Normativity and Representation in Kant's Theory of Cognition

This dissertation examines various aspects of normativity and representation as they figure in Kant’s theory of cognition. In particular, I argue that Kant holds that certain forms of representational content constitutively depend on normative constraint. This applies to all of the kinds of content that can be captured by concepts (viz. ‘kind’-properties, and the objective temporal structures that correspond to the “categories”). Since we perceptually represent objects as exhibiting these features, even the activities that produce perceptions must be normatively constrained. Nevertheless, representation per se does not depend on normative constraint: Kant holds that non-human animals can represent objects, suggesting that he endorses forms of ‘non-conceptual content’ that don’t depend on normative constraint. Chapter 1 explores the preconditions for representing objective temporal sequence, as outlined in the Second Analogy. I argue that Kant’s notion of the “necessitation of the subjective order of perceptions” must be understood as a form of normative necessity, so representations of objective temporal sequence constitutively depend on normativity. Chapter 2 continues the discussion of the Second Analogy by exploring the connection between causation and lawfulness. I argue that Kant holds that the concept of contains the notion of lawful connection. He therefore has sound reasons for asserting the Strong Causal Principle (that every event is produced according to a universal causal law) on the basis of the Second Analogy’s argument. Chapter 3 examines the role of schemata in Kant’s theory of cognition. Assuming that schemata are rules for synthesis of the imagination, I argue that they should be understood as akin to maxims: mentally represented rules that bring our activities into contact with intersubjective normative standards. I argue that, by bringing synthesis under normative constraint, schemata enable intuitions to represent their objects as bearing ‘kind’-properties. Chapter 4 discharges the assumption that schemata are rules for synthesis of imagination, through close reading and criticism of alternative interpretations. Chapter 5 examines Kant’s views about animal minds and what they tell us about his theory of human cognition. I argue that he genuinely credits animals with intuitions of objects. Nevertheless, there are still good motivations for thinking that all human intuitions are produced by the understanding, and that it makes human and animal intuitions different in kind. The Conclusion brings together material from the preceding five chapters to discuss the extent to which Kant endorses a ‘normative theory of representation’.AHRC Leverhulme Trus

Directional adposition use in English, Swedish and Finnish

Directional adpositions such as to the left of describe where a Figure is in relation to a Ground. English and Swedish directional adpositions refer to the location of a Figure in relation to a Ground, whether both are static or in motion. In contrast, the Finnish directional adpositions edellä (in front of) and jäljessä (behind) solely describe the location of a moving Figure in relation to a moving Ground (Nikanne, 2003). When using directional adpositions, a frame of reference must be assumed for interpreting the meaning of directional adpositions. For example, the meaning of to the left of in English can be based on a relative (speaker or listener based) reference frame or an intrinsic (object based) reference frame (Levinson, 1996). When a Figure and a Ground are both in motion, it is possible for a Figure to be described as being behind or in front of the Ground, even if neither have intrinsic features. As shown by Walker (in preparation), there are good reasons to assume that in the latter case a motion based reference frame is involved. This means that if Finnish speakers would use edellä (in front of) and jäljessä (behind) more frequently in situations where both the Figure and Ground are in motion, a difference in reference frame use between Finnish on one hand and English and Swedish on the other could be expected. We asked native English, Swedish and Finnish speakers’ to select adpositions from a language specific list to describe the location of a Figure relative to a Ground when both were shown to be moving on a computer screen. We were interested in any differences between Finnish, English and Swedish speakers. All languages showed a predominant use of directional spatial adpositions referring to the lexical concepts TO THE LEFT OF, TO THE RIGHT OF, ABOVE and BELOW. There were no differences between the languages in directional adpositions use or reference frame use, including reference frame use based on motion. We conclude that despite differences in the grammars of the languages involved, and potential differences in reference frame system use, the three languages investigated encode Figure location in relation to Ground location in a similar way when both are in motion. Levinson, S. C. (1996). Frames of reference and Molyneux’s question: Crosslingiuistic evidence. In P. Bloom, M.A. Peterson, L. Nadel & M.F. Garrett (Eds.) Language and Space (pp.109-170). Massachusetts: MIT Press. Nikanne, U. (2003). How Finnish postpositions see the axis system. In E. van der Zee & J. Slack (Eds.), Representing direction in language and space. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Walker, C. (in preparation). Motion encoding in language, the use of spatial locatives in a motion context. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Lincoln, Lincoln. United Kingdo

The phenomenology of same-race prejudice

This thesis is not structured as a conventional empirical study (theoretical background, method, results, discussion), but instead consists of an iterative series of attempts at making sense of same-race prejudice – hopefully systematically homing in on a richer and more acute understanding of the phenomenon. The chapters are grouped together in pairs or triplets – each grouping addressing different but related perspectives on the problem. Chapters 1 and 2 are contextual, setting the scene historically and conceptually. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 introduce three different perspectives on using phenomenology as a means of approaching the issue of same-race prejudice. Chapters 6 and 7 are dedicated to looking at the themes of same-race prejudice, a critical interrogation of the themes from the interview discussions, the literature and how same-race prejudice is experienced, played out and sustained. Chapter 8 links back to Chapter 1 by casting another look at sensitivity and responsiveness to same-race prejudice by organisations whose work is supposedly on prejudice eradication. The chapter further links with both Chapters 3 and 4 by calling upon a phenomenological understanding to humanity as what can bring a liveable change to humanity regarding same-race prejudice. Chapter 9 serves as a summary of all the chapters, what each individually and collectively hoped to achieve, and the general findings and statements about same-race prejudice from the chapters’ theoretical discussions, research interviews, and critical interrogation of both the mundane and theoretical understanding.PsychologyD. Phil. (Psychology

Constructivism and human rights locating values in a divided approach

Constructivism is sociological, constitutive and manages to incorporate both positivist and post-positivist methods of analysing the international system, although how well it combines the two is much disputed. It has produced a large amount of theoretical and empirical work detailing the constitutive and procedural norms of this system, and it has (largely) done so by placing a premium on the lives, characteristics and contributions of humans within it. As such it is often regarded as the most fertile ground within International Relations (IR) theory for bringing together theory and practice into a coherent whole. But how normative should it be? Critical scholars, mindful perhaps of the Third Debate origins of constructivism, strongly suggest that it should be more normative in its outlook, and thus able to direct the flow of international theory and practice rather than simply report on it. It is adept at cataloguing and interpreting the institutions and standards which constitute the international system, and the procedures and behaviours that govern it, but not the values which many see as underpinning it. This thesis will test this claim. It will do so by using the currently most visible and even tangible expression of values in the international system - the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - to anchor an otherwise metaphysical concept. The capacity of constructivism to engage more consistently with human rights will be assessed by critically analysing three key expressions of the approach namely those of Alexander Wendt, Nicholas Onuf and Andrew Linklater. This triangulation opens up a new intellectual space which enables an exploration of the broad range of constructivist positions, in order to appraise how they cohere and diverge on this subject. This in turn allows for the conclusions that constructivism does engage with values, but that it is not suited to furthering a purposive, moral agenda. Any attempt to push its boundaries towards a more critical formulation divest it of any meaning as a category of international theory

What it takes to successfully ground rationality norms in a constitutive account of agency

Abstract: Current accounts of normativity struggle to explain the source of the normative grip of rationality norms. They fail to explain, that is, why one should be committed to adhering to rationality norms rather than to violating them, or why one should be guided by rationality norms at all. A popular fix is to appeal to a constitutive account of agency: the normative grip of rationality norms can be found in constitutive features of agency, such as beliefs, desires or drives. If accepting rationality norms is constitutive of this feature of agency, then, in virtue of being an agent, we are guided by rationality norms. This is one promising way to pin down the source of the normative grip of rationality norms. The problem, I argue in the first half of this dissertation, is that existing accounts do not actually achieve this. This failure can be attributed to one core issue: none of the accounts can explain why we should care to be agents. The purpose of my project is to provide a new account of agency which can successfully answer this core concern, and thus ground rationality norms. In the second half of the dissertation, I propose a new constitutive account of agency which has two main tenets. First, it is plausible to think of agency as something we have chosen and continue to choose. I call this elective agency. It places us in a unique position to answer the question of why we should care to be agents rather than non-agents. Second, the distinguishing mark of elective agency is something I call the worth-drive. By embracing the worth-drive, we seek to establish the value of being agents, and of constantly re-electing agency. I argue that accepting rationality norms is constitutive of the worth-drive, and that the worth-drive is partially constitutive of agency. Being able to choose agency means that we choose to accept the rationality norms that come along with it. Because we have this constitutive drive to establish value, we care to be agents and we care to follow rationality norms. I argue that this constitutive account is the most promising for grounding the normative grip of rationality norms.D.Phil. (Philosophy

Autism Spectrum Disorders and the New Testament : Preliminary Reflections

Peer reviewedPostprin

Democratic Multiplicity

Our structures of democratic governance are often characterized by 'dysfunctionality', 'hollowing out', and 'gridlock'. This volume proposes an approach grounded in five different modes of democratic praxis. In exploring various democratic traditions, it recognizes that addressing eco-social crises requires coordination and cooperation among them

Beliefs about the unobserved

What should one believe about the unobserved? My thesis is a collection of four papers, each of which addresses this question. In the first paper, “Why Subjectivism?”, I consider the standing of a position called radical subjective Bayesianism, or subjectivism. The view is composed of two claims—that agents ought to be logically omniscient, and that there is no further norm of rationality—both of which are subject to seemingly conclusive objections. In this paper, I seek, if not to rehabilitate subjectivism, at least to show its critic what is attractive about the position. I show that the critics of subjectivism assume a particular view about justification, which I call the telic view, and that there exist an alternative view, the poric view, on which subjectivism is appealing. I conclude by noting that the tension between telic and poric conceptions of justification might not be an easy one to resolve. In the second paper, “Bayesianism and the Problem of Induction”, I examine and reject the two existing Bayesian takes on Hume’s problem of induction, and propose my own in their stead. In the third paper, “The Nature of Awareness Growth”, I consider the question of how to model an agent who comes to entertain a new proposition about the unobserved. I argue that, contrary to what is typically thought, awareness growth occurs by refinement of the algebra, both on the poric and the telic pictures of Bayesianism. Finally, in the fourth paper, “Objectivity and the Method of Arbitrary Functions”, I consider whether, as is widely believed, a mathematical theorem known as the method of arbitrary functions can establish that it is in virtue of systems’ dynamics that (some) scientific probabilities are objective. I differentiate between three ways in which authors have claimed that dynamics objectivise probabilities (they putatively render them: ontically interpreted, objectively evaluable, and high-level robust); and I argue that the method of arbitrary functions can establish no such claims, thus dampening the hope that constraints in what to believe about the unobserved can emerge from dynamical facts in the world