: 1° the short run management of network externalities; 2° the long run management of network investment; and 3° the coordination of neighboring Transmission System Operators for cross border trade. In order to tackle this diversity of designs of TSOs, we show that for each of these modules, three different basic ways of managing them are possible. Among the identified twenty seven options of organisation, we define an Ideal TSO. Second, we demonstrate that 1°monopoly design differs from this Ideal TSO and cannot handle these three modules irrespective of the “institutional” definition and allocation of property rights on transmission; while 2°definition and allocation of property rights on transmission cannot ignore the existing electrical industry and transmission network structure: they have to complement each other to be efficient. Some conclusions for regulatory issues of transmission systems operators are derived from this analysis of network monopoly organisation

Coping with Extreme Events: Institutional Flocking

Recent measurements in the North Atlantic confirm that the thermohaline circulation driving the Gulf Stream has come to a stand. Oceanographic monitoring over the last 50 years already showed that the circulation was weakening. Under the influence of the large inflow of melting water in Northern Atlantic waters during last summer, it has now virtually stopped. Consequently, the KNMI and the RIVM estimate the average . In this essay we will explore how such a new risk profile affects the distribution of risks among societal groups, and the way in which governing institutions need to adapt in order to be prepared for situations of rapid but unknown change. The next section will first introduce an analytical perspective, building upon the Risk Society thesis and a proposed model of ‘institutional flocking’.temperature to decrease by 3°C in the next 15 years