Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches

Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac

Optimal Structuring of Assessment Processes in Competition Law: A Survey of Theoretical Approaches

In competition law, the problem of the optimal design of institutional and procedural rules concerns assessment processes of the pro- and anticompetitiveness of business behaviors. This is well recognized in the discussion about the relative merits of different assessment principles such as the rule of reason and per se rules. Supported by modern industrial organization research, which applies a more differentiated analysis to the welfare effects of different business behaviors, a full-scale case-by-case assessment seems to be the prevailing idea. Even though the discussion mainly focuses on extreme solutions, different theoretical approaches do exist, which provide important determinants and allow for a sound analysis of appropriate legal directives and investigation procedures from a ‘Law and Economics’ perspective. Integrating and examining them in light of various constellations results in differentiated solutions of optimally structured assessment processes.Law Enforcement, Competition Law, Competition Policy, Antitrust Law, Antitrust Policy, Decision-Making

Cores of Cooperative Games in Information Theory

Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory, and arise most frequently in the characterization of fundamental limits in various scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in network information theory such as Slepian-Wolf source coding and multiple access channels, classical settings in statistics such as robust hypothesis testing, and new settings at the intersection of networking and statistics such as distributed estimation problems for sensor networks. Cooperative game theory allows one to understand aspects of all of these problems from a fresh and unifying perspective that treats users as players in a game, sometimes leading to new insights. At the heart of these analyses are fundamental dualities that have been long studied in the context of cooperative games; for information theoretic purposes, these are dualities between information inequalities on the one hand and properties of rate, capacity or other resource allocation regions on the other.Comment: 12 pages, published at http://www.hindawi.com/GetArticle.aspx?doi=10.1155/2008/318704 in EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, Special Issue on "Theory and Applications in Multiuser/Multiterminal Communications", April 200

Companions in Guilt Arguments and Moore's Paradox

In a series of articles Christopher Cowie has provided what he calls a ‘Master Argument’ against the Companions in Guilt defence of moral objectivity. In what follows I defend the CG strategy against Cowie. I show, firstly, that epistemic judgements are relevantly similar to moral judgements, and secondly, that it is not possible coherently to deny the existence of irreducible and categorically normative epistemic reasons. My argument for the second of these claims exploits an analogy between the thesis that epistemic norms are non-categorical and G.E. Moore’s paradox concerning first personal belief ascriptions. I argue that the absurdity of the assertion “I have evidence that p but no reason to believe it” shows that the norms of belief are categorical. I then consider the counter-argument that this categoricity is a ‘conceptual’ rather than an ‘objective’ requirement. By drawing on the work of Hilary Putnam and Charles Travis, I show that this counter-argument is unsuccessful. Putnam is one of the original proponents of the Companions in Guilt strategy. Thus, by supporting the CG argument through appeal to other Putnamian theses, I show that its insights can only fully be appreciated in the context of broader metaphysical and semantic lessons

Inferentialism

This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialist’s standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2 focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits of logical inferentialism, chiefly with regards to the epistemology of logic, and consider a number of objections. §3 introduces and critically examines the most influential and most fully developed form of global inferentialism: Robert Brandom’s inferentialism about linguistic and conceptual content in general. Finally, in §4 we consider a number of general objections to IRS and consider possible responses on the inferentialist’s behalf

Breaking the Economic Barrier of Caching in Cellular Networks: Incentives and Contracts

In this paper, a novel approach for providing incentives for caching in small cell networks (SCNs) is proposed based on the economics framework of contract theory. In this model, a mobile network operator (MNO) designs contracts that will be offered to a number of content providers (CPs) to motivate them to cache their content at the MNO's small base stations (SBSs). A practical model in which information about the traffic generated by the CPs' users is not known to the MNO is considered. Under such asymmetric information, the incentive contract between the MNO and each CP is properly designed so as to determine the amount of allocated storage to the CP and the charged price by the MNO. The contracts are derived by the MNO in a way to maximize the global benefit of the CPs and prevent them from using their private information to manipulate the outcome of the caching process. For this interdependent contract model, the closed-form expressions of the price and the allocated storage space to each CP are derived. This proposed mechanism is shown to satisfy the sufficient and necessary conditions for the feasibility of a contract. Moreover, it is shown that the proposed pricing model is budget balanced, enabling the MNO to cover all the caching expenses via the prices charged to the CPs. Simulation results show that none of the CPs will have an incentive to choose a contract designed for CPs with different traffic loads.Comment: Accepted for publication at Globecom 201