FIVE STEPS TO RESPONSIBILITY

Responsibility has entered the academic discourse of logicians hardly more than few decades ago. I suggest a logical concept of responsibility which employs ideas both from a number of theories belonging to different branches of logic as well from other academic areas. As a comment to this concept, I suggest five steps narrative scenario in order to show how the logical dimension of responsibility emerges from diverse tendencies in logic and other sciences. Here are the five steps briefly stated: Step 1. Developing modal formalisms capable of evaluative analysis of situations (deontic, epistemic and etc.). Step 2. Drawing a conceptual borderline between normal and non-normal (weak) logical systems. Step 3. Using different kinds of models. Step 4. Agent- and action- friendly turn in logic. Step 5. Creating formalisms for modeling different types of agency. An idea advocated here within 5-Steps route to responsibility is that this concept is a complex causal and evaluative (axiological) relation. A logical account may be given for causal and normative aspects of this relation. Unfolding the responsibility back and forth through 5 Steps will result in different concepts. The technicalities are minimized for the sake of keeping the philosophical scope of the paper. For the same reason I also refrain from discussing legal and juridical ramifications of the issue

Blameworthiness in Strategic Games

There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games

Knowledge and Blameworthiness

Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information

Blameworthiness in Multi-Agent Settings

We provide a formal definition of blameworthiness in settings where multiple agents can collaborate to avoid a negative outcome. We first provide a method for ascribing blameworthiness to groups relative to an epistemic state (a distribution over causal models that describe how the outcome might arise). We then show how we can go from an ascription of blameworthiness for groups to an ascription of blameworthiness for individuals using a standard notion from cooperative game theory, the Shapley value. We believe that getting a good notion of blameworthiness in a group setting will be critical for designing autonomous agents that behave in a moral manner.Comment: Appears in AAAI-1

The Problems with Blaming

This work examines the social practice of blaming, beginning with a prominent view of the moral philosophy of blaming, the semantics of character that support this (and related) views, and the social and cultural biases we bring to the process of attributing blame. Our penchant for blaming is too often manifest in a hyper-willingness to attribute wrongdoing solely to the character of the wrongdoer, often overlooking the salience of the varied situations in which the wrongdoer finds himself. I synthesize the wealth of data, mostly from social psychology, showing that blaming actualizes our own dispositions for over-emphasizing the actor’s wicked disposition to doing wrong in a process that, on balance, fails to serve our long term goal of providing a safer society for ourselves and our children. Finally, I address the role of blaming as part of the paradox of evil, and present an outline for a different approach

Private Requitals

Previously, I examined the establishment of a person’s substantive rights and, correlatively, duties. But this was only the first step. This Article addresses the second step: the means for recognizing requital rights violations, including their articulation, adoption, and implementation. Taking a deontic, individualistic perspective on rights, this Article aims to delineate and protect one’s personal freedom, one’s autonomy. To do so, this Article, using a formal understanding of the categorical imperative, will examine whether an agent’s chosen maxims are deontically acceptable. The maxims need to be both first-order, substantive ones that establish autonomy boundary baselines, and second-order, requital ones that address violations of the baselines. Important elements in perhaps all maxims, both first- and second-order, are the notions of harm, wrongfulness, and blameworthiness. Once an agent’s substantive and requital maxims are properly in place and honored, she is truly in a position to be an autonomous person