Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online

The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first truthful, budget-feasible and $O(1)$-approximate mechanisms that run in polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions. Prior to our work, the only $O(1)$-approximation mechanism known for non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value queries. At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly enforce truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problem where---crucially---the agents are not ordered with respect to their marginal value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online setting as well. To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the case where additional feasibility constraints are present. We obtain $O(p)$-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a $p$-system. With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting that, when one cares about non-trivial approximation guarantees in polynomial time, our results are asymptotically best possible.Comment: Accepted to EC 201

Submodular Maximization Meets Streaming: Matchings, Matroids, and More

We study the problem of finding a maximum matching in a graph given by an input stream listing its edges in some arbitrary order, where the quantity to be maximized is given by a monotone submodular function on subsets of edges. This problem, which we call maximum submodular-function matching (MSM), is a natural generalization of maximum weight matching (MWM), which is in turn a generalization of maximum cardinality matching (MCM). We give two incomparable algorithms for this problem with space usage falling in the semi-streaming range---they store only $O(n)$ edges, using $O(n\log n)$ working memory---that achieve approximation ratios of $7.75$ in a single pass and $(3+\epsilon)$ in $O(\epsilon^{-3})$ passes respectively. The operations of these algorithms mimic those of Zelke's and McGregor's respective algorithms for MWM; the novelty lies in the analysis for the MSM setting. In fact we identify a general framework for MWM algorithms that allows this kind of adaptation to the broader setting of MSM. In the sequel, we give generalizations of these results where the maximization is over "independent sets" in a very general sense. This generalization captures hypermatchings in hypergraphs as well as independence in the intersection of multiple matroids.Comment: 18 page

Constrained Monotone Function Maximization and the Supermodular Degree

The problem of maximizing a constrained monotone set function has many practical applications and generalizes many combinatorial problems. Unfortunately, it is generally not possible to maximize a monotone set function up to an acceptable approximation ratio, even subject to simple constraints. One highly studied approach to cope with this hardness is to restrict the set function. An outstanding disadvantage of imposing such a restriction on the set function is that no result is implied for set functions deviating from the restriction, even slightly. A more flexible approach, studied by Feige and Izsak, is to design an approximation algorithm whose approximation ratio depends on the complexity of the instance, as measured by some complexity measure. Specifically, they introduced a complexity measure called supermodular degree, measuring deviation from submodularity, and designed an algorithm for the welfare maximization problem with an approximation ratio that depends on this measure. In this work, we give the first (to the best of our knowledge) algorithm for maximizing an arbitrary monotone set function, subject to a k-extendible system. This class of constraints captures, for example, the intersection of k-matroids (note that a single matroid constraint is sufficient to capture the welfare maximization problem). Our approximation ratio deteriorates gracefully with the complexity of the set function and k. Our work can be seen as generalizing both the classic result of Fisher, Nemhauser and Wolsey, for maximizing a submodular set function subject to a k-extendible system, and the result of Feige and Izsak for the welfare maximization problem. Moreover, when our algorithm is applied to each one of these simpler cases, it obtains the same approximation ratio as of the respective original work.Comment: 23 page

Differentially Private Decomposable Submodular Maximization

We study the problem of differentially private constrained maximization of decomposable submodular functions. A submodular function is decomposable if it takes the form of a sum of submodular functions. The special case of maximizing a monotone, decomposable submodular function under cardinality constraints is known as the Combinatorial Public Projects (CPP) problem [Papadimitriou et al., 2008]. Previous work by Gupta et al. [2010] gave a differentially private algorithm for the CPP problem. We extend this work by designing differentially private algorithms for both monotone and non-monotone decomposable submodular maximization under general matroid constraints, with competitive utility guarantees. We complement our theoretical bounds with experiments demonstrating empirical performance, which improves over the differentially private algorithms for the general case of submodular maximization and is close to the performance of non-private algorithms