3,133 research outputs found
Argument-based Belief in Topological Structures
This paper combines two studies: a topological semantics for epistemic
notions and abstract argumentation theory. In our combined setting, we use a
topological semantics to represent the structure of an agent's collection of
evidence, and we use argumentation theory to single out the relevant sets of
evidence through which a notion of beliefs grounded on arguments is defined. We
discuss the formal properties of this newly defined notion, providing also a
formal language with a matching modality together with a sound and complete
axiom system for it. Despite the fact that our agent can combine her evidence
in a 'rational' way (captured via the topological structure), argument-based
beliefs are not closed under conjunction. This illustrates the difference
between an agent's reasoning abilities (i.e. the way she is able to combine her
available evidence) and the closure properties of her beliefs. We use this
point to argue for why the failure of closure under conjunction of belief
should not bear the burden of the failure of rationality.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825
Logic and Topology for Knowledge, Knowability, and Belief - Extended Abstract
In recent work, Stalnaker proposes a logical framework in which belief is
realized as a weakened form of knowledge. Building on Stalnaker's core
insights, and using frameworks developed by Bjorndahl and Baltag et al., we
employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on this analysis. The
structure of topological subset spaces allows for a natural distinction between
what is known and (roughly speaking) what is knowable; we argue that the
foundational axioms of Stalnaker's system rely intuitively on both of these
notions. More precisely, we argue that the plausibility of the principles
Stalnaker proposes relating knowledge and belief relies on a subtle
equivocation between an "evidence-in-hand" conception of knowledge and a weaker
"evidence-out-there" notion of what could come to be known. Our analysis leads
to a trimodal logic of knowledge, knowability, and belief interpreted in
topological subset spaces in which belief is definable in terms of knowledge
and knowability. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic
as well as its uni-modal belief fragment. We then consider weaker logics that
preserve suitable translations of Stalnaker's postulates, yet do not allow for
any reduction of belief. We propose novel topological semantics for these
irreducible notions of belief, generalizing our previous semantics, and provide
sound and complete axiomatizations for the corresponding logics.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.08250. The full version of this
paper, including the longer proofs, is at arXiv:1612.0205
Mathematical models of games of chance: Epistemological taxonomy and potential in problem-gambling research
Games of chance are developed in their physical consumer-ready form on the basis of mathematical models, which stand as the premises of their existence and represent their physical processes. There is a prevalence of statistical and probabilistic models in the interest of all parties involved in the study of gambling – researchers, game producers and operators, and players – while functional models are of interest more to math-inclined players than problem-gambling researchers. In this paper I present a structural analysis of the knowledge attached to mathematical models of games of chance and the act of modeling, arguing that such knowledge holds potential in the prevention and cognitive treatment of excessive gambling, and I propose further research in this direction
The Implementation, Interpretation, and Justification of Likelihoods in Cosmology
I discuss the formal implementation, interpretation, and justification of likelihood attributions in cosmology. I show that likelihood arguments in cosmology suffer from significant conceptual and formal problems that undermine their applicability in this context
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