Socialising Epistemic Cognition

We draw on recent accounts of social epistemology to present a novel account of epistemic cognition that is ‘socialised’. In developing this account we foreground the: normative and pragmatic nature of knowledge claims; functional role that ‘to know’ plays when agents say they ‘know x’; the social context in which such claims occur at a macro level, including disciplinary and cultural context; and the communicative context in which such claims occur, the ways in which individuals and small groups express and construct (or co-construct) their knowledge claims. We frame prior research in terms of this new approach to provide an exemplification of its application. Practical implications for research and learning contexts are highlighted, suggesting a re-focussing of analysis on the collective level, and the ways knowledge-standards emerge from group-activity, as a communicative property of that activity

Epistemic and social scripts in computer-supported collaborative learning

Collaborative learning in computer-supported learning environments typically means that learners work on tasks together, discussing their individual perspectives via text-based media or videoconferencing, and consequently acquire knowledge. Collaborative learning, however, is often sub-optimal with respect to how learners work on the concepts that are supposed to be learned and how learners interact with each other. One possibility to improve collaborative learning environments is to conceptualize epistemic scripts, which specify how learners work on a given task, and social scripts, which structure how learners interact with each other. In this contribution, two studies will be reported that investigated the effects of epistemic and social scripts in a text-based computer-supported learning environment and in a videoconferencing learning environment in order to foster the individual acquisition of knowledge. In each study the factors ‘epistemic script’ and ‘social script’ have been independently varied in a 2×2-factorial design. 182 university students of Educational Science participated in these two studies. Results of both studies show that social scripts can be substantially beneficial with respect to the individual acquisition of knowledge, whereas epistemic scripts apparently do not to lead to the expected effects

Epistemic and Social Scripts in Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning

Collaborative learning in computer-supported learning environments typically means that learners work on tasks together, discussing their individual perspectives via text-based media or videoconferencing, and consequently acquire knowledge. Collaborative learning, however, is often sub-optimal with respect to how learners work on the concepts that are supposed to be learned and how learners interact with each other. Therefore, instructional support needs to be implemented into computer-supported collaborative learning environments. One possibility to improve collaborative learning environments is to conceptualize scripts that structure epistemic activities and social interactions of learners. In this contribution, two studies will be reported that investigated the effects of epistemic and social scripts in a text-based computer-supported learning environment and in a videoconferencing learning environment in order to foster the individual acquisition of knowledge. In each study the factors "epistemic script" and "social script" have been independently varied in a 2×2-factorial design. 182 university students of Educational Science participated in these two studies. Results of both studies show that social scripts can be substantially beneficial with respect to the individual acquisition of knowledge, whereas epistemic scripts apparently do not lead to the expected effects.Unter kooperativem Lernen in computerunterstützten Lernumgebungen versteht man typischerweise, dass Lernende Wissen erwerben indem sie gemeinsam Aufgaben bearbeiten und dabei ihre individuellen Perspektiven mittels textbasierter Medien oder in Videokonferenzen diskutieren. Kooperatives Lernen scheint aber häufig suboptimal zu sein in Bezug auf die inhaltliche Bearbeitung der zu lernenden Konzepte sowie hinsichtlich der sozialen Interaktionen der Lernenden. Eine Möglichkeit kooperative Lernumgebungen zu verbessern besteht darin, Skripts zu konzeptualisieren, die epistemische Aktivitäten und soziale Interaktionen von Lernenden unterstützen. In diesem Beitrag werden zwei Studien berichtet, die die Wirkungen epistemischer und sozialer Skripts auf den individuellen Wissenserwerb in einer text- bzw. einer videobasierten computerunterstützten Lernumgebung untersuchen. In beiden Studien wurden die Faktoren "epistemisches Skript" und "soziales Skript" unabhängig voneinander in einem 2×2-faktoriellen Design miteinander variiert. 182 Studierende der Pädagogik der LMU München nahmen an diesen beiden Studien teil. Die Ergebnisse beider Studien deuten darauf hin, dass soziale Skripts individuellen Wissenserwerb substanziell fördern können, während epistemische Skripts scheinbar nicht zu den erwarteten Ergebnissen führen

Reasons for Reliabilism

One leading approach to justification comes from the reliabilist tradition, which maintains that a belief is justified provided that it is reliably formed. Another comes from the ‘Reasons First’ tradition, which claims that a belief is justified provided that it is based on reasons that support it. These two approaches are typically developed in isolation from each other; this essay motivates and defends a synthesis. On the view proposed here, justification is understood in terms of an agent’s reasons for belief, which are in turn analyzed along reliabilist lines: an agent's reasons for belief are the states that serve as inputs to their reliable processes. I show that this synthesis allows each tradition to profit from the other's explanatory resources. In particular, it enables reliabilists to explain epistemic defeat without abandoning their naturalistic ambitions. I go on to compare my proposed synthesis with other hybrid versions of reliabilism that have been proposed in the literature

On colonial blind spots, ego-politics of knowledge and 'Universal Reason'

This paper examines the notion of death as a philosophical and counter-hegemonic subject ‘erased’ from the imperialist cartography of knowledge. It revolves around three main points: the ‘loss’ of death from the imperialist epistemology of the global North, its subservient position towards the dominance of life in biopolitical discourses, and the instrumentality of death under the ongoing matrix of colonial/capitalist power. The paper challenges the hegemonic rationality of biopolitical discourses while proposing counter-hegemonic alternatives: they are hereby mainly situated in the critique of sovereignty exemplified by Achille Mbembe’s groundbreaking work on the politics of death. In what serves as an attempt to avert our gaze from the dominant viewpoint of epistemic imperialism, the paper invites us to ‘unlearn’ what we are supposed to be proud of. As a way to engage in the decolonizing processes, it pleads for self-liberation from the forms of knowledge that, in their claim to be ‘universal’, continue to pertain to the imperialist reason and its hegemonic matrix of power

Varieties of Cognitive Integration

Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent’s cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration—cluster-model functionalism—which finds application in both domains of inquiry, and which meets the challenge posed by putative cases of cognitive or epistemic bloat

Must Realists Be Pessimists About Democracy? Responding to Epistemic and Oligarchic Challenges

In this paper we show how a realistic normative democratic theory can work within the constraints set by the most pessimistic empirical results about voting behaviour and elite capture of the policy process. After setting out the empirical evidence and discussing some extant responses by political theorists, we argue that the evidence produces a two-pronged challenge for democracy: an epistemic challenge concerning the quality and focus of decision-making and an oligarchic challenge concerning power concentration. To address the challenges we then put forward three main normative claims, each of which is compatible with the evidence. We start with a critique of the epistocratic position commonly thought to be supported by the evidence. We then introduce a qualified critique of referenda and other forms of plebiscite, and an outline of a tribune-based system of popular control over oligarchic influence on the policy process. Our discussion points towards a renewal of democracy in a plebeian but not plebiscitarian direction: Attention to the relative power of social classes matters more than formal dispersal of power through voting. We close with some methodological reflections about the compatibility between our normative claims and the realist program in political philosophy