Directional adposition use in English, Swedish and Finnish

Directional adpositions such as to the left of describe where a Figure is in relation to a Ground. English and Swedish directional adpositions refer to the location of a Figure in relation to a Ground, whether both are static or in motion. In contrast, the Finnish directional adpositions edellä (in front of) and jäljessä (behind) solely describe the location of a moving Figure in relation to a moving Ground (Nikanne, 2003). When using directional adpositions, a frame of reference must be assumed for interpreting the meaning of directional adpositions. For example, the meaning of to the left of in English can be based on a relative (speaker or listener based) reference frame or an intrinsic (object based) reference frame (Levinson, 1996). When a Figure and a Ground are both in motion, it is possible for a Figure to be described as being behind or in front of the Ground, even if neither have intrinsic features. As shown by Walker (in preparation), there are good reasons to assume that in the latter case a motion based reference frame is involved. This means that if Finnish speakers would use edellä (in front of) and jäljessä (behind) more frequently in situations where both the Figure and Ground are in motion, a difference in reference frame use between Finnish on one hand and English and Swedish on the other could be expected. We asked native English, Swedish and Finnish speakers’ to select adpositions from a language specific list to describe the location of a Figure relative to a Ground when both were shown to be moving on a computer screen. We were interested in any differences between Finnish, English and Swedish speakers. All languages showed a predominant use of directional spatial adpositions referring to the lexical concepts TO THE LEFT OF, TO THE RIGHT OF, ABOVE and BELOW. There were no differences between the languages in directional adpositions use or reference frame use, including reference frame use based on motion. We conclude that despite differences in the grammars of the languages involved, and potential differences in reference frame system use, the three languages investigated encode Figure location in relation to Ground location in a similar way when both are in motion. Levinson, S. C. (1996). Frames of reference and Molyneux’s question: Crosslingiuistic evidence. In P. Bloom, M.A. Peterson, L. Nadel & M.F. Garrett (Eds.) Language and Space (pp.109-170). Massachusetts: MIT Press. Nikanne, U. (2003). How Finnish postpositions see the axis system. In E. van der Zee & J. Slack (Eds.), Representing direction in language and space. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Walker, C. (in preparation). Motion encoding in language, the use of spatial locatives in a motion context. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Lincoln, Lincoln. United Kingdo

Six challenges for embodiment research

20 years after Barsalou's seminal perceptual symbols paper (Barsalou, 1999), embodied cognition, the notion that cognition involves simulations of sensory, motor, or affective states, has moved in status from an outlandish proposal advanced by a fringe movement in psychology to a mainstream position adopted by large numbers of researchers in the psychological and cognitive (neuro)sciences. While it has generated highly productive work in the cognitive sciences as a whole, it had a particularly strong impact on research into language comprehension. The view of a mental lexicon based on symbolic word representations, which are arbitrarily linked to sensory aspects of their referents, for example, was generally accepted since the cognitive revolution in the 1950s. This has radically changed. Given the current status of embodiment as a main theory of cognition, it is somewhat surprising that a close look at the state of the affairs in the literature reveals that the debate about the nature of the processes involved in language comprehension is far from settled and key questions remain unanswered. We present several suggestions for a productive way forward

Lexical Flexibility, Natural Language, and Ontology

The Realist that investigates questions of ontology by appeal to the quantificational structure of language assumes that the semantics for the privileged language of ontology is externalist. I argue that such a language cannot be (some variant of) a natural language, as some Realists propose. The flexibility exhibited by natural language expressions noted by Chomsky and others cannot obviously be characterized by the rigid models available to the externalist. If natural languages are hostile to externalist treatments, then the meanings of natural language expressions serve as poor guides for ontological investigation, insofar as their meanings will fail to determine the referents of their constituents. This undermines the Realist’s use of natural languages to settle disputes in metaphysics

A systemic functional analysis of TOEFL sample writings

The purpose of this study is to investigate the tendency of the structural and lexico-grammatical features between high score writings and low score writings by comparing some sample writings of TOEFL practice text books from the perspectives of Systemic Functional Linguistics. Especially, this study focuses on analyzing clause complex, grammatical metaphor, lexical density, and causality of the sample writings of TOEFL practice books. The analysis shows the tendency to get higher scores with appropriate and effective writing structure of the writing section of TOFL iBT. Actually, most practice textbooks briefly provide only the templates that enable the test takers to memorize the form of the construction of the writing and some simple ways of use of conjunctions which is for logically structured writings. The study proves some defects of introduction and explanation part of the writing section of TOEFL iBT; especially, the explanation of ways of conducting text flow, such as effective use of adverbs and conjunctions and word choices, and so on

Deep Lexical Semantics: The Ontological Ascent

PACLIC 21 / Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea / November 1-3, 200

Linguistic Variation from Cognitive Variability: The Case of English \u27Have\u27

In this dissertation, I seek to construct a model of meaning variation built upon variability in linguistic structure, conceptual structure, and cognitive makeup, and in doing so, exemplify an approach to studying meaning that is both linguistically principled and neuropsychologically grounded. As my test case, I make use of the English lexical item ‘have\u27 by proposing a novel analysis of its meaning based on its well-described variability in English and its embed- ding into crosslinguistically consistent patterns of variation and change.I support this analysis by investigating its real-time comprehension patterns through behavioral, electropsychophysiological, and hemodynamic brain data, thereby incorporating dimensions of domain-general cognitive variability as crucial determinants of linguistic variability. Per my account, ‘have\u27 retrieves a generalized relational meaning which can give rise to a conceptually constrained range of readings, depending on the degree of causality perceived from either linguistic or contextual cues. Results show that comprehenders can make use of both for ‘have\u27-sentences, though they vary in the degree to which they rely on each.At the very broadest level, the findings support a model in which the semantic distribution of ‘have\u27 is inherently principled due to a unified conceptual structure. This underlying conceptual structure and relevant context cooperate in guiding comprehension by modulating the salience of potential readings, as comprehension unfolds; though, this ability to use relevant context–context-sensitivity–is variable but systematic across comprehenders. These linguistic and cognitive factors together form the core of normal language processing and, with a gradient conceptual framework, the minimal infrastructure for meaning variation and change

Linguistic variation from cognitive variability: the case of English \u27have\u27

In this dissertation, I seek to construct a model of meaning variation built upon variability in linguistic structure, conceptual structure, and cognitive makeup, and in doing so, exemplify an approach to studying meaning that is both linguistically principled and neuropsychologically grounded. As my test case, I make use of the English lexical item \u27have\u27 by proposing a novel analysis of its meaning based on its well-described variability in English and its embedding into crosslinguistically consistent patterns of variation and change. I support this analysis by investigating its real-time comprehension patterns through behavioral, electropsychophysiological, and hemodynamic brain data, thereby incorporating dimensions of domain-general cognitive variability as crucial determinants of linguistic variability. Per my account, \u27have\u27 retrieves a generalized relational meaning which can give rise to a conceptually constrained range of readings, depending on the degree of causality perceived from either linguistic or contextual cues. Results show that comprehenders can make use of both for \u27have\u27-sentences, though they vary in the degree to which they rely on each. At the very broadest level, the findings support a model in which the semantic distribution of \u27have\u27 is inherently principled due to a unified conceptual structure. This underlying conceptual structure and relevant context cooperate in guiding comprehension by modulating the salience of potential readings, as comprehension unfolds; though, this ability to use relevant context--context-sensitivity--is variable but systematic across comprehenders. These linguistic and cognitive factors together form the core of normal language processing and, with a gradient conceptual framework, the minimal infrastructure for meaning variation and change