786,579 research outputs found
To Work or Not? Simulating Inspection Game with Labor Unions
The model of social network is used to analyze the impact of the power of labor unions in the labor relations. We find that labor union capable to affect a pecuniary compensation of shirking employees lessens the motivation of employees to work and improve to the unionization rate. As a result, the performance of the firm is significantly deteriorated and its existence endangered. On the other hand, the inspection proved to be a successful method for âmotivatingâ employees to work. By using non-omniscient agents, we also estimated the cost of that non-omniscience, which proved to be significant in all cases.social networks, inspection game, evolutionary games
To trust or not to trust: cognitive reflection in trust game
We present results from two studies that show a positive relation between cognitive reflection and trusting behavior, but no significant relation with trustworthy behavior. Our finding holds regardless of individual distributional social preferences and risk aversion. Our results add to a growing body of literature that illustrates the role of cognitive ability in helping explain outcomes in economic experiments
To trust or not to trust: cognitive reflection in trust game
We present results from two studies that show a positive relation between cognitive reflection and trusting behavior, but no significant relation with trustworthy behavior. Our finding holds regardless of individual distributional social preferences and risk aversion. Our results add to a growing body of literature that illustrates the role of cognitive ability in helping explain outcomes in economic experiments
To Switch or Not to Switch Payment Scheme? Determinants and Effects in a Bargaining Game
The incentive scheme selected in a laboratory experiment might trigger
different type of behavior in participants. This paper is an attempt to screen
the strategies adopted by agents in a bargaining game when buyer and seller
have partly conflicting interests and are asymmetrically informed. We allow
participants to choose the incentive scheme through which they will be paid
at the end of the experiment controlling for past experience and individual
characteristics. It is well known that payment method is highly correlated to
the risk preferences shown by individuals, but little research is devoted to the
analysis of the behavior induced by Random Lottery Incentive scheme (RLI
for short) and Cumulative Scheme payment (CS for short) both on individual
and social results. This paper aims to fill the gap
"To sense" or "not to sense" in energy-efficient power control games
A network of cognitive transmitters is considered. Each transmitter has to
decide his power control policy in order to maximize energy-efficiency of his
transmission. For this, a transmitter has two actions to take. He has to decide
whether to sense the power levels of the others or not (which corresponds to a
finite sensing game), and to choose his transmit power level for each block
(which corresponds to a compact power control game). The sensing game is shown
to be a weighted potential game and its set of correlated equilibria is
studied. Interestingly, it is shown that the general hybrid game where each
transmitter can jointly choose the hybrid pair of actions (to sense or not to
sense, transmit power level) leads to an outcome which is worse than the one
obtained by playing the sensing game first, and then playing the power control
game. This is an interesting Braess-type paradox to be aware of for
energy-efficient power control in cognitive networks.Comment: Proc. of the 2nd International Conference on Game Theory for Network
(GAMENETS), 201
Progress in Behavioral Game Theory
Is game theory meant to describe actual choices by people and institutions or
not? It is remarkable how much game theory has been done while largely
ignoring this question. The seminal book by von Neumann and Morgenstern,
The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, was clearly about how rational players
would play against others they knew were rational. In more recent work, game
theorists are not always explicit about what they aim to describe or advise. At one
extreme, highly mathematical analyses have proposed rationality requirements that
people and firms are probably not smart enough to satisfy in everyday decisions. At
the other extreme, adaptive and evolutionary approaches use very simple models-mostly
developed to describe nonhuman animals-in which players may not realize
they are playing a game at all. When game theory does aim to describe behavior,
it often proceeds with a disturbingly low ratio of careful observation to theorizing
To Copy or Not to Copy, That is the Question: The Game Theory Approach to Protecting Fashion Designs
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