The timing of capacity expansion investments in oligopoly under demand uncertainty

Since a flexibility value emerges in waiting to expand capacity, the impact of demand uncertainty in an oligopolistic industry leads to capacity expansion timing. The creation of growth opportunities is then the outcome of expanding capacity at optimal times. However, in our model different capacity size competitors interact not affecting each others, because assessing the impact of demand uncertainty on capacity expansion projects takes them to set up independently their optimal capacity expansion timing schedules. In equilibrium no firm expands capacity more often than any other. Under demand uncertainty simultaneity in capacity expansions is the only possible Markov Perfect Equilibrium

The role of performance analysis in elite netball competition structures.

Coaches at both the International and top domestic levels in Netball have turned to performance analysis to assist in their decision making and provide reliable and accurate information to inform their coaching process (Jenkins et al, 2007). The role of the performance analyst in this elite environment is to provide key objective information on performances which can be transformed into relevant feedback to facilitate learning and effect improvement. However, the coaching process and use of performance analysis to support the specific process, is affected by the characteristics of the competition. Thus it is important to highlight the differences and constraints which occur as a result of the competition structure and identify how the challenges created impact the performance analyst and coaching process

A Versatile Stochastic Duel Game

This paper deals with a standard stochastic game model with a continuum of states under the duel-type setup. It newly proposes a hybrid model of game theory and the fluctuation process, which could be applied for various practical decision making situations. The unique theoretical stochastic game model is targeted to analyze a two-person duel-type game in the time domain. The parameters for strategic decisions including the moments of crossings, prior crossings, and the optimal number of iterations to get the highest winning chance are obtained by the compact closed joint functional. This paper also demonstrates the usage of a new time based stochastic game model by analyzing a conventional duel game model in the distance domain and briefly explains how to build strategies for an atypical business case to show how this theoretical model works.Comment: This paper is the condensed version of the original paper titled "A Versatile Stochastic Duel Game" which has been published in the Mathematic

Co-Opetition and Prelaunch in Standard-Setting for Developing Technologies

Firms faced with the decision of whether to standardize or not prior to introducing a new network technology face a tradeoff: Compatibility improves the technology's chances of consumer acceptance, but it also means having to share the resulting profits with other sponsors of the standard. In this paper, we show that even prior to market introduction of a new technology, the timing of decisions is important and that firms have to weigh up the cooperative and competitive elements of pre-market choices. We also show that the option to precommit to a technology before it is fully developed (as has been the case with the Compact Disc) can be profitable for network technologies.Standardization, compact disc, preemption, war-of- attrition

Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time

When subjects interact in continuous time, their ability to cooperate may dramatically increase. In an experiment, we study the impact of different time horizons on cooperation in (quasi) continuous time prisoner's dilemmas. We find that cooperation levels are similar or higher when the horizon is deterministic rather than stochastic. Moreover, a deterministic duration generates different aggregate patterns and individual strategies than a stochastic one. For instance, under a deterministic horizon subjects show high initial cooperation and a strong end-of-period reversal to defection. Moreover, they do not learn to apply backward induction but to postpone defection closer to the end.