Secure Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks

Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a promising concept to meet the challenges in next-generation networks such as providing flexible, adaptive, and reconfigurable architecture while offering cost-effective solutions to the service providers. Unlike traditional Wi-Fi networks, with each access point (AP) connected to the wired network, in WMNs only a subset of the APs are required to be connected to the wired network. The APs that are connected to the wired network are called the Internet gateways (IGWs), while the APs that do not have wired connections are called the mesh routers (MRs). The MRs are connected to the IGWs using multi-hop communication. The IGWs provide access to conventional clients and interconnect ad hoc, sensor, cellular, and other networks to the Internet. However, most of the existing routing protocols for WMNs are extensions of protocols originally designed for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and thus they perform sub-optimally. Moreover, most routing protocols for WMNs are designed without security issues in mind, where the nodes are all assumed to be honest. In practical deployment scenarios, this assumption does not hold. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of security issues in WMNs and then particularly focuses on secure routing in these networks. First, it identifies security vulnerabilities in the medium access control (MAC) and the network layers. Various possibilities of compromising data confidentiality, data integrity, replay attacks and offline cryptanalysis are also discussed. Then various types of attacks in the MAC and the network layers are discussed. After enumerating the various types of attacks on the MAC and the network layer, the chapter briefly discusses on some of the preventive mechanisms for these attacks.Comment: 44 pages, 17 figures, 5 table

Situational Awareness Enhancement for Connected and Automated Vehicle Systems

Recent developments in the area of Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) have boosted the interest in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs). While ITS is intended to resolve and mitigate serious traffic issues such as passenger and pedestrian fatalities, accidents, and traffic congestion; these goals are only achievable by vehicles that are fully aware of their situation and surroundings in real-time. Therefore, connected and automated vehicle systems heavily rely on communication technologies to create a real-time map of their surrounding environment and extend their range of situational awareness. In this dissertation, we propose novel approaches to enhance situational awareness, its applications, and effective sharing of information among vehicles.;The communication technology for CAVs is known as vehicle-to-everything (V2x) communication, in which vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) have been targeted for the first round of deployment based on dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) devices for vehicles and road-side transportation infrastructures. Wireless communication among these entities creates self-organizing networks, known as Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs). Due to the mobile, rapidly changing, and intrinsically error-prone nature of VANETs, traditional network architectures are generally unsatisfactory to address VANETs fundamental performance requirements. Therefore, we first investigate imperfections of the vehicular communication channel and propose a new modeling scheme for large-scale and small-scale components of the communication channel in dense vehicular networks. Subsequently, we introduce an innovative method for a joint modeling of the situational awareness and networking components of CAVs in a single framework. Based on these two models, we propose a novel network-aware broadcast protocol for fast broadcasting of information over multiple hops to extend the range of situational awareness. Afterward, motivated by the most common and injury-prone pedestrian crash scenarios, we extend our work by proposing an end-to-end Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P) framework to provide situational awareness and hazard detection for vulnerable road users. Finally, as humans are the most spontaneous and influential entity for transportation systems, we design a learning-based driver behavior model and integrate it into our situational awareness component. Consequently, higher accuracy of situational awareness and overall system performance are achieved by exchange of more useful information

Protocol and Architecture to Bring Things into Internet of Things

The Internet of Things (IoT) concept proposes that everyday objects are globally accessible from the Internet and integrate into new services having a remarkable impact on our society. Opposite to Internet world, things usually belong to resource-challenged environmentswhere energy, data throughput, and computing resources are scarce. Building upon existing standards in the field such as IEEE1451 and ZigBee and rooted in context semantics, this paper proposes CTP (Communication Things Protocol) as a protocol specification to allow interoperability among things with different communication standards as well as simplicity and functionality to build IoT systems. Also, this paper proposes the use of the IoT gateway as a fundamental component in IoT architectures to provide seamless connectivity and interoperability among things and connect two different worlds to build the IoT: the Things world and the Internet world. Both CTP and IoT gateway constitute a middleware content-centric architecture presented as the mechanism to achieve a balance between the intrinsic limitations of things in the physical world and what is required fromthem in the virtual world. Said middleware content-centric architecture is implemented within the frame of two European projects targeting smart environments and proving said CTP’s objectives in real scenarios

ACUTA Journal of Telecommunications in Higher Education

In This Issue lT Market Clock for Enterprise Networking lnfrastructure, 2010 Emerging Technology Trends-Finding the Next Big Thing Money and Mobile Access Challenge Community Colleges A Business Perspective on Hosted Communications FMC: Ready to Fly or Flop? Challenges Facing Broadband Wireless Providers Deploying IEEE 802.11n Data and Security Networks Campuswide While Optimizing Energy Efficiency Interview President\u27s Message. From the Executive Director O&A from the CI

Security Analysis for Distributed IoT-Based Industrial Automation

Internet of Things (IoT) technologies enable development of reconfigurable manufacturing systems--a new generation of modularized industrial equipment suitable for highly customized manufacturing. Sequential control in these systems is largely based on discrete events, whereas their formal execution semantics is specified as control interpreted Petri nets (CIPN). Despite industry-wide use of programming languages based on the CIPN formalism, formal verification of such control applications in the presence of adversarial activity is not supported. Consequently, in this article, we introduce security-aware modeling and verification techniques for CIPN-based sequential control applications. Specifically, we show how CIPN models of networked industrial IoT controllers can be transformed into time Petri net (TPN)-based models and composed with plant and security-aware channel models in order to enable system-level verification of safety properties in the presence of network-based attacks. Additionally, we introduce realistic channel-specific attack models that capture adversarial behavior using nondeterminism. Moreover, we show how verification results can be utilized to introduce security patches and facilitate design of attack detectors that improve system resiliency and enable satisfaction of critical safety properties. Finally, we evaluate our framework on an industrial case study

ACUTA Journal of Telecommunications in Higher Education

In This Issue lT Market Clock for Enterprise Networking lnfrastructure, 2010 Emerging Technology Trends-Finding the Next Big Thing Money and Mobile Access Challenge Community Colleges A Business Perspective on Hosted Communications FMC: Ready to Fly or Flop? Challenges Facing Broadband Wireless Providers Deploying IEEE 802.11n Data and Security Networks Campuswide While Optimizing Energy Efficiency Interview President\u27s Message. From the Executive Director O&A from the CI

On Age-of-Information Aware Resource Allocation for Industrial Control-Communication-Codesign

Unter dem Überbegriff Industrie 4.0 wird in der industriellen Fertigung die zunehmende Digitalisierung und Vernetzung von industriellen Maschinen und Prozessen zusammengefasst. Die drahtlose, hoch-zuverlässige, niedrig-latente Kommunikation (engl. ultra-reliable low-latency communication, URLLC) – als Bestandteil von 5G gewährleistet höchste Dienstgüten, die mit industriellen drahtgebundenen Technologien vergleichbar sind und wird deshalb als Wegbereiter von Industrie 4.0 gesehen. Entgegen diesem Trend haben eine Reihe von Arbeiten im Forschungsbereich der vernetzten Regelungssysteme (engl. networked control systems, NCS) gezeigt, dass die hohen Dienstgüten von URLLC nicht notwendigerweise erforderlich sind, um eine hohe Regelgüte zu erzielen. Das Co-Design von Kommunikation und Regelung ermöglicht eine gemeinsame Optimierung von Regelgüte und Netzwerkparametern durch die Aufweichung der Grenze zwischen Netzwerk- und Applikationsschicht. Durch diese Verschränkung wird jedoch eine fundamentale (gemeinsame) Neuentwicklung von Regelungssystemen und Kommunikationsnetzen nötig, was ein Hindernis für die Verbreitung dieses Ansatzes darstellt. Stattdessen bedient sich diese Dissertation einem Co-Design-Ansatz, der beide Domänen weiterhin eindeutig voneinander abgrenzt, aber das Informationsalter (engl. age of information, AoI) als bedeutenden Schnittstellenparameter ausnutzt. Diese Dissertation trägt dazu bei, die Echtzeitanwendungszuverlässigkeit als Folge der Überschreitung eines vorgegebenen Informationsalterschwellenwerts zu quantifizieren und fokussiert sich dabei auf den Paketverlust als Ursache. Anhand der Beispielanwendung eines fahrerlosen Transportsystems wird gezeigt, dass die zeitlich negative Korrelation von Paketfehlern, die in heutigen Systemen keine Rolle spielt, für Echtzeitanwendungen äußerst vorteilhaft ist. Mit der Annahme von schnellem Schwund als dominanter Fehlerursache auf der Luftschnittstelle werden durch zeitdiskrete Markovmodelle, die für die zwei Netzwerkarchitekturen Single-Hop und Dual-Hop präsentiert werden, Kommunikationsfehlerfolgen auf einen Applikationsfehler abgebildet. Diese Modellierung ermöglicht die analytische Ableitung von anwendungsbezogenen Zuverlässigkeitsmetriken wie die durschnittliche Dauer bis zu einem Fehler (engl. mean time to failure). Für Single-Hop-Netze wird das neuartige Ressourcenallokationsschema State-Aware Resource Allocation (SARA) entwickelt, das auf dem Informationsalter beruht und die Anwendungszuverlässigkeit im Vergleich zu statischer Multi-Konnektivität um Größenordnungen erhöht, während der Ressourcenverbrauch im Bereich von konventioneller Einzelkonnektivität bleibt. Diese Zuverlässigkeit kann auch innerhalb eines Systems von Regelanwendungen, in welchem mehrere Agenten um eine begrenzte Anzahl Ressourcen konkurrieren, statistisch garantiert werden, wenn die Anzahl der verfügbaren Ressourcen pro Agent um ca. 10 % erhöht werden. Für das Dual-Hop Szenario wird darüberhinaus ein Optimierungsverfahren vorgestellt, das eine benutzerdefinierte Kostenfunktion minimiert, die niedrige Anwendungszuverlässigkeit, hohes Informationsalter und hohen durchschnittlichen Ressourcenverbrauch bestraft und so das benutzerdefinierte optimale SARA-Schema ableitet. Diese Optimierung kann offline durchgeführt und als Look-Up-Table in der unteren Medienzugriffsschicht zukünftiger industrieller Drahtlosnetze implementiert werden.:1. Introduction 1 1.1. The Need for an Industrial Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Related Work 7 2.1. Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2. Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.3. Codesign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.3.1. The Need for Abstraction – Age of Information . . . . . . . . 11 2.4. Dependability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.5. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3. Deriving Proper Communications Requirements 17 3.1. Fundamentals of Control Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.1.1. Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.1.2. Performance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.1.3. Packet Losses and Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.2. Joint Design of Control Loop with Packet Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.2.1. Method 1: Reduced Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.2.2. Method 2: Markov Jump Linear System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.2.3. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.3. Focus Application: The AGV Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.3.1. Control Loop Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.3.2. Control Performance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.3.3. Joint Modeling: Applying Reduced Sampling . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.3.4. Joint Modeling: Applying MJLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4. Modeling Control-Communication Failures 43 4.1. Communication Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.1.1. Small-Scale Fading as a Cause of Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4.1.2. Connectivity Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4.2. Failure Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.2.1. Single-hop network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.2.2. Dual-hop network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4.3. Performance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.3.1. Mean Time to Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.3.2. Packet Loss Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4.3.3. Average Number of Assigned Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 4.3.4. Age of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 4.4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 5. Single Hop – Single Agent 61 5.1. State-Aware Resource Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 5.2. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 5.3. Erroneous Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 5.4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 6. Single Hop – Multiple Agents 71 6.1. Failure Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 6.1.1. Admission Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 6.1.2. Transition Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 6.1.3. Computational Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 6.1.4. Performance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 6.2. Illustration Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 6.3. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 6.3.1. Verification through System-Level Simulation . . . . . . . . . 78 6.3.2. Applicability on the System Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 6.3.3. Comparison of Admission Control Schemes . . . . . . . . . . 80 6.3.4. Impact of the Packet Loss Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 6.3.5. Impact of the Number of Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 6.3.6. Age of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 6.3.7. Channel Saturation Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 6.3.8. Enforcing Full Channel Saturation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 6.4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 7. Dual Hop – Single Agent 91 7.1. State-Aware Resource Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 7.2. Optimization Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 7.3. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 7.3.1. Extensive Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 7.3.2. Non-Integer-Constrained Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 7.4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 8. Conclusions and Outlook 105 8.1. Key Results and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 8.2. Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 A. DC Motor Model 111 Bibliography 113 Publications of the Author 127 List of Figures 129 List of Tables 131 List of Operators and Constants 133 List of Symbols 135 List of Acronyms 137 Curriculum Vitae 139In industrial manufacturing, Industry 4.0 refers to the ongoing convergence of the real and virtual worlds, enabled through intelligently interconnecting industrial machines and processes through information and communications technology. Ultrareliable low-latency communication (URLLC) is widely regarded as the enabling technology for Industry 4.0 due to its ability to fulfill highest quality-of-service (QoS) comparable to those of industrial wireline connections. In contrast to this trend, a range of works in the research domain of networked control systems have shown that URLLC’s supreme QoS is not necessarily required to achieve high quality-ofcontrol; the co-design of control and communication enables to jointly optimize and balance both quality-of-control parameters and network parameters through blurring the boundary between application and network layer. However, through the tight interlacing, this approach requires a fundamental (joint) redesign of both control systems and communication networks and may therefore not lead to short-term widespread adoption. Therefore, this thesis instead embraces a novel co-design approach which keeps both domains distinct but leverages the combination of control and communications by yet exploiting the age of information (AoI) as a valuable interface metric. This thesis contributes to quantifying application dependability as a consequence of exceeding a given peak AoI with the particular focus on packet losses. The beneficial influence of negative temporal packet loss correlation on control performance is demonstrated by means of the automated guided vehicle use case. Assuming small-scale fading as the dominant cause of communication failure, a series of communication failures are mapped to an application failure through discrete-time Markov models for single-hop (e.g, only uplink or downlink) and dual-hop (e.g., subsequent uplink and downlink) architectures. This enables the derivation of application-related dependability metrics such as the mean time to failure in closed form. For single-hop networks, an AoI-aware resource allocation strategy termed state-aware resource allocation (SARA) is proposed that increases the application reliability by orders of magnitude compared to static multi-connectivity while keeping the resource consumption in the range of best-effort single-connectivity. This dependability can also be statistically guaranteed on a system level – where multiple agents compete for a limited number of resources – if the provided amount of resources per agent is increased by approximately 10 %. For the dual-hop scenario, an AoI-aware resource allocation optimization is developed that minimizes a user-defined penalty function that punishes low application reliability, high AoI, and high average resource consumption. This optimization may be carried out offline and each resulting optimal SARA scheme may be implemented as a look-up table in the lower medium access control layer of future wireless industrial networks.:1. Introduction 1 1.1. The Need for an Industrial Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Related Work 7 2.1. Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2. Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.3. Codesign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.3.1. The Need for Abstraction – Age of Information . . . . . . . . 11 2.4. Dependability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.5. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3. Deriving Proper Communications Requirements 17 3.1. Fundamentals of Control Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.1.1. Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.1.2. Performance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.1.3. Packet Losses and Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.2. Joint Design of Control Loop with Packet Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.2.1. Method 1: Reduced Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.2.2. Method 2: Markov Jump Linear System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.2.3. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.3. Focus Application: The AGV Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.3.1. Control Loop Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.3.2. Control Performance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.3.3. Joint Modeling: Applying Reduced Sampling . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.3.4. Joint Modeling: Applying MJLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4. Modeling Control-Communication Failures 43 4.1. Communication Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.1.1. Small-Scale Fading as a Cause of Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4.1.2. Connectivity Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4.2. Failure Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.2.1. Single-hop network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.2.2. Dual-hop network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4.3. Performance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.3.1. Mean Time to Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.3.2. Packet Loss Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4.3.3. Average Number of Assigned Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 4.3.4. Age of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 4.4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 5. Single Hop – Single Agent 61 5.1. State-Aware Resource Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 5.2. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 5.3. Erroneous Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 5.4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 6. Single Hop – Multiple Agents 71 6.1. Failure Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 6.1.1. Admission Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 6.1.2. Transition Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 6.1.3. Computational Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 6.1.4. Performance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 6.2. Illustration Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 6.3. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 6.3.1. Verification through System-Level Simulation . . . . . . . . . 78 6.3.2. Applicability on the System Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 6.3.3. Comparison of Admission Control Schemes . . . . . . . . . . 80 6.3.4. Impact of the Packet Loss Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 6.3.5. Impact of the Number of Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 6.3.6. Age of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 6.3.7. Channel Saturation Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 6.3.8. Enforcing Full Channel Saturation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 6.4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 7. Dual Hop – Single Agent 91 7.1. State-Aware Resource Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 7.2. Optimization Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 7.3. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 7.3.1. Extensive Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 7.3.2. Non-Integer-Constrained Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 7.4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 8. Conclusions and Outlook 105 8.1. Key Results and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 8.2. Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 A. DC Motor Model 111 Bibliography 113 Publications of the Author 127 List of Figures 129 List of Tables 131 List of Operators and Constants 133 List of Symbols 135 List of Acronyms 137 Curriculum Vitae 13

ACUTA Journal of Telecommunications in Higher Education

In This Issue Strategic Planning in the College and University Ecosystem Outlook 2012: Chickens or Eggs? lT Trends on Campus: 2012 Best Practices in Deploying a Successful University SAN Beyond Convergence: How Advanced Networking Will Erase Campus Boundaries Distributed Computing: The Path to the Power? Cell Phones on the University Campus: Adversary or Ally? lnstitutional Excellence Award Honorable Mention: Wake Forest University Interview President\u27s Message From the Executive Director Here\u27s My Advic