Costless Discrimination and Unequal Achievements in a Labour Market Experiment

We investigate the emergence of discrimination in an experiment where individuals affiliated to different groups compete for a monetary prize, submitting independent bids to an auctioneer. The auctioneer receives perfect information about the bids (i.e. there is no statistical discrimination), and she has no monetary incentive to favour the members of her own group (the bidders are symmetric). We observe nonetheless some discrimination by auctioneers, who tend to assign the prize more frequently to a member of their own group when two or more players put forward the highest bid. Out-group bidders react to this bias and reduce significantly their bids, causing an average decay of their earnings throughout the game, with cumulative effects that generate strongly unequal outcomes. Because the initial bias is costless, such mechanism can survive even in competitive market, providing a rationale for a well-known puzzle in the literature, i.e. the long-run persistence of discrimination.discrimination, tournament, groups, experiment

Difference in Interim Performance and Risk Taking with Short-sale Constraints

Absent much theory, empirical works often rely on the following informal reasoning when looking for evidence of a mutual fund tournament: If there is a tournament, interim winners have incentives to decrease their portfolio volatility as they attempt to protect their lead, while interim losers are expected to increase their volatility so as to catch up with winners. We consider a rational model of a mutual fund tournament in the presence of short-sale constraints and find the opposite – interim winners choose more volatile portfolios in equilibrium than interim losers. Several empirical works present evidence consistent with our model, however based on the above informal argument they appear to conclude against the tournament behavior. We argue that this conclusion is unwarranted. We also demonstrate that tournament incentives lead to differences in interim performance for otherwise identical managers, and that mid-year trading volume is inversely related to mid-year stock return.mutual fund tournament, risk-taking incentives, relative performance, portfolio choice, short-sale constraints

Incentives in Economic Departments: Testing Tournaments?

Existing tests of tournament theory have recently been criticized for their failure to distinguish tournaments from other theories that have similar effects like standards and marginal productivity theory (Gibbs, 1994, 1996; Prendergast, 1999). In this paper, we propose a series of empirical tests that allow to make this distinction. We use a dataset of average wages by rank in US economic departments over the period 1977-1997 and link this information to individual production data to test whether wage gaps affect the productivity and cooperative behavior of economists and to control for marginal productivity theory. We find that the wage gap is increasing along the hierarchy, even when controlling for production by rank. Moreover, wages are more sensitive to productivity for higher ranks. We find some evidence that higher wage gaps lead to higher productivity but not that wage gaps depend on the number of contestants nor that they lead to less cooperation.incentives; sorting; tournaments; standards; marginal productivity; economic departments

Thought and Behavior Contagion in Capital Markets

Prevailing models of capital markets capture a limited form of social influence and information transmission, in which the beliefs and behavior of an investor affects others only through market price, information transmission and processing is simple (without thoughts and feelings), and there is no localization in the influence of an investor on others. In reality, individuals often process verbal arguments obtained in conversation or from media presentations, and observe the behavior of others. We review here evidence concerning how these activities cause beliefs and behaviors to spread, affect financial decisions, and affect market prices; and theoretical models of social influence and its effects on capital markets. Social influence is central to how information and investor sentiment are transmitted, so thought and behavior contagion should be incorporated into the theory of capital markets.capital markets; thought contagion; behavioral contagion; herd behavior; information cascades; social learning; investor psychology; accounting regulation; disclosure policy; behavioral finance; market efficiency; popular models; memes

The theory of the firm

January 1987, first draft, May 1987, latest revisio

The Legal Employment Market: Determinants of Elite Firm Placement, and How Law Schools Stack Up

Data collected on 15,293 law firm associates from 1295 employers who graduated from law school between 2001 and 2003 were used to develop a “total quality score” for every ABA-accredited law school, both nationally and for nine geographic regions. Quantitative methods were then used to identify factors that help explain the variation in a law school’s national career placement success at elite law firms. The findings revealed that while a law school’s academic reputation is the single biggest predictor of placement, several other factors were also highly significant. Differences in grading system, class rank disclosure policies, and the number of first year courses required were responsible for significant variation. Numbers grade systems, such as those used at the University of Chicago, and honors/pass/fail grading systems, such as those used by Yale, both have a strong negative impact on placement when all else is held equal, likely because both systems impair the middle of the class’s job prospects relative to traditional letter grade systems. Law schools that do not disclose class rank to students or employers place better than schools that disclose rank, when all else is held constant, although it is unclear whether this is due to employer preferences or due to disparate psychological effects on students that impact their career placement strategies. Law schools that require a greater number of first year classes, however, can make up for deficiencies in these other areas

Mutual funds: temporary problem or permanent morass?

The improprieties in the mutual fund industry that surfaced in the fall of 2003 prompted the passage and drafting of legislation and regulations that cover nearly every facet of mutual fund pricing and operations. While this regulatory flurry is clearly intended to protect shareholders’ interests, the question remains: How will these scandals and regulatory changes ultimately affect mutual fund investors? ; When considering the problems inherent in mutual fund management and the best ways to address them, it is important, the author stresses, to understand current business practices in the industry, who these benefit, and why they exist. ; Mutual fund investors, the author explains, are legally considered owners of a company that pools the investment capital of many investors. In practice, however, investors are often viewed (and often view themselves) as customers of a management firm that acts as an investment adviser. ; Regardless of which view is taken, inherent conflicts exist between investors and advisers because the two parties have differing objectives: Investors want to receive higher returns on their investment while minimizing risk, and advisers want to maximize their own profits without exerting undue efforts (costs). ; The author reviews a number of possible solutions to these conflicts of interest, including compensation-based fee structures, a separation of functions, proposed regulatory and legislative changes, and monitoring and information disclosure. ; By far the strongest weapon investors have in resolving these conflicts is their own demand, the author concludes. “When unfettered and free of frictions, a competitive marketplace will supply the products and services investors demand at the lowest possible price,” she notes.Mutual funds