Economics of Arbitrability in International IP Contracting

IP arbitrability in international commercial disputes enshrines the friction between traders and holders, between private contracts and public registers, between party autonomy and mandatory rules. Particularly, non‑arbitrability of invalidity defenses concerning registered industrial intellectual property rights has been insufficiently analyzed as a crucial matter of recognition and enforcement of international awards. Consequently, a sound economic rationale on grounds of competitive advantages is disregarded in too many instances. Having regarded the ever‑growing importance of IP rights for companies’ productivity and today’s primary use of arbitration in cross‑border contracting, the present research aims at pointing that out. It applies a transaction cost economics approach and takes into account the legal comparative background. The study finally examines arbitrability of IP validity with inter‑partes effect as an operable solution and the advantages of a predictable model as was early adopted by the United States

THE COST OF COERCION: IS THERE A PLACE FOR “HARD” INTERVENTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW?

The contractual relationship between author and intermediary—be it a producer, publisher, or anyone facilitating the commercial exploitation of the author’s copyrighted works—is often viewed as an unequal one. Other than a minority of superstars, the vast majority of authors are forced to accept contractual terms dictated by their powerful counterparties. This outcome is perceived by many scholars and policymakers as undesirable. Thus, in an effort to protect the authors’ wellbeing in their contractual dealings, legislatures from around the world are increasingly keen to adopt regulatory measures that limit the menu of options the parties can adopt contractually. Specifically, these instruments endeavor to offset author’s weak bargaining position either by ensuring a minimum level of remuneration to authors’ ex-ante or providing them with an inalienable right to ask for a modification of the com-sensation stipulated in the contract ex-post or by granting them an inalienable right to regain control of their previously transferred rights. Overall, these legislative interventions are seemingly based on the assumption that regulating author-intermediary transactions ex ante and ex post will invariably improve the financial situation of authors as a whole. This assumption is mistaken. Drawing on insights from neoclassical and behavioral economics, the benefits and drawbacks of these interventions are narrated throughout this paper. It is further demonstrated that while these legislative interventions were adopted with the best possible intentions, they ultimately prove ineffective in meeting their own objective of securing authors a more favorable distribution of wealth. In fact, they occasionally harm the very group of beneficiaries they were designed to help. Particularly, the different forms of interventions into the author-intermediary contractual relationships create an inter-author redistribution of wealth and redistribution over time, which largely harm the most vulnerable groups of authors. These findings illustrate the limitations of the current legislative interventions that were designed to strengthen the position of authors vis-àvis their counterparties and emphasize that the structural disparities in bargaining powers cannot be easily remedied by legal intervention alone

THE COST OF COERCION: IS THERE A PLACE FOR “HARD” INTERVENTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW?

The contractual relationship between author and intermediary—be it a producer, publisher, or anyone facilitating the commercial exploitation of the author’s copyrighted works—is often viewed as an unequal one. Other than a minority of superstars, the vast majority of authors are forced to accept contractual terms dictated by their powerful counterparties. This outcome is perceived by many scholars and policymakers as undesirable. Thus, in an effort to protect the authors’ wellbeing in their contractual dealings, legislatures from around the world are increasingly keen to adopt regulatory measures that limit the menu of options the parties can adopt contractually. Specifically, these instruments endeavor to offset author’s weak bargaining position either by ensuring a minimum level of remuneration to authors’ ex-ante or providing them with an inalienable right to ask for a modification of the com-sensation stipulated in the contract ex-post or by granting them an inalienable right to regain control of their previously transferred rights. Overall, these legislative interventions are seemingly based on the assumption that regulating author-intermediary transactions ex ante and ex post will invariably improve the financial situation of authors as a whole. This assumption is mistaken. Drawing on insights from neoclassical and behavioral economics, the benefits and drawbacks of these interventions are narrated throughout this paper. It is further demonstrated that while these legislative interventions were adopted with the best possible intentions, they ultimately prove ineffective in meeting their own objective of securing authors a more favorable distribution of wealth. In fact, they occasionally harm the very group of beneficiaries they were designed to help. Particularly, the different forms of interventions into the author-intermediary contractual relationships create an inter-author redistribution of wealth and redistribution over time, which largely harm the most vulnerable groups of authors. These findings illustrate the limitations of the current legislative interventions that were designed to strengthen the position of authors vis-àvis their counterparties and emphasize that the structural disparities in bargaining powers cannot be easily remedied by legal intervention alone

Standardized Terms and Conditions For Open Patenting

After providing a legal characterization of the open patenting phenomenon and discussing many of the empirical and theoretical experiences that relate to both Open Innovation and defensive patenting, this paper suggests standardized terms and conditions that a patent license should contain in order to foster both the free movement of patented knowledge and its business applications

Academic freedom in Europe: time for a Magna Charta?

This paper is a preliminary attempt to establish a working definition of academic freedom for the European Union states. The paper details why such a definition is required for the European Union and then examines some of the difficulties of defining academic freedom. By drawing upon experience of the legal difficulties beset by the concept in the USA and building on previous analyses of constitutional and legislative protection for academic freedom, and of legal regulations concerning institutional governance and academic tenure, a working definition of academic freedom is then derived. The resultant definition which, it is suggested, could form the basis for a European Magna Charta Libertatis Academicae, goes beyond traditional discussions of academic freedom by specifying not only the rights inherent in the concept but also its accompanying duties, necessary limitations and safeguards. The paper concludes with proposals for how the definition might be tested and carried forward

Licenses and the Property/Contract Interface

INTRODUCTION I. THE ROLE OF FORMAL CATEGORIES II. THE COMPOUND-PAUCITAL LICENSE A. IDIOSYNCRASY AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES B. REGULATING LICENSES 1. THE NOTICE STRATEGY 2. THE PROTECTION STRATEGY III. RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION AND USE A. HARMS CAUSED BY RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION AND USE 1. INCREASED INFORMATION COSTS 2.WASTE B. LIMITING HARM WITH PROTECTIVE STANDARDIZATION 1. THE LICENSE V. SALE DISTINCTION IN PRACTICE 2.WHAT IS A DIGITAL SALE? 3. FAVORING SALES WITHOUT LOSING FLEXIBILITY C. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN IN REM AND IN PERSONAM LICENSE TERMS IV. LICENSE REVOCATION A. TIMING REVOCATION B. BENEFITS AND CONCERNS 1.MANAGING SHARED RESOURCES VS. UPSET RELIANCE INTERESTS 2. DESTABILIZING PERSONHOOD CONCLUSIO