3,060 research outputs found
Exploiting Input Sanitization for Regex Denial of Service
Web services use server-side input sanitization to guard against harmful input. Some web services publish their sanitization logic to make their client interface more usable, e.g., allowing clients to debug invalid requests locally. However, this usability practice poses a security risk. Specifically, services may share the regexes they use to sanitize input strings — and regex-based denial of service (ReDoS) is an emerging threat. Although prominent service outages caused by ReDoS have spurred interest in this topic, we know little about the degree to which live web services are vulnerable to ReDoS.
In this paper, we conduct the first black-box study measuring the extent of ReDoS vulnerabilities in live web services. We apply the Consistent Sanitization Assumption: that client-side sanitization logic, including regexes, is consistent with the sanitization logic on the server-side. We identify a service’s regex-based input sanitization in its HTML forms or its API, find vulnerable regexes among these regexes, craft ReDoS probes, and pinpoint vulnerabilities. We analyzed the HTML forms of 1,000 services and the APIs of 475 services. Of these, 355 services publish regexes; 17 services publish unsafe regexes; and 6 services are vulnerable to ReDoS through their APIs (6 domains; 15 subdomains). Both Microsoft and Amazon Web Services patched their web services as a result of our disclosure. Since these vulnerabilities were from API specifications, not HTML forms, we proposed a ReDoS defense for a popular API validation library, and our patch has been merged. To summarize: in client-visible sanitization logic, some web services advertise ReDoS vulnerabilities in plain sight. Our results motivate short-term patches and long-term fundamental solutions
Side-channel timing attack on content privacy of named data networking
Tese de Doutoramento em Engenharia Electrónica e de ComputadoresA diversity of current applications, such as Netflix, YouTube, and social media, have used the Internet mainly
as a content distribution network. Named Data Networking (NDN) is a network paradigm that attempts to
answer today’s applications need by naming the content. NDN promises an optimized content distribution
through a named content-centric design. One of the NDN key features is the use of in-network caching
to improve network efficiency in terms of content distribution. However, the cached contents may put the
consumer privacy at risk. Since the time response of cached contents is different from un-cached contents,
the adversary may distinguish the cached contents (targets) from un-cached ones, through the side-channel
timing responses. The scope of attack can be towards the content, the name, or the signature. For instance,
the adversary may obtain the call history, the callee or caller location on a trusted Voice over NDN (VoNDN)
and the popularity of contents in streaming applications (e.g. NDNtube, NDNlive) through side-channel
timing responses of the cache.
The side-channel timing attack can be mitigated by manipulating the time of the router responses. The
countermeasures proposed by other researches, such as additional delay, random/probabilistic caching,
group signatures, and no-caching can effectively be used to mitigate the attack. However, the content
distribution may be affected by pre-configured countermeasures which may go against the goal of the
original NDN paradigm. In this work, the detection and defense (DaD) approach is proposed to mitigate the
attack efficiently and effectively. With the DaD usage, an attack can be detected by a multi-level detection
mechanism, in order to apply the countermeasures against the adversarial faces. Also, the detections can
be used to determine the severity of the attack. In order to detect the behavior of an adversary, a brute-force
timing attack was implemented and simulated with the following applications and testbeds: i. a trusted
application that mimics the VoNDN and identifies the cached certificate on a worldwide NDN testbed, and
ii. a streaming-like NDNtube application to identify the popularity of videos on the NDN testbed and AT&T
company. In simulation primary results showed that the multi-level detection based on DaD mitigated the
attack about 39.1% in best-route, and 36.6% in multicast communications. Additionally, the results showed
that DaD preserves privacy without compromising the efficiency benefits of in-network caching in NDNtube
and VoNDN applications.Várias aplicações atuais, como o Netflix e o YouTube, têm vindo a usar a Internet como uma rede de
distribuição de conteúdos. O Named Data Networking (NDN) é um paradigma recente nas redes de comunicações
que tenta responder às necessidades das aplicações modernas, através da nomeação dos
conteúdos. O NDN promete uma otimização da distribuição dos conteúdos usando uma rede centrada
nos conteúdos. Uma das características principais do NDN é o uso da cache disponivel nos nós da rede
para melhorar a eficiência desta em termos de distribuição de conteúdos. No entanto, a colocação dos
conteúdos em cache pode colocar em risco a privacidade dos consumidores. Uma vez que a resposta
temporal de um conteúdo em cache é diferente do de um conteúdo que não está em cache, o adversário
pode distinguir os conteúdos que estão em cache dos que não estão em cache, através das respostas de
side-channel. O objectivo do ataque pode ser direcionado para o conteúdo, o nome ou a assinatura da
mensagem. Por exemplo, o adversário pode obter o histórico de chamadas, a localização do callee ou do
caller num serviço seguro de voz sobre NDN (VoNDN) e a popularidade do conteúdos em aplicações de
streaming (e.g. NDNtube, NDNlive) através das respostas temporais de side-channel.
O side-channel timing attack pode ser mitigado manipulando o tempo das respostas dos routers. As
contramedidas propostas por outros pesquisadores, tais como o atraso adicional, o cache aleatório /probabilístico,
as assinaturas de grupo e não fazer cache, podem ser efetivamente usadas para mitigar um
ataque. No entanto, a distribuição de conteúdos pode ser afetada por contramedidas pré-configuradas
que podem ir contra o propósito original do paradigma NDN. Neste trabalho, a abordagem de detecção e
defesa (DaD) é proposta para mitigar o ataque de forma eficiente e eficaz. Com o uso do DaD, um ataque
pode ser detectado por um mecanismo de detecção multi-nível, a fim de aplicar as contramedidas contra
as interfaces dos adversários. Além disso, as detecções podem ser usadas para determinar a gravidade
do ataque. A fim de detectar o comportamento de um adversário, um timing attack de força-bruta foi
implementado e simulado com as seguintes aplicações e plataformas (testbeds): i. uma aplicação segura
que implementa o VoNDN e identifica o certificado em cache numa plataforma NDN mundial; e ii. uma
aplicação de streaming do tipo NDNtube para identificar a popularidade de vídeos na plataforma NDN da
empresa AT&T. Os resultados da simulação mostraram que a detecção multi-nível oferecida pelo DaD atenuou
o ataque cerca de 39,1% em best-route e 36,5% em comunicações multicast. Para avaliar o efeito nos
pedidos legítimos, comparou-se o DaD com uma contramedida estática, tendo-se verificado que o DaD foi
capaz de preservar todos os pedidos legítimos
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Traffic Analysis Attacks and Defenses in Low Latency Anonymous Communication
The recent public disclosure of mass surveillance of electronic communication, involving powerful government authorities, has drawn the public's attention to issues regarding Internet privacy. For almost a decade now, there have been several research efforts towards designing and deploying open source, trustworthy and reliable systems that ensure users' anonymity and privacy. These systems operate by hiding the true network identity of communicating parties against eavesdropping adversaries. Tor, acronym for The Onion Router, is an example of such a system. Such systems relay the traffic of their users through an overlay of nodes that are called Onion Routers and are operated by volunteers distributed across the globe. Such systems have served well as anti-censorship and anti-surveillance tools. However, recent publications have disclosed that powerful government organizations are seeking means to de-anonymize such systems and have deployed distributed monitoring infrastructure to aid their efforts.
Attacks against anonymous communication systems, like Tor, often involve trac analysis. In such attacks, an adversary, capable of observing network traffic statistics in several different networks, correlates the trac patterns in these networks, and associates otherwise seemingly unrelated network connections. The process can lead an adversary to the source of an anonymous connection. However, due to their design, consisting of globally distributed relays, the users of anonymity networks like Tor, can route their traffic virtually via any network; hiding their tracks and true identities from their communication peers and eavesdropping adversaries. De-anonymization of a random anonymous connection is hard, as the adversary is required to correlate traffic patterns in one network link to those in virtually all other networks. Past research mostly involved reducing the complexity of this process by rst reducing the set of relays or network routers to monitor, and then identifying the actual source of anonymous traffic among network connections that are routed via this reduced set of relays or network routers to monitor. A study of various research efforts in this field reveals that there have been many more efforts to reduce the set of relays or routers to be searched than to explore methods for actually identifying an anonymous user amidst the network connections using these routers and relays. Few have tried to comprehensively study a complete attack, that involves reducing the set of relays and routers to monitor and identifying the source of an anonymous connection. Although it is believed that systems like Tor are trivially vulnerable to traffic analysis, there are various technical challenges and issues that can become obstacles to accurately identifying the source of anonymous connection. It is hard to adjudge the vulnerability of anonymous communication systems without adequately exploring the issues involved in identifying the source of anonymous traffic.
We take steps to ll this gap by exploring two novel active trac analysis attacks, that solely rely on measurements of network statistics. In these attacks, the adversary tries to identify the source of an anonymous connection arriving to a server from an exit node. This generally involves correlating traffic entering and leaving the Tor network, linking otherwise unrelated connections. To increase the accuracy of identifying the victim connection among several connections, the adversary injects a traffic perturbation pattern into a connection arriving to the server from a Tor node, that the adversary wants to de-anonymize. One way to achieve this is by colluding with the server and injecting a traffic perturbation pattern using common traffic shaping tools. Our first attack involves a novel remote bandwidth estimation technique to conrm the identity of Tor relays and network routers along the path connecting a Tor client and a server by observing network bandwidth fluctuations deliberately injected by the server. The second attack involves correlating network statistics, for connections entering and leaving the Tor network, available from existing network infrastructure, such as Cisco's NetFlow, for identifying the source of an anonymous connection. Additionally, we explored a novel technique to defend against the latter attack. Most research towards defending against traffic analysis attacks, involving transmission of dummy traffic, have not been implemented due to fears of potential performance degradation. Our novel technique involves transmission of dummy traffic, consisting of packets with IP headers having small Time-to-Live (TTL) values. Such packets are discarded by the routers before they reach their destination. They distort NetFlow statistics, without degrading the client's performance. Finally, we present a strategy that employs transmission of unique plain-text decoy traffic, that appears sensitive, such as fake user credentials, through Tor nodes to decoy servers under our control. Periodic tallying of client and server logs to determine unsolicited connection attempts at the server is used to identify the eavesdropping nodes. Such malicious Tor node operators, eavesdropping on users' traffic, could be potential traffic analysis attackers
Discovering New Vulnerabilities in Computer Systems
Vulnerability research plays a key role in preventing and defending against malicious computer system exploitations. Driven by a multi-billion dollar underground economy, cyber criminals today tirelessly launch malicious exploitations, threatening every aspect of daily computing. to effectively protect computer systems from devastation, it is imperative to discover and mitigate vulnerabilities before they fall into the offensive parties\u27 hands. This dissertation is dedicated to the research and discovery of new design and deployment vulnerabilities in three very different types of computer systems.;The first vulnerability is found in the automatic malicious binary (malware) detection system. Binary analysis, a central piece of technology for malware detection, are divided into two classes, static analysis and dynamic analysis. State-of-the-art detection systems employ both classes of analyses to complement each other\u27s strengths and weaknesses for improved detection results. However, we found that the commonly seen design patterns may suffer from evasion attacks. We demonstrate attacks on the vulnerabilities by designing and implementing a novel binary obfuscation technique.;The second vulnerability is located in the design of server system power management. Technological advancements have improved server system power efficiency and facilitated energy proportional computing. However, the change of power profile makes the power consumption subjected to unaudited influences of remote parties, leaving the server systems vulnerable to energy-targeted malicious exploit. We demonstrate an energy abusing attack on a standalone open Web server, measure the extent of the damage, and present a preliminary defense strategy.;The third vulnerability is discovered in the application of server virtualization technologies. Server virtualization greatly benefits today\u27s data centers and brings pervasive cloud computing a step closer to the general public. However, the practice of physical co-hosting virtual machines with different security privileges risks introducing covert channels that seriously threaten the information security in the cloud. We study the construction of high-bandwidth covert channels via the memory sub-system, and show a practical exploit of cross-virtual-machine covert channels on virtualized x86 platforms
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Improving Security and Performance in Low Latency Anonymous Networks
Conventional wisdom dictates that the level of anonymity offered by low latency anonymity networks increases as the user base grows. However, the most significant obstacle to increased adoption of such systems is that their security and performance properties are perceived to be weak. In an effort to help foster adoption, this dissertation aims to better understand and improve security, anonymity, and performance in low latency anonymous communication systems.
To better understand the security and performance properties of a popular low latency anonymity network, we characterize Tor, focusing on its application protocol distribution, geopolitical client and router distributions, and performance. For instance, we observe that peer-to-peer file sharing protocols use an unfair portion of the network’s scarce bandwidth. To reduce the congestion produced by bulk downloaders in networks such as Tor, we design, implement, and analyze an anonymizing network tailored specifically for the BitTorrent peer-to-peer file sharing protocol. We next analyze Tor’s security and anonymity properties and empirically show that Tor is vulnerable to practical end-to-end traffic correlation attacks launched by relatively weak adversaries that inflate their bandwidth claims to attract traffic and thereby compromise key positions on clients’ paths. We also explore the security and performance trade-offs that revolve around path length design decisions and we show that shorter paths offer performance benefits and provide increased resilience to certain attacks. Finally, we discover a source of performance degradation in Tor that results from poor congestion and flow control. To improve Tor’s performance and grow its user base, we offer a fresh approach to congestion and flow control inspired by techniques from IP and ATM networks
Cache-based Side-Channel Attacks in Multi-Tenant Public Clouds and Their Countermeasures
Cloud computing is gaining traction due to the business agility, resource scalability and operational efficiency that it enables. However, the murkiness of the security assurances offered by public clouds to their tenants is one of the major impediments to enterprise and government adoption of cloud computing. This dissertation explores one of the major design flaws in modern public clouds, namely insufficient isolation among cloud tenants as evidenced by the cloud's inability to prevent side-channel attacks between co-located tenants, in both Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds and Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) clouds. Specifically, we demonstrate that one virtual machine (VM) can successfully exfiltrate cryptographic private keys from another VM co-located on the same physical machine using a cache-based side-channel attack, which calls into question the established belief that the security isolation provided by modern virtualization technologies remains adequate under the new threat model in multi-tenant public IaaS clouds. We have also demonstrated in commercial PaaS clouds that cache-based side channels can penetrate container-based isolation by extracting sensitive information from the execution paths of the victim applications, thereby subverting their security. Finally, we devise two defensive techniques for the IaaS setting, which can be adopted by cloud tenants immediately on modern cloud platforms without extra help from cloud providers, to address side-channel threats: (1) for tenants requiring a high degree of security and physical isolation, a tool to facilitate cloud auditing of such isolation; and (2) for tenants who use multi-tenant cloud services, an operating-system-level defense to defend against cache-based side-channel threats on their own.Doctor of Philosoph
Agent Organization and Request Propagation in the Knowledge Plane
In designing and building a network like the Internet, we continue to face the problems of scale and distribution. In particular, network management has become an increasingly difficult task, and network applications often need to maintain efficient connectivity graphs for various purposes. The knowledge plane was proposed as a new construct to improve network management and applications. In this proposal, I propose an application-independent mechanism to support the construction of application-specific connectivity graphs. Specifically, I propose to build a network knowledge plane and multiple sub-planes for different areas of network services. The network knowledge plane provides valuable knowledge about the Internet to the sub-planes, and each sub-plane constructs its own connectivity graph using network knowledge and knowledge in its own specific area. I focus on two key design issues: (1) a region-based architecture for agent organization; (2) knowledge dissemination and request propagation. Network management and applications benefit from the underlying network knowledge plane and sub-planes. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this mechanism, I conduct case studies in network management and security
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