Binary Sequent Calculi for Truth-invariance Entailment of Finite Many-valued Logics

In this paper we consider the class of truth-functional many-valued logics with a finite set of truth-values. The main result of this paper is the development of a new \emph{binary} sequent calculi (each sequent is a pair of formulae) for many valued logic with a finite set of truth values, and of Kripke-like semantics for it that is both sound and complete. We did not use the logic entailment based on matrix with a strict subset of designated truth values, but a different new kind of semantics based on the generalization of the classic 2-valued truth-invariance entailment. In order to define this non-matrix based sequent calculi, we transform many-valued logic into positive 2-valued multi-modal logic with classic conjunction, disjunction and finite set of modal connectives. In this algebraic framework we define an uniquely determined axiom system, by extending the classic 2-valued distributive lattice logic (DLL) by a new set of sequent axioms for many-valued logic connectives. Dually, in an autoreferential Kripke-style framework we obtain a uniquely determined frame, where each possible world is an equivalence class of Lindenbaum algebra for a many-valued logic as well, represented by a truth value.Comment: 21 page

The Modal Logics of Kripke-Feferman Truth

We determine the modal logic of fixed-point models of truth and their axiomatizations by Solomon Feferman via Solovay-style completeness results. Given a fixed-point model $\mathcal{M}$, or an axiomatization $S$ thereof, we find a modal logic $M$ such that a modal sentence $\varphi$ is a theorem of $M$ if and only if the sentence $\varphi^*$ obtained by translating the modal operator with the truth predicate is true in $\mathcal{M}$ or a theorem of $S$ under all such translations. To this end, we introduce a novel version of possible worlds semantics featuring both classical and nonclassical worlds and establish the completeness of a family of non-congruent modal logics whose internal logic is subclassical with respect to this semantics

The Modal Logics of Kripke-Feferman Truth

We determine the modal logic of fixed-point models of truth and their axiomatizations by Solomon Feferman via Solovay-style completeness results

Goldblatt-Thomason for LE-logics

We prove a uniform version of the Goldblatt-Thomason theorem for logics algebraically captured by normal lattice expansions (normal LE-logics)

Designing Normative Theories for Ethical and Legal Reasoning: LogiKEy Framework, Methodology, and Tool Support

A framework and methodology---termed LogiKEy---for the design and engineering of ethical reasoners, normative theories and deontic logics is presented. The overall motivation is the development of suitable means for the control and governance of intelligent autonomous systems. LogiKEy's unifying formal framework is based on semantical embeddings of deontic logics, logic combinations and ethico-legal domain theories in expressive classic higher-order logic (HOL). This meta-logical approach enables the provision of powerful tool support in LogiKEy: off-the-shelf theorem provers and model finders for HOL are assisting the LogiKEy designer of ethical intelligent agents to flexibly experiment with underlying logics and their combinations, with ethico-legal domain theories, and with concrete examples---all at the same time. Continuous improvements of these off-the-shelf provers, without further ado, leverage the reasoning performance in LogiKEy. Case studies, in which the LogiKEy framework and methodology has been applied and tested, give evidence that HOL's undecidability often does not hinder efficient experimentation.Comment: 50 pages; 10 figure

Negation in context

The present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest's dialetheic "Logic of Paradox"), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or "algebraic") value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well

The logic of vague categories

We introduce a complete many-valued semantics for basic normal lattice-based modal logic. This relational semantics is grounded on many-valued formal contexts from Formal Concept Analysis. We discuss an interpretation and possible applications of this logical framework for categorization theory to the formal analysis of multi-market competition.Comment: 24 page

An Approach to Fuzzy Modal Logic of Time Intervals

Temporal reasoning based on intervals is nowadays ubiquitous in artificial intelligence, and the most representative interval temporal logic, called HS, was introduced by Halpern and Shoham in the eighties. There has been a great effort in the past in studying the expressive power and computational properties of the satisfiability problem for HS and its fragments, but only recently HS has been proposed as a suitable formalism for artificial intelligence applications. Such applications highlighted some of the intrinsic limits of HS: Sometimes, when dealing with real-life data one is not able to express temporal relations and propositional labels in a definite, crisp way. In this paper, following the seminal ideas of Fitting and Zadeh, among others, we present a fuzzy generalization of HS that partially solves such problems of expressive power, and we prove that, as in the crisp case, its satisfiability problem is generally undecidable

Modelling socio-political competition

This paper continues the investigation of the logic of competing theories, be they scientific, social, political etc. We introduce a many-valued, multi-type modal language which we endow with relational semantics based on enriched reflexive graphs, inspired by Plo\v{s}\v{c}ica's representation of general lattices. We axiomatize the resulting many-valued, non-distributive modal logic of these structures and prove a completeness theorem. We illustrate the application of this logic through a case study in which we model competition among interacting political promises and social demands within an arena of political parties social groups.Comment: 24 page

New Directions in Justification Logic

Justification logics are constructive analogues of modal logics. As such, they provide perspicuous models of those modalities that have inherently constructive character, such as intuitionistic mathematical provability or the knowledge operator of evidentialist epistemology. In this dissertation, I examine a variety of positions in epistemology, along with their associated ontological commitments, and develop various classical and non-classical justification logics that are suitable for use as models of these positions