WHAT IS COMPUTATION?

Three conditions are usually given that must be satisfied by a process in order for it to be called a computation, namely, there must exist a finite length algorithm for the process, the algorithm must terminate in finite time for valid inputs and return a valid output, and finally the algorithm must never return an output for invalid inputs. These three conditions are advanced as being necessary and sufficient for the process to be computable by a universal model of computation. In fact, these conditions are neither necessary, nor sufficient. On the one hand, recently defined paradigms show how certain processes that do not satisfy one or more of the aforementioned properties can indeed be carried out in principle on new, more powerful, types of computers, and hence can be considered as computations. Thus the conditions are not necessary. On the other hand, contemporary work in unconventional computation has demonstrated the existence of processes that satisfy the three stated conditions, yet contradict the Church-Turing Thesis, and more generally, the principle of universality in computer science. Thus the conditions are not sufficient

Technical Report 2013-608 WHAT IS COMPUTATION?

Abstract Three conditions are usually given that must be satisfied by a process in order for it to be called a computation, namely, there must exist a finite length algorithm for the process, the algorithm must terminate in finite time for valid inputs and return a valid output, and finally the algorithm must never return an output for invalid inputs. These three conditions are advanced as being necessary and sufficient for the process to be computable by a universal model of computation. In fact, these conditions are neither necessary, nor sufficient. On the one hand, recently defined paradigms show how certain processes that do not satisfy one or more of the aforementioned properties can indeed be carried out in principle on new, more powerful, types of computers, and hence can be considered as computations. Thus the conditions are not necessary. On the other hand, contemporary work in unconventional computation has demonstrated the existence of processes that satisfy the three stated conditions, yet contradict the Church-Turing Thesis, and more generally, the principle of universality in computer science. Thus the conditions are not sufficient

Does mathematics look certain in the front, but fallible in the back?

In this paper we re-examine the implications of the differences between 'doing' and 'writing' science and mathematics, questioning whether the way that science and mathematics are presented in textbooks or research articles creates a misleading picture of these differences. We focus our discussion on mathematics, in particular on Reuben Hersh's formulation of the contrast in terms of Goffman's dramaturgical frontstage-backstage analogy and his claim that various myths about mathematics only fit with how mathematics is presented in the 'front', but not with how it is practised in the 'back'. By investigating examples of both the 'front' (graduate lectures in mathematical logic) and the 'back' (meetings between supervisor and doctoral students) we examine, first, whether the 'front' of mathematics presents a misleading picture of mathematics, and, second, whether the 'front' and 'back' of mathematics are so discrepant that mathematics really does look certain in the 'front', but fallible in the 'back'

Brain-based Learning for Preschoolers

The nineties have been called the Decade of the Brain and the Decade of Education. Because of new technology we know more about the function of the brain than ever before. We now know that, in an enriched environment where a person is actively engaged with their surroundings, the cortex of their brain actually increases. Because a thicker brain cortex produces smarter lab animals, scientists have drawn the inference that the same is true for humans (Jacobs, Schall, Scheibel, 1993). The science of deliberate enrichment, to stimulate the student’s development, is called “brain-based education.” For the preschool child there are fundamentally basic elements that must be a part of their education. These are: helping the preschooler make sense of their world; helping them feel safe and secure; teaching them that learning is fun; and empowering them with a thirst for knowledge that lasts a lifetime. A preschool classroom and environment that uses brain-based education techniques can achieve these elements.Master'sCollege of Arts and Sciences: EducationUniversity of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/117770/1/Wind.pd

The Fat Female Bodies of Saturday Night Live: Uncovering the Normative Cultural Power of a Countercultural Comedy Institution

Despite its reputation as one of the most countercultural and anti-establishment voices in mainstream television comedy, Saturday Night Live helps produce and reproduces cultural norms. Using weight and gender as a lens, this paper investigates Saturday Night Live’s methods of creating, imitating, and evoking the fat female body in order to limit female agency and police unruly female power. It contends that even the inclusion of nonnormative female bodies—fat bodies, queer bodies, and bodies of color—is merely a reiteration of the techniques of neoliberal multiculturalism for the television audience

Epistemic levels

Thesis (Ph. D. )--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2012.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-86).In this dissertation I defend some controversial "level-bridging" principles in epistemology. In the first chapter, I defend the KK principle-the principle that if one knows that P, then one knows that one knows that P. I argue that saying plausible things about higher-order interpersonal knowledge requires rejecting some popular arguments against KK, and that many apparent counterexamples to KK can be explained away by appeal to contextualism about knowledge. In the second chapter, I take up the topic of epistemic akrasia-the state of believing some proposition P, while believing that one oughtn't believe that P. While many take for granted that epistemic akrasia is always irrational (and least implicitly endorse a level-bridging principle in the process), there are some apparently powerful arguments for holding that epistemic akrasia must sometimes be rational. I argue that once we get clearer on the descriptive/psychological question of what sort of state epistemic akrasia is, we can resolve this puzzle in favor of the intuitive view that epistemic akrasia is a species of irrationality. In the third chapter, I appeal to level-bridging principles to respond to some recent arguments to the effect that certain epistemological debates are somehow non-substantive, or merely verbal. If my argument succeeds, this constitutes a kind of indirect support for level-bridging principles-if we think that epistemological debates typically are substantive, we face some pressure to adopt level-bridging principles to explain this.by Daniel Greco.Ph.D

What Joy from Misery: the Pleasures of Horror

This thesis investigates the allure of narrative genres, such as horror, that have historically been viewed as philosophically (and often morally) problematic owing to their negative content and the painful emotional responses they elicit. It departs from the majority of classical and contemporary solutions to the alleged paradox posed by such genres, in that it does not attempt to render their pleasures explicable by appealing to their fictive status, thematic or ideological meanings or the more comprehensibly-pleasurable meta-responses they inspire. Rather, this account suggests that we choose to consume stories – fictional and factual – that depict violent or distressing situations and evoke discomforting emotions, for the same reason we choose to engage with less obviously conflict-filled narratives. Fictions compel our attention insofar as they resemble potentially salient information, appealing to a set of deeply ingrained and unconscious cognitive biases that prompt us to attend to certain kinds of stimuli. We are capable of finding narrative genres such as horror, tragedy and the ‘misery memoir’ compelling – without, it is important to note, finding their content in any way pleasant – because we are predisposed to find some types of mental effort rewarding. While horror is often criticised – and defended – on the grounds that its pleasures must lie in slaking anti-social appetites, this thesis criticises the model of fiction’s appeal on which such assumptions are based. Instead it suggests that narrative pleasure characteristically resides in intellectual and emotional absorption or stimulation rather than any straightforward fulfilment of our real life desires. In support of this contention, this account incorporates analyses of a number of related topics, examining subjects such as the alleged rationality of the emotions, whether our attraction to non-factual narratives represents an adaptive trait and how fiction-making, criticism and consuming function as cultural practices