Financing Africa: Through the crisis and beyond.

[Dataset available: http://hdl.handle.net/10411/17679]

The State of the Region: Hampton Roads 2017

This is Old Dominion University\u27s 18th annual State of the Region report. While it represents the work of many people connected in various ways to the university, the report does not constitute an official viewpoint of Old Dominion, or its president, John R. Broderick. The report maintains the goal of stimulating thought and discussion that ultimately will make Hampton Roads an even better place to live. We are proud of our regions many successes, but realize that it is possible to improve our performance. In order to do so, we must have accurate information about where we are and a sound understanding of the policy options open to us.https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/economics_books/1021/thumbnail.jp

Was the IMF's Imposition of Economic Regime Change Justified? A Critique of the IMF's Economic and Political Role in Korea During and After the Crisis

As late as October 1997 the IMF declared that the Korean economy was experiencing a temporary liquidity squeeze, not a solvency problem. Yet in December 1997 Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer declared that Korea suffered from a systemic “breakdown of economic relations” so complete that only radical economic restructuring could restore prosperity. The IMF attached what it called “extreme structural conditionality” to its loan agreements with Korea, demanding a complete and rapid transition from Korea’s traditional East Asian economic model to a globally integrated neoliberal model. We subject the IMF’s assertion that the allocative efficiency of the Korean economy had collapsed by 1997 to a number of empirical tests, including time series and cross-section analyses of capital productivity and corporate profitability, and firm and industry level econometric tests of the proposition that investment spending was excessive and misallocated in the pre-crisis period. This evidence does not support the IMF’s systemic breakdown claim. We conclude that the IMF’s imposition of “extreme structural conditionality” on Korea is best understood as an illegitimate and antidemocratic exercise of power designed to meet the needs of the IMF’s key constituents rather than those of the majority of Korea’s people.