Tool supported risk modeling and analysis of evolving critical infrastructures

Part 2: Workshop; International audience; Risk management is coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk, and includes the identification, analysis and mitigation of unacceptable risks. For critical infrastructures consisting of interdependent systems, risk analysis and mitigation is challenging because the overall risk picture can be strongly affected by changes in only a few of the systems. In order to continuously manage risks and maintain an adequate level of protection, there is a need to continuously maintain the validity of risk models while systems change and evolve. This paper presents a risk analysis tool that supports the modeling and analysis of changing and evolving risks. The tool supports the traceability of system changes to risk models, as well as the explicit modeling of the impact on the risk picture. The tool, as well as the underlying risk analysis method, is exemplified and validated in the domain of air traffic management. Document type: Part of book or chapter of boo

RISK ASSESSMENT OF MALICIOUS ATTACKS AGAINST POWER SYSTEMS

The new scenarios of malicious attack prompt for their deeper consideration and mainly when critical systems are at stake. In this framework, infrastructural systems, including power systems, represent a possible target due to the huge impact they can have on society. Malicious attacks are different in their nature from other more traditional cause of threats to power system, since they embed a strategic interaction between the attacker and the defender (characteristics that cannot be found in natural events or systemic failures). This difference has not been systematically analyzed by the existent literature. In this respect, new approaches and tools are needed. This paper presents a mixed-strategy game-theory model able to capture the strategic interactions between malicious agents that may be willing to attack power systems and the system operators, with its related bodies, that are in charge of defending them. At the game equilibrium, the different strategies of the two players, in terms of attacking/protecting the critical elements of the systems, can be obtained. The information about the attack probability to various elements can be used to assess the risk associated with each of them, and the efficiency of defense resource allocation is evidenced in terms of the corresponding risk. Reference defense plans related to the online defense action and the defense action with a time delay can be obtained according to their respective various time constraints. Moreover, risk sensitivity to the defense/attack-resource variation is also analyzed. The model is applied to a standard IEEE RTS-96 test system for illustrative purpose and, on the basis of that system, some peculiar aspects of the malicious attacks are pointed ou

Critical Infrastructure Protection Approaches: Analytical Outlook on Capacity Responsiveness to Dynamic Trends

Overview: Critical infrastructures (CIs) – any asset with a functionality that is critical to normal societal functions, safety, security, economic or social wellbeing of people, and disruption or destruction of which would have a very significant negative societal impact. CIs are clearly central to the normal functioning of a nation’s economy and require to be protected from both intentional and unintentional sabotages. It is important to correctly discern and aptly manage security risks within CI domains. The protection (security) of CIs and their networks can provide clear benefits to owner organizations and nations including: enabling the attainment of a properly functioning social environment and economic market, improving service security, enabling integration to external markets, and enabling service recipients (consumers, clients, and users) to benefit from new and emerging technological developments. To effectively secure CI system, firstly, it is crucial to understand three things - what can happen, how likely it is to happen, and the consequences of such happenings. One way to achieve this is through modelling and simulations of CI attributes, functionalities, operations, and behaviours to support security analysis perspectives, and especially considering the dynamics in trends and technological adoptions. Despite the availability of several security-related CI modelling approaches (tools and techniques), trends such as inter-networking, internet and IoT integrations raise new issues. Part of the issues relate to how to effectively (more precisely and realistically) model the complex behavior of interconnected CIs and their protection as system of systems (SoS). This report attempts to address the broad goal around this issue by reviewing a sample of critical infrastructure protection approaches; comprising tools, techniques, and frameworks (methodologies). The analysis covers contexts relating to the types of critical infrastructures, applicable modelling techniques, risk management scope covered, considerations for resilience, interdependency, and policy and regulations factors. Key Findings: This research presents the following key findings: 1. There is not a single specific Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) approach – tool, technique, methodology or framework – that exists or emerges as a ‘fit-for-all’; to allow the modelling and simulation of cyber security risks, resilience, dependency, and impact attributes in all critical infrastructure set-ups. 2. Typically, two or more modelling techniques can be (need to be) merged to cover a broader scope and context of modelling and simulation applications (areas) to achieve desirable highlevel protection and security for critical infrastructures. 3. Empirical-based, network-based, agent-based, and system dynamics-based modelling techniques are more widely used, and all offer gains for their use. 4. The deciding factors for choosing modelling techniques often rest on; complexity of use, popularity of approach, types and objectives of user Organisation and sector. 5. The scope of modelling functions and operations also help to strike the balance between ‘specificity’ and ‘generality’ of modelling technique and approach for the gains of in-depth analysis and wider coverage respectively. 6. Interdependency and resilience modelling and simulations in critical infrastructure operations, as well as associated security and safety risks; are crucial characteristics that need to be considered and explored in revising existing or developing new CIP modelling approaches. Recommendations: Key recommendations from this research include: 1. Other critical infrastructure sectors such as emergency services, food & agriculture, and dams; need to draw lessons from the energy and transportation sectors for the successive benefits of: i. Amplifying the drive and efforts towards evaluating and understanding security risks to their infrastructure and operations. ii. Support better understanding of any associated dependencies and cascading impacts. iii. Learning how to establish effective security and resilience. iv. Support the decision-making process linked with measuring the effectiveness of preparedness activities and investments. v. Improve the behavioural security-related responses of CI to disturbances or disruptions. 2. Security-related critical infrastructure modelling approaches should be developed or revised to include wider scopes of security risk management – from identification to effectiveness evaluations, to support: i. Appropriate alignment and responsiveness to the dynamic trends introduced by new technologies such as IoT and IIoT. ii. Dynamic security risk management – especially the assessment section needs to be more dynamic than static, to address the recurrent and impactful risks that emerge in critical infrastructures

Evolution of security engineering artifacts: a state of the art survey

Security is an important quality aspect of modern open software systems. However, it is challenging to keep such systems secure because of evolution. Security evolution can only be managed adequately if it is considered for all artifacts throughout the software development lifecycle. This article provides state of the art on the evolution of security engineering artifacts. The article covers the state of the art on evolution of security requirements, security architectures, secure code, security tests, security models, and security risks as well as security monitoring. For each of these artifacts the authors give an overview of evolution and security aspects and discuss the state of the art on its security evolution in detail. Based on this comprehensive survey, they summarize key issues and discuss directions of future research

Report from GI-Dagstuhl Seminar 16394: Software Performance Engineering in the DevOps World

This report documents the program and the outcomes of GI-Dagstuhl Seminar 16394 "Software Performance Engineering in the DevOps World". The seminar addressed the problem of performance-aware DevOps. Both, DevOps and performance engineering have been growing trends over the past one to two years, in no small part due to the rise in importance of identifying performance anomalies in the operations (Ops) of cloud and big data systems and feeding these back to the development (Dev). However, so far, the research community has treated software engineering, performance engineering, and cloud computing mostly as individual research areas. We aimed to identify cross-community collaboration, and to set the path for long-lasting collaborations towards performance-aware DevOps. The main goal of the seminar was to bring together young researchers (PhD students in a later stage of their PhD, as well as PostDocs or Junior Professors) in the areas of (i) software engineering, (ii) performance engineering, and (iii) cloud computing and big data to present their current research projects, to exchange experience and expertise, to discuss research challenges, and to develop ideas for future collaborations

Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: a survey of techniques

SCADA systems monitor and control critical infrastructures of national importance such as power generation and distribution, water supply, transportation networks, and manufacturing facilities. The pervasiveness, miniaturisations and declining costs of internet connectivity have transformed these systems from strictly isolated to highly interconnected networks. The connectivity provides immense benefits such as reliability, scalability and remote connectivity, but at the same time exposes an otherwise isolated and secure system, to global cyber security threats. This inevitable transformation to highly connected systems thus necessitates effective security safeguards to be in place as any compromise or downtime of SCADA systems can have severe economic, safety and security ramifications. One way to ensure vital asset protection is to adopt a viewpoint similar to an attacker to determine weaknesses and loopholes in defences. Such mind sets help to identify and fix potential breaches before their exploitation. This paper surveys tools and techniques to uncover SCADA system vulnerabilities. A comprehensive review of the selected approaches is provided along with their applicability

Contrasting Views of Complexity and Their Implications For Network-Centric Infrastructures

There exists a widely recognized need to better understand and manage complex “systems of systems,” ranging from biology, ecology, and medicine to network-centric technologies. This is motivating the search for universal laws of highly evolved systems and driving demand for new mathematics and methods that are consistent, integrative, and predictive. However, the theoretical frameworks available today are not merely fragmented but sometimes contradictory and incompatible. We argue that complexity arises in highly evolved biological and technological systems primarily to provide mechanisms to create robustness. However, this complexity itself can be a source of new fragility, leading to “robust yet fragile” tradeoffs in system design. We focus on the role of robustness and architecture in networked infrastructures, and we highlight recent advances in the theory of distributed control driven by network technologies. This view of complexity in highly organized technological and biological systems is fundamentally different from the dominant perspective in the mainstream sciences, which downplays function, constraints, and tradeoffs, and tends to minimize the role of organization and design