2,501 research outputs found
Sublinear-Time Algorithms for Monomer-Dimer Systems on Bounded Degree Graphs
For a graph , let be the partition function of the
monomer-dimer system defined by , where is the
number of matchings of size in . We consider graphs of bounded degree
and develop a sublinear-time algorithm for estimating at an
arbitrary value within additive error with high
probability. The query complexity of our algorithm does not depend on the size
of and is polynomial in , and we also provide a lower bound
quadratic in for this problem. This is the first analysis of a
sublinear-time approximation algorithm for a # P-complete problem. Our
approach is based on the correlation decay of the Gibbs distribution associated
with . We show that our algorithm approximates the probability
for a vertex to be covered by a matching, sampled according to this Gibbs
distribution, in a near-optimal sublinear time. We extend our results to
approximate the average size and the entropy of such a matching within an
additive error with high probability, where again the query complexity is
polynomial in and the lower bound is quadratic in .
Our algorithms are simple to implement and of practical use when dealing with
massive datasets. Our results extend to other systems where the correlation
decay is known to hold as for the independent set problem up to the critical
activity
Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the VC Dimension
Algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) studies the delicate interplay between
computational efficiency, truthfulness, and optimality. We focus on AMD's
paradigmatic problem: combinatorial auctions. We present a new generalization
of the VC dimension to multivalued collections of functions, which encompasses
the classical VC dimension, Natarajan dimension, and Steele dimension. We
present a corresponding generalization of the Sauer-Shelah Lemma and harness
this VC machinery to establish inapproximability results for deterministic
truthful mechanisms. Our results essentially unify all inapproximability
results for deterministic truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions to
date and establish new separation gaps between truthful and non-truthful
algorithms
On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions
We consider the following communication problem: Alice and Bob each have some
valuation functions and over subsets of items,
and their goal is to partition the items into in a way that
maximizes the welfare, . We study both the allocation
problem, which asks for a welfare-maximizing partition and the decision
problem, which asks whether or not there exists a partition guaranteeing
certain welfare, for binary XOS valuations. For interactive protocols with
communication, a tight 3/4-approximation is known for both
[Fei06,DS06].
For interactive protocols, the allocation problem is provably harder than the
decision problem: any solution to the allocation problem implies a solution to
the decision problem with one additional round and additional bits of
communication via a trivial reduction. Surprisingly, the allocation problem is
provably easier for simultaneous protocols. Specifically, we show:
1) There exists a simultaneous, randomized protocol with polynomial
communication that selects a partition whose expected welfare is at least
of the optimum. This matches the guarantee of the best interactive, randomized
protocol with polynomial communication.
2) For all , any simultaneous, randomized protocol that
decides whether the welfare of the optimal partition is or correctly with probability requires
exponential communication. This provides a separation between the attainable
approximation guarantees via interactive () versus simultaneous () protocols with polynomial communication.
In other words, this trivial reduction from decision to allocation problems
provably requires the extra round of communication
Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures
This document collects the lecture notes from my mini-course "Complexity
Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," taught at the Bellairs Research Institute
of McGill University, Holetown, Barbados, February 19--23, 2017, as the 29th
McGill Invitational Workshop on Computational Complexity.
The goal of this mini-course is twofold: (i) to explain how complexity theory
has helped illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory; and (ii)
to illustrate how game-theoretic questions have led to new and interesting
complexity theory, including recent several breakthroughs. It consists of two
five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and
computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures,
focusing on applications of complexity theory in game theory and economics. No
background in game theory is assumed.Comment: Revised v2 from December 2019 corrects some errors in and adds some
recent citations to v1 Revised v3 corrects a few typos in v
Finding Weighted Graphs by Combinatorial Search
We consider the problem of finding edges of a hidden weighted graph using a
certain type of queries. Let be a weighted graph with vertices. In the
most general setting, the vertices are known and no other information about
is given. The problem is finding all edges of and their weights using
additive queries, where, for an additive query, one chooses a set of vertices
and asks the sum of the weights of edges with both ends in the set. This model
has been extensively used in bioinformatics including genom sequencing.
Extending recent results of Bshouty and Mazzawi, and Choi and Kim, we present a
polynomial time randomized algorithm to find the hidden weighted graph when
the number of edges in is known to be at most and the weight
of each edge satisfies \ga \leq |w(e)|\leq \gb for fixed constants
\ga, \gb>0. The query complexity of the algorithm is , which is optimal up to a constant factor
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