Estudio exploratorio de la técnicaTimming Attack en el criptosistema RSA

This paper makes an exploratory bibliographic analysis of the Timing Attack (TA) technique on the Side Channel Attacks (SCA) in RSA. The information assets, operation modes and countermeasures of 22 papers were analyzed. Findings show that smartcards are the most attacked information assets (32%), blinding is the most applied countermeasure (33%) and the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) or Montgomery Multiplication (MM) with CRT are the most frequent operation modes (41%). Furthermore, just one attack was executed in telecom unication systems, this opens the possibilty for future work, analyzing the same technique using the tecnologies WiMAX and the SIP VoIP protocol.  El presente trabajo realiza un análisis bibliográfico exploratorio del tipo de ataque Timing Attack (TA) de On The Side Channel Attack (SCA) en RSA. Para lo cual, se analizaron los activos de información, los modos de operación y las contramedidas efectuadas de 22 artículos. Los resultados evidencian que el activo de información que más ataques tuvo son las tarjetas inteligentes (32%), la contramedida mayormente aplicada es el cegamiento (33%) y los modos de operación más utilizados son el Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) o Montgomery Multiplication (MM) con CRT (41%). Adicionalmente se evidencia que sólo un ataque fue realizado a los sistemas de telecomunicaciones, lo cual permite plantear trabajos futuros en el análisis de la misma técnica con base en las tecnologías WiMAX y el protocolo SIP de VoIP. &nbsp

High-level Cryptographic Abstractions

The interfaces exposed by commonly used cryptographic libraries are clumsy, complicated, and assume an understanding of cryptographic algorithms. The challenge is to design high-level abstractions that require minimum knowledge and effort to use while also allowing maximum control when needed. This paper proposes such high-level abstractions consisting of simple cryptographic primitives and full declarative configuration. These abstractions can be implemented on top of any cryptographic library in any language. We have implemented these abstractions in Python, and used them to write a wide variety of well-known security protocols, including Signal, Kerberos, and TLS. We show that programs using our abstractions are much smaller and easier to write than using low-level libraries, where size of security protocols implemented is reduced by about a third on average. We show our implementation incurs a small overhead, less than 5 microseconds for shared key operations and less than 341 microseconds (< 1%) for public key operations. We also show our abstractions are safe against main types of cryptographic misuse reported in the literature

Under Quantum Computer Attack: Is Rainbow a Replacement of RSA and Elliptic Curves on Hardware?

Among cryptographic systems, multivariate signature is one of the most popular candidates since it has the potential to resist quantum computer attacks. Rainbow belongs to the multivariate signature, which can be viewed as a multilayer unbalanced Oil-Vinegar system. In this paper, we present techniques to exploit Rainbow signature on hardware meeting the requirements of efficient high-performance applications. We propose a general architecture for efficient hardware implementations of Rainbow and enhance our design in three directions. First, we present a fast inversion based on binary trees. Second, we present an efficient multiplication based on compact construction in composite fields. Third, we present a parallel solving system of linear equations based on Gauss-Jordan elimination. Via further other minor optimizations and by integrating the major improvement above, we implement our design in composite fields on standard cell CMOS Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs). The experimental results show that our implementation takes 4.9 us and 242 clock cycles to generate a Rainbow signature with the frequency of 50 MHz. Comparison results show that our design is more efficient than the RSA and ECC implementations

Low-Latency Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication

This paper presents a low-latency algorithm designed for parallel computer architectures to compute the scalar multiplication of elliptic curve points based on approaches from cryptographic side-channel analysis. A graphics processing unit implementation using a standardized elliptic curve over a 224-bit prime field, complying with the new 112-bit security level, computes the scalar multiplication in 1.9ms on the NVIDIA GTX 500 architecture family. The presented methods and implementation considerations can be applied to any parallel 32-bit architectur