Towards an Active Foveated Approach to Computer Vision

In this paper, a series of experimental methods are presented explaining a new approach towards active foveated Computer Vision (CV). This is a collaborative effort between researchers at CONICET Mendoza Technological Scientific Center from Argentina, Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Loyola University Chicago from the US. The aim is to advance new CV approaches more in line with those found in biological agents in order to bring novel solutions to the main problems faced by current CV applications. Basically this work enhance Self-supervised (SS) learning, incorporating foveated vision plus saccadic behavior in order to improve training and computational efficiency without reducing performance significantly. This paper includes a compendium of methods’ explanations, and since this is a work that is currently in progress, only preliminary results are provided. We also make our code fully available

When do circumstances excuse? Moral prejudices and beliefs about the true self drive preferences for agency-minimizing explanations

When explaining human actions, people usually focus on a small subset of potential causes. What leads us to prefer certain explanations for valenced actions over others? The present studies indicate that our moral attitudes often predict our explanatory preferences far better than our beliefs about how causally sensitive actions are to features of the actor's environment. Study 1 found that high-prejudice participants were much more likely to endorse non-agential explanations of an erotic same-sex encounter, such as that one of the men endured a stressful event earlier that day. Study 2 manipulated participants' beliefs about how the agent's behavior depended on features of his environment, finding that such beliefs played no clear role in modeling participants' explanatory preferences. This result emerged both with low- and high-prejudice, US and Indian participants, suggesting that these findings probably reflect a species-typical feature of human psychology. Study 3 found that moral attitudes also predicted explanations for a woman's decision to abort her pregnancy (3a) and a person's decision to convert to Islam (3b). Study 4 found that luck in an action's etiology tends to undermine perceptions of blame more readily than perceptions of praise. Finally, Study 5 found that when explaining support for a rival ideology, both Liberals and Conservatives downplay agential causes while emphasizing environmental ones. Taken together, these studies indicate that our explanatory preferences often reflect a powerful tendency to represent agents as possessing virtuous true selves. Consequently, situation-focused explanations often appear salient because people resist attributing negatively valenced actions to the true self. There is a person/situation distinction, but it is normative

An argument for the use of Aristotelian method in bioethics

The main claim of this paper is that the method outlined and used in Aristotle's Ethics is an appropriate and credible one to use in bioethics. Here “appropriate” means that the method is capable of establishing claims and developing concepts in bioethics and “credible” that the method has some plausibility, it is not open to obvious and immediate objection. It begins by suggesting why this claim matters and then gives a brief outline of Aristotle's method. The main argument is made in three stages. First, it is argued that Aristotelian method is credible because it compares favourably with alternatives. In this section it is shown that Aristotelian method is not vulnerable to criticisms that are made both of methods that give a primary place to moral theory (such as utilitarianism) and those that eschew moral theory (such as casuistry and social science approaches). As such, it compares favourably with these other approaches that are vulnerable to at least some of these criticisms. Second, the appropriateness of Aristotelian method is indicated through outlining how it would deal with a particular case. Finally, it is argued that the success of Aristotle's philosophy is suggestive of both the credibility and appropriateness of his method.</p

(WP 2020-01) The Sea Battle Tomorrow: The Identity of Reflexive Economic Agents

This paper develops a conception of reflexive economic agents as an alternative to the standard utility conception, and explains individual identity in terms of how agents adjust to change in a self-organizing way, an idea developed from Herbert Simon. The paper distinguishes closed equilibrium and open process conceptions of the economy, and argues the former fails to explain time in a before-and-after sense in connection with Aristotle’s sea battle problem. A causal model is developed to represent the process conception, and a structure-agency understanding of the adjustment behavior of reflexive economic agents is illustrated using Merton’s self-fulfilling prophecy analysis. Simon’s account of how adjustment behavior has stopping points is then shown to underlie how agents’ identities are disrupted and then self-organized, and the identity analysis this involves is applied to the different identity models of Merton, Ross, Arthur, and Kirman. Finally, the self-organization idea is linked to the recent ‘preference purification’ debate in bounded rationality theory regarding the ‘inner rational agent trapped in an outer psychological shell,’ and it is argued that the behavior of self-organizing agents involves them taking positions toward their own individual identities

Towards a sociology of (public) mourning?

Within the last decade or so there has been a growing recognition among sociologists of the role played by emotions in various aspects of human behaviour (witness, for example, the range of articles appearing in Sociology alone, e.g. Jackson 1993; Craib 1995; Burkitt 1997, and the formation of a BSA study group devoted to the sociology of emotion). This burgeoning focus on emotions has challenged sociology to rethink its dominant conception of the human subject as governed by rational and conscious thought alone. In so doing it has raised a question mark both against the adequacy of the (theoretical) tools used for analysing emotions which have developed from these premises and the ability of sociology in general to provide answers to such questions

Neo-Statecraft Theory, Historical Institutionalism and Institutional Change

This article provides a critical examination of the contribution that statecraft theory, which has been subject to recent revision and development, makes to the literature on institutional change. It articulates an emergent neo-statecraft approach that offers an agent-led form of historical institutionalism. This overcomes the common criticism that historical institutionalists underplay the creative role of actors. The article also argues that the approach brings back into focus the imperatives of electoral politics as a source of institutional change and provides a macro theory of change which is also commonly missing from historical institutionalist work. It can therefore identify previously unnoticed sources of stability and change, especially in states with strong executives and top-down political cultures

Morphogenetic Régulation in action:understanding inclusive governance, neoliberalizing processes in Palestine, and the political economy of the contemporary internet

The Morphogenetic Régulation approach (MR) contributes to the Morphogenetic Approach by explaining the material and ideational origins of change and stasis in agency, structure, and culture. In this paper, we focus on the expressive quality of ideas and systemic persistence in three research projects. The first demystifies inclusive governance and its adverse impacts. It shows how, contrary to institutions of governance, inclusiveness is not simply a norm but actually the explication of corporate agents’ ideas about rational choice institutionalism which leads to adverse impacts on vulnerable groups and ecologies known as adverse inclusion. The second investigates the role of ideas as adequacy and self-explication in guiding Palestinian actors’ actions towards the deepening of neoliberalization in Palestine. The third explains the relevance of the systemic persistence problematique for understanding how three juxtaposed themes–Web2, Web3, and Artificial Intelligence (AI)–are shaping the political economy and infrastructure of the Internet.</p

Interacting Unities: An Agent-Based System

Recently architects have been inspired by Thompsonis Cartesian deformations and Waddingtonis flexible topological surface to work within a dynamic field characterized by forces. In this more active space of interactions, movement is the medium through which form evolves. This paper explores the interaction between pedestrians and their environment by regarding it as a process occurring between the two. It is hypothesized that the recurrent interaction between pedestrians and environment can lead to a structural coupling between those elements. Every time a change occurs in each one of them, as an expression of its own structural dynamics, it triggers changes to the other one. An agent-based system has been developed in order to explore that interaction, where the two interacting elements, agents (pedestrians) and environment, are autonomous units with a set of internal rules. The result is a landscape where each agent locally modifies its environment that in turn affects its movement, while the other agents respond to the new environment at a later time, indicating that the phenomenon of stigmergy is possible to take place among interactions with human analogy. It is found that it is the environmentis internal rules that determine the nature and extent of change

Expectation-Aware Planning: A Unifying Framework for Synthesizing and Executing Self-Explaining Plans for Human-Aware Planning

In this work, we present a new planning formalism called Expectation-Aware planning for decision making with humans in the loop where the human's expectations about an agent may differ from the agent's own model. We show how this formulation allows agents to not only leverage existing strategies for handling model differences but can also exhibit novel behaviors that are generated through the combination of these different strategies. Our formulation also reveals a deep connection to existing approaches in epistemic planning. Specifically, we show how we can leverage classical planning compilations for epistemic planning to solve Expectation-Aware planning problems. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed formulation is the first complete solution to decision-making in the presence of diverging user expectations that is amenable to a classical planning compilation while successfully combining previous works on explanation and explicability. We empirically show how our approach provides a computational advantage over existing approximate approaches that unnecessarily try to search in the space of models while also failing to facilitate the full gamut of behaviors enabled by our framework

Teleology and mentalizing in the explanation of action

In empirically informed research on action explanation, philosophers and developmental psychologists have recently proposed a teleological account of the way in which we make sense of people’s intentional behavior. It holds that we typically don’t explain an agent’s action by appealing to her mental states but by referring to the objective, publically accessible facts of the world that count in favor of performing the action so as to achieve a certain goal. Advocates of the teleological account claim that this strategy is our main way of understanding people’s actions. I argue that common motivations mentioned to support the teleological account are insufficient to sustain its generalization from children to adults. Moreover, social psychological studies, combined with theoretical considerations, suggest that we do not explain actions mainly by invoking publically accessible, reason-giving facts alone but by ascribing mental states to the agent