On resilient control of dynamical flow networks

Resilience has become a key aspect in the design of contemporary infrastructure networks. This comes as a result of ever-increasing loads, limited physical capacity, and fast-growing levels of interconnectedness and complexity due to the recent technological advancements. The problem has motivated a considerable amount of research within the last few years, particularly focused on the dynamical aspects of network flows, complementing more classical static network flow optimization approaches. In this tutorial paper, a class of single-commodity first-order models of dynamical flow networks is considered. A few results recently appeared in the literature and dealing with stability and robustness of dynamical flow networks are gathered and originally presented in a unified framework. In particular, (differential) stability properties of monotone dynamical flow networks are treated in some detail, and the notion of margin of resilience is introduced as a quantitative measure of their robustness. While emphasizing methodological aspects -- including structural properties, such as monotonicity, that enable tractability and scalability -- over the specific applications, connections to well-established road traffic flow models are made.Comment: accepted for publication in Annual Reviews in Control, 201

Possibilistic Information Flow Control for Workflow Management Systems

In workflows and business processes, there are often security requirements on both the data, i.e. confidentiality and integrity, and the process, e.g. separation of duty. Graphical notations exist for specifying both workflows and associated security requirements. We present an approach for formally verifying that a workflow satisfies such security requirements. For this purpose, we define the semantics of a workflow as a state-event system and formalise security properties in a trace-based way, i.e. on an abstract level without depending on details of enforcement mechanisms such as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). This formal model then allows us to build upon well-known verification techniques for information flow control. We describe how a compositional verification methodology for possibilistic information flow can be adapted to verify that a specification of a distributed workflow management system satisfies security requirements on both data and processes.Comment: In Proceedings GraMSec 2014, arXiv:1404.163

Common Representation of Information Flows for Dynamic Coalitions

We propose a formal foundation for reasoning about access control policies within a Dynamic Coalition, defining an abstraction over existing access control models and providing mechanisms for translation of those models into information-flow domain. The abstracted information-flow domain model, called a Common Representation, can then be used for defining a way to control the evolution of Dynamic Coalitions with respect to information flow