Proportionality and Party Success in Europe

This thesis consists of four articles and an introductory section. The main research questions in all the articles are about proportionality and party success in Europe, at European, national or district levels. Proportionality in this thesis denotes the proximity of seat shares parties receive compared to their respective vote shares, after the electoral system’s allocation process. This proportionality can be measured through numerous indices that illustrate either the overall proportionality of an electoral system or a particular election. The correspondence of a single party’s seat shares to its vote shares can also be measured. The overall proportionality is essential in three of the articles (1, 2 and 4), where the system’s performance is studied by means of plots. In article 3, minority party success is measured by advantage-ratios that reveal single party’s winnings or losses in the votes to seat allocation process. The first article asks how proportional are the European parliamentary (EP) electoral systems, how do they compare with results gained from earlier studies and how do the EP electoral systems treat different sized parties. The reasons for different outcomes are looked for in explanations given by traditional electoral studies i.e. electoral system variables. The countries studied (EU15) apply electoral systems that vary in many important aspects, even though a certain amount of uniformity has been aspired to for decades. Since the electoral systems of the EP elections closely resemble the national elections, the same kinds of profiles emerge as in the national elections. The electoral systems indeed treat the parties differentially and six different profile types can be found. The counting method seems to somewhat determine the profile group, but the strongest variables determining the shape of a countries’ profile appears to be the average district magnitude and number of seats allocated to each country. The second article also focuses on overall proportionality performance of an electoral system, but here the focus is on the impact of electoral system changes. I have developed a new method of visualizing some previously used indices and some new indices for this purpose. The aim is to draw a comparable picture of these electoral systems’ changes and their effects. The cases, which illustrate this method, are four elections systems, where a change has occurred in one of the system variables, while the rest remained unchanged. The studied cases include the French, Greek and British European parliamentary systems and the Swedish national parliamentary system. The changed variables are electoral type (plurality changed to PR in the UK), magnitude (France splitting the nationwide district into eight smaller districts), legal threshold (Greece introducing a three percent threshold) and counting method (d’Hondt was changed to modified Sainte-Laguë in Sweden). The radar plots from elections after and before the changes are drawn for all country cases. When quantifying the change, the change in the plots area that is created has also been calculated. Using these radar plots we can observe that the change in electoral system type, magnitude, and also to some extent legal threshold had an effect on overall proportionality and accessibility for small parties, while the change between the two highest averages counting method had none. The third article studies the success minority parties have had in nine electoral systems in European heterogeneous countries. This article aims to add more motivation as to why we should care how different sized parties are treated by the electoral systems. Since many of the parties that aspire to represent minorities in European countries are small, the possibilities for small parties are highlighted. The theory of consociational (or power-sharing) democracy suggests that, in heterogeneous societies, a proportional electoral system will provide the fairest treatment of minority parties. The OSCE Lund Recommendations propose a number of electoral system features, which would improve minority representation. In this article some party variables, namely the unity of the minority parties and the geographical concentration of the minorities were included among possible explanations. The conclusions are that the central points affecting minority success were indeed these non-electoral system variables rather than the electoral system itself. Moreover, the size of the party was a major factor governing success in all the systems investigated; large parties benefited in all the studied electoral systems. In the fourth article the proportionality profiles are again applied, but this time to district level results in Finnish parliamentary elections. The level of proportionality distortion is also studied by way of indices. The average magnitudes during the studied periodrange from 7.5 to 26.2 in the Finnish electoral districts and this opens up unequal opportunities for parties in different districts and affects the shape of the profiles. The intra-country case allows the focus to be placed on the effect of district magnitude, since all other electoral systems are kept constant in an intra-country study. The time span in the study is from 1962 to 2007, i.e. the time that the districts have largely been the same geographically. The plots and indices tell the same story, district magnitude and electoral alliances matter. The district magnitude is connected to the overall proportionality of the electoral districts according to both indices, and the profiles are, as expected, also closer to perfect proportionality in large districts. Alliances have helped some small parties to gain a much higher seat share than their respective vote share and these successes affect some of the profiles. The profiles also show a consistent pattern of benefits for the small parties who ally with the larger parties.Siirretty Doriast

Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering: An Evaluation of the Efficiency Gap Proposal

Electoral districting presents a risk of partisan gerrymandering: the manipulation of electoral boundaries to favor one political party over another. For three decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to settle on a legal test for partisan gerrymandering, and such claims have uniformly failed. Until recently. Plaintiffs prevailed before a three-judge federal panel in Wisconsin by leveraging a new measure called the efficiency gap, which quantifies partisan gerrymandering in terms of two parties\u27 relative efficiency at translating votes for their party into seats in government. The case is now before the Court, which may embrace the efficiency gap approach and thereby remake the law of electoral districting. Through a synthesis of mathematical and legal analysis, this Article examines the efficiency gap measure, focusing particularly on its underlying methodological choices and electoral assumptions as well as its relationship to competitiveness, seats-votes proportionality, and voter turnout. The efficiency gap is a useful indicative measure of partisan gerrymandering under the circumstances of cases like the one currently before the Court, in which each party earns about half the votes and a large efficiency gap persists under plausible variations in voter behavior. Relying in part on the efficiency gap measure, the Court should rule in favor of the plaintiffs. However, a mapmaker can achieve a below-threshold efficiency gap with a skewed bipartisan gerrymander that carves a state up into uncompetitive districts denying minority parties sufficient representation. For example, a party that earns only 59% of the vote can secure a filibuster- and veto-proof 75% supermajority of the legislature with a below-threshold efficiency gap. For this and other reasons, the Court should not adopt the efficiency gap as the exclusive definitional measure of partisan gerrymandering, such that a plan would be invalid if and only if it exhibited a large, durable, and unjustified efficiency gap. Instead, the Court should permit some flexibility for scholars, litigants, and courts to refine measurement approaches over time and under varying circumstances. One approach worth future exploration is a variation on the efficiency gap that defines a surplus vote in terms of the full margin of victory and compares wasted vote shares instead of totals. Finally, the Court should be aware that any measure, like the efficiency gap, that compares votes to seats entails the perverse risk that partisan voter suppression may operate to reduce the apparent severity of partisan gerrymanders

Bringing Spatial Interaction Measures into Multi-Criteria Assessment of Redistricting Plans Using Interactive Web Mapping

Redistricting is the process by which electoral district boundaries are drawn, and a common normative assumption in this process is that districts should be drawn so as to capture coherent communities of interest (COIs). While states rely on various proxies for community illustration, such as compactness metrics and municipal split counts, to guide redistricting, recent legal challenges and scholarly works have shown the failings of such proxy measures and the difficulty of balancing multiple criteria in district plan creation. To address these issues, we propose the use of spatial interaction communities to directly quantify the degree to which districts capture the underlying COIs. Using large-scale human mobility flow data, we condense spatial interaction community capture for a set of districts into a single number, the interaction ratio (IR), which can be used for redistricting plan evaluation. To compare the IR to traditional redistricting criteria (compactness and fairness), and to explore the range of IR values found in valid districting plans, we employ a Markov chain-based regionalization algorithm (ReCom) to produce ensembles of valid plans, and calculate the degree to which they capture spatial interaction communities. Furthermore, we propose two methods for biasing the ReCom algorithm towards different IR values. We perform a multi-criteria assessment of the space of valid maps, and present the results in an interactive web map. The experiments on Wisconsin congressional districting plans demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods for biasing sampling towards higher or lower IR values. Furthermore, the analysis of the districts produced with these methods suggests that districts with higher IR and compactness values tend to produce district plans that are more proportional with regards to seats allocated to each of the two major parties.Comment: 12 figure

Two-Party Structural Countermandering

The popular narrative surrounding gerrymandering frames it as a performative phenomenon—achieved through the intentional manipulations of malevolent partisan actors. Efforts to curb partisan gerrymandering —which I call countermandering—have been performative, in turn, focusing on constraining these bad actors through judicial review or mapmaker neutrality. Yet performative countermandering has had limited success. Judicial and institutional constraints are only sometimes available and are often cumbersome and costly. More important, their utility is inherently limited, because gerrymandering is not only performative. It is also structural—an inevitable product of the American electoral schema itself. This paper makes the case for structural countermandering. It explains why transformative change to our electoral schema is urgently necessary. It also hypothesizes that such transformative change has no practical chance of success unless it preserves the two-party system. Accordingly, this paper proposes a new electoral schema called MM2. It operates much like the traditional Mixed-Member Proportional (“MMP”) system used successfully for decades in Germany and New Zealand, but its goal is two-party, not multiparty, proportionality. Like MMP, MM2 preserves personal, geographic representation by selecting most legislators through single-seat districts; and it implements structural countermandering by allocating additional seats to political parties to compensate for any vote-seat distortion these districted elections produce. But whereas MMP allocates these seats to achieve vote-seat proportionality for every party, MM2 allocates these seats to achieve vote-seat proportionality only for the top two parties. By preserving certain core features of American democracy, while structurally nullifying gerrymandering, MM2 presents a promising and feasible prospect for transformative change

Sistemas electorales: implicaciones democráticas y económicas

En esta tesis doctoral se analizan los elementos constitutivos de los sistemas electorales (circunscripciones, formas de candidatura y de votación, métodos de reparto y barreras legales) con el objeto de rediseñarlos buscando que la representación política sea más ecuánime que la obtenida mediante los mecanismos de traducción votos/escaños vigentes en la práctica. Así mismo, el análisis realizado se utiliza para introducir instrumentos más precisos de cuantificación de la calidad democrática. Por otro lado, nos inspiramos en uno de estos elementos, las barreras legales, modificándolo adecuadamente, para mejorar el desempeño del sistema de partidos en cuanto a su financiación estatal. Cabe señalar que, aunque trabajamos desde una amplia perspectiva de sistemas electorales y países, hemos focalizado nuestra atención en México, especialmente tras la última reforma electoral.Departamento de Economía AplicadaDoctorado en Economí

Designing Redress: A Study About Grievances Against Public Bodies

How grievances against public bodies are resolved is important not only for the individuals concerned and the decision-makers complained about but also to the whole system of government. People need to have confidence that when things go wrong, they will be put right. There is a general public interest in that being done in accordance with constitutional principles and in ways that are effective and efficient. Over many years, a great variety of different ?mechanisms? for dealing with grievances have been created, ranging from internal complaints processes through to the work of external bodies (including ombudsmen, tribunals and courts). This project has focused on how mechanisms are designed. The study explores how different mechanisms can be thought of as relating to each other. It also looks at the various reasons why mechanisms have to be designed. Drawing on interviews with people involved in the design process and analysis of public information, a map of where the activity of designing redress has been created. Evaluating the ?administrative justice landscape?, two particular deficiencies emerge: there is no strong political or official leadership in relation to how mechanisms ought to be designed and the system is fragmented, with many different people, in various organisations all contributing to design activities. Might a toolkit of guiding principles for designing redress be one way of achieving a better design process and outcomes? A number of principles are proposed in this report, and the authors hope to engage stakeholders in a debate about how this might best be taken forward