The AGI Containment Problem

There is considerable uncertainty about what properties, capabilities and motivations future AGIs will have. In some plausible scenarios, AGIs may pose security risks arising from accidents and defects. In order to mitigate these risks, prudent early AGI research teams will perform significant testing on their creations before use. Unfortunately, if an AGI has human-level or greater intelligence, testing itself may not be safe; some natural AGI goal systems create emergent incentives for AGIs to tamper with their test environments, make copies of themselves on the internet, or convince developers and operators to do dangerous things. In this paper, we survey the AGI containment problem - the question of how to build a container in which tests can be conducted safely and reliably, even on AGIs with unknown motivations and capabilities that could be dangerous. We identify requirements for AGI containers, available mechanisms, and weaknesses that need to be addressed

Heterogeneity induces emergent functional networks for synchronization

We study the evolution of heterogeneous networks of oscillators subject to a state-dependent interconnection rule. We find that heterogeneity in the node dynamics is key in organizing the architecture of the functional emerging networks. We demonstrate that increasing heterogeneity among the nodes in state-dependent networks of phase oscillators causes a differentiation in the activation probabilities of the links. This, in turn, yields the formation of hubs associated to nodes with larger distances from the average frequency of the ensemble. Our generic local evolutionary strategy can be used to solve a wide range of synchronization and control problems

Effects of a Trust Mechanism on Complex Adaptive Supply Networks: An Agent-Based Social Simulation Study

This paper models a supply network as a complex adaptive system (CAS), in which firms or agents interact with one another and adapt themselves. And it applies agent-based social simulation (ABSS), a research method of simulating social systems under the CAS paradigm, to observe emergent outcomes. The main purposes of this paper are to consider a social factor, trust, in modeling the agents\' behavioral decision-makings and, through the simulation studies, to examine the intermediate self-organizing processes and the resulting macro-level system behaviors. The simulations results reveal symmetrical trust levels between two trading agents, based on which the degree of trust relationship in each pair of trading agents as well as the resulting collaboration patterns in the entire supply network emerge. Also, it is shown that agents\' decision-making behavior based on the trust relationship can contribute to the reduction in the variability of inventory levels. This result can be explained by the fact that mutual trust relationship based on the past experiences of trading diminishes an agent\'s uncertainties about the trustworthiness of its trading partners and thereby tends to stabilize its inventory levels.Complex Adaptive System, Agent-Based Social Simulation, Supply Network, Trust

Discovering Evolutionary Stepping Stones through Behavior Domination

Behavior domination is proposed as a tool for understanding and harnessing the power of evolutionary systems to discover and exploit useful stepping stones. Novelty search has shown promise in overcoming deception by collecting diverse stepping stones, and several algorithms have been proposed that combine novelty with a more traditional fitness measure to refocus search and help novelty search scale to more complex domains. However, combinations of novelty and fitness do not necessarily preserve the stepping stone discovery that novelty search affords. In several existing methods, competition between solutions can lead to an unintended loss of diversity. Behavior domination defines a class of algorithms that avoid this problem, while inheriting theoretical guarantees from multiobjective optimization. Several existing algorithms are shown to be in this class, and a new algorithm is introduced based on fast non-dominated sorting. Experimental results show that this algorithm outperforms existing approaches in domains that contain useful stepping stones, and its advantage is sustained with scale. The conclusion is that behavior domination can help illuminate the complex dynamics of behavior-driven search, and can thus lead to the design of more scalable and robust algorithms.Comment: To Appear in Proceedings of the Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference (GECCO 2017

Simplified Distributed Programming with Micro Objects

Developing large-scale distributed applications can be a daunting task. object-based environments have attempted to alleviate problems by providing distributed objects that look like local objects. We advocate that this approach has actually only made matters worse, as the developer needs to be aware of many intricate internal details in order to adequately handle partial failures. The result is an increase of application complexity. We present an alternative in which distribution transparency is lessened in favor of clearer semantics. In particular, we argue that a developer should always be offered the unambiguous semantics of local objects, and that distribution comes from copying those objects to where they are needed. We claim that it is often sufficient to provide only small, immutable objects, along with facilities to group objects into clusters.Comment: In Proceedings FOCLASA 2010, arXiv:1007.499

Utility Design for Distributed Resource Allocation -- Part I: Characterizing and Optimizing the Exact Price of Anarchy

Game theory has emerged as a fruitful paradigm for the design of networked multiagent systems. A fundamental component of this approach is the design of agents' utility functions so that their self-interested maximization results in a desirable collective behavior. In this work we focus on a well-studied class of distributed resource allocation problems where each agent is requested to select a subset of resources with the goal of optimizing a given system-level objective. Our core contribution is the development of a novel framework to tightly characterize the worst case performance of any resulting Nash equilibrium (price of anarchy) as a function of the chosen agents' utility functions. Leveraging this result, we identify how to design such utilities so as to optimize the price of anarchy through a tractable linear program. This provides us with a priori performance certificates applicable to any existing learning algorithm capable of driving the system to an equilibrium. Part II of this work specializes these results to submodular and supermodular objectives, discusses the complexity of computing Nash equilibria, and provides multiple illustrations of the theoretical findings.Comment: 15 pages, 5 figure