Towards Activity Context using Software Sensors

Service-Oriented Computing delivers the promise of configuring and reconfiguring software systems to address user's needs in a dynamic way. Context-aware computing promises to capture the user's needs and hence the requirements they have on systems. The marriage of both can deliver ad-hoc software solutions relevant to the user in the most current fashion. However, here it is a key to gather information on the users' activity (that is what they are doing). Traditionally any context sensing was conducted with hardware sensors. However, software can also play the same role and in some situations will be more useful to sense the activity of the user. Furthermore they can make use of the fact that Service-oriented systems exchange information through standard protocols. In this paper we discuss our proposed approach to sense the activity of the user making use of software

Free will, neuroscience, and choice: towards a decisional capacity model for insanity defense evaluations

Il libero arbitrio è stato spesso considerato una tematica centrale nella dottrina della responsabilità criminale. Ciononostante, il concetto stesso di libero arbitrio presenta intrinseche problematiche nella sua definizione teorica e applicazione pratica in un contesto clinico/ forense ed è intensamente dibattuto. Nello specifico, l’esistenza stessa del libero arbitrio è stata recentemente posta in discussione anche sulla base di alcune evidenze sperimentali neuroscientifiche. Questo dibattito ha implicazioni significative in quei campi in cui l’associazione tra libertà di scelta è comportamento costituisce il focus di interesse, quali la psichiatria forense. Esiste inoltre una sorta di conflittualità tra la centralità e concezione teorica del libero arbitrio (free will) e il suo status e applicazione pratica. Questo problema ha bisogno di essere affrontato, specialmente all’interno della psichiatria forense, dal momento che risulta rilevante per l’effettiva valutazione dell’infermità di mente. Nel presente articolo cercheremo di rendere operativo il concetto del “libero arbitrio” utilizzando il modello a quattro dimensioni utilizzato per la capacità decisionale, che può essere impiegato nella valutazione forense dell’infermità di mente. Descriveremo i suoi vantaggi e applicazioni per guidare la valutazione dell’infermità di mente. Mentre il libero arbitrio è spesso considerato problematico dal punto di vista delle neuroscienze, questo modello, a nostro avviso, è compatibile con le neuroscienze; inoltre, le valutazioni che utilizzino questo modello possono anche essere arricchite e rafforzate dalle scoperte neuro scientifiche, per esempio riguardo il controllo inibitorioFree will has often been considered central to criminal responsibility. Yet, the concept of free will is also difficult to define and operationalize, and, moreover, it is intensely debated. In particular, the very existence of free will has been denied based on recent neuroscience findings. This debate has significant implications on those fields in which the link between free will and behaviour is the main focus of interest, such as forensic psychiatry. In fact, a tension is often experienced between the centrality of the notion of free will on the one hand, and its controversial status on the other. This tension needs to be addressed, especially in forensic psychiatry, since it is relevant for actual assessments of legal insanity. In the present paper we will try to operationalize “free will” using a fourpartite decision-making capacity model, which can be used in forensic assessment of insanity. We will describe its advantages and application to guide mental insanity assessments. Whereas free will is often considered problematic from a neuroscience perspective, this model, we argue, is compatible with neuroscience; moreover, evaluations using this model can also be informed and strengthened by neuroscientific findings, for example regarding inhibitory control

Isabelle/PIDE as Platform for Educational Tools

The Isabelle/PIDE platform addresses the question whether proof assistants of the LCF family are suitable as technological basis for educational tools. The traditionally strong logical foundations of systems like HOL, Coq, or Isabelle have so far been counter-balanced by somewhat inaccessible interaction via the TTY (or minor variations like the well-known Proof General / Emacs interface). Thus the fundamental question of math education tools with fully-formal background theories has often been answered negatively due to accidental weaknesses of existing proof engines. The idea of "PIDE" (which means "Prover IDE") is to integrate existing provers like Isabelle into a larger environment, that facilitates access by end-users and other tools. We use Scala to expose the proof engine in ML to the JVM world, where many user-interfaces, editor frameworks, and educational tools already exist. This shall ultimately lead to combined mathematical assistants, where the logical engine is in the background, without obstructing the view on applications of formal methods, formalized mathematics, and math education in particular.Comment: In Proceedings THedu'11, arXiv:1202.453