Creationism and evolution

In Tower of Babel, Robert Pennock wrote that “defenders of evolution would help their case immeasurably if they would reassure their audience that morality, purpose, and meaning are not lost by accepting the truth of evolution.” We first consider the thesis that the creationists’ movement exploits moral concerns to spread its ideas against the theory of evolution. We analyze their arguments and possible reasons why they are easily accepted. Creationists usually employ two contradictive strategies to expose the purported moral degradation that comes with accepting the theory of evolution. On the one hand they claim that evolutionary theory is immoral. On the other hand creationists think of evolutionary theory as amoral. Both objections come naturally in a monotheistic view. But we can find similar conclusions about the supposed moral aspects of evolution in non-religiously inspired discussions. Meanwhile, the creationism-evolution debate mainly focuses — understandably — on what constitutes good science. We consider the need for moral reassurance and analyze reassuring arguments from philosophers. Philosophers may stress that science does not prescribe and is therefore not immoral, but this reaction opens the door for the objection of amorality that evolution — as a naturalistic world view at least — supposedly endorses. We consider that the topic of morality and its relation to the acceptance of evolution may need more empirical research

Know-how and non-propositional intentionality

This paper investigates the question of whether know-how can be regarded as a form of non-propositional intentionality

Skepticism avoided

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2003.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-126).I evaluate three replies to skepticism, drawing conclusions about the meaning of "justified", the viability of foundationalism, the value of knowledge, and the role of belief in rational action. In the first chapter, I examine the following skeptical argument: Something is justified only if justified by a justified thing; circular and infinite chains of justification are illegitimate; therefore, no belief is justified. A linguistic investigation reveals that this argument contains two ambiguities not yet noticed by epistemologists. The linguistic observations favor foundationalism about justification, showing how the foundationalist can maintain his view, while explaining away the force of the skeptical argument. However, in the second chapter, I argue that foundationalism is unsatisfactory, for non-skeptical reasons. If a foundationalist tries to explain how some things can be basic, then she must endorse a certain kind of circularity. But a foundationalist should not endorse this circularity. Dissecting a single skeptical argument is an interesting although limited endeavour. In the third chapter, I argue that an entire class of skeptical arguments can be avoided. Distinguishing rational action from rational belief change, I claim that certain changes in belief cannot occur during a rational act. In particular, I argue, some skeptical conclusions cannot be accepted while performing an ordinary rational act. The main conclusion of this chapter is: to avoid acting irrationally, it is rational to avoid certain skeptical arguments. Sometimes it is better to concede to skepticism than to flee.(cont.) In the fourth chapter, I argue that knowledge is no more valuable than stable true belief. This surprising claim supports the conclusion that skepticism about knowledge is harmless. Even if we cannot know anything about the external world-or even if we cannot know anything at all-we may have something just as valuable as knowledge: stable true beliefs.by Patrick Hawley.Ph.D

Dynamic agent safety logic : theory and applications

Modal logic is a family of logics for reasoning about relational structures, broadly construed. It sits at the nexus of philosophy, mathematics, software engineering, and economics. By modeling a target domain as a relational structure, one can define a modal logic for reasoning about its properties. Common examples include modal logics for knowledge, belief, time, program execution, mathematical provability, and ethics. This thesis presents a modal logic that combines several modalities in order to reason about realistic human-like agents. We combine knowledge, belief, action, and safe action, which we call Dynamic Agent Safety Logic, or DASL. We distinguish DASL from other modal logics treating similar topics by arguing that the standard models of human agency are not adequate. We present some criteria a logic of agency should strive to achieve, and then compare how related logics fare. We use the Coq interactive theorem prover to mechanically prove soundness and completeness results for the logic, as well as apply it to case studies in the domain of aviation safety, demonstrating its ability to model realistic, minimally rational agents. Finally, we examine the consequences of modeling agents capable of a certain sort of self-reflection. Such agents face a formal difficulty due to Lob's Theorem, called Lob's Obstacle in the literature. We show how DASL can be relaxed to avoid Lob's Obstacle, while the other modal logics of agency cannot easily do so.Includes bibliographical reference

The Virtues of Bayesian Epistemology

The aim of this dissertation is to address the intersection of two normative epistemologies, Bayesian confirmation theory (BCT) and virtue epistemology (VE). While both are successful in many respects, I argue that the constraints on rational degrees of belief provided by Bayesianism are not enough. VE offers additional constraints on degrees of belief, and plays a salutary role for BCT in the form constraints from background knowledge on the more subjective aspects of Bayesianism. Chapter 1 is an introduction to my project. Chapter 2 presents a brief review of the logic and epistemology of science, Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Chapter 3 presents a recent development in cognitive science, rational analysis, which employs a Bayesian approach to understanding human reasoning and bases everyday rationality in formal rationality. Chapter 4 presents historical motivations for turning to virtue epistemology. I argue that given historical considerations virtue epistemology offers a truly novel approach by shifting the focus of analysis from properties of beliefs alone to properties of agents. Chapter 5 presents a development of a particular, reliabilist view in virtue epistemology. Chapter 6 concludes my dissertation. In this chapter I argue that Bayesian Confirmation Theory, as an epistemology of science, should be embedded within virtue epistemology and that at least one familiar problem, the problem of the priors, can be ameliorated

Moral Equality: Article of Faith

In the first part of this thesis I demonstrate that the best arguments we have for the equal moral worth of all human beings are incorrigibly defective. This is a problem because many people hold that equality between persons in the political, legal and social realms depends on and is justified by their equal value in the moral realm. I solve the problem in the second part of my thesis by developing an account of human worth which cuts the chain of dependency so that political, legal and social equality needn’t hang on moral equality. The result is an account of human value as neither equal nor unequal and which preserves and satisfies the spirit of moral and political egalitarianism. What is that spirit? That everyone matters and no-one more than any other

Culture, worldview and transformative philosophy of mathematics education in Nepal: a cultural-philosophical inquiry

This thesis portrays my multifaceted and emergent inquiry into the protracted problem of culturally decontextualised mathematics education faced by students of Nepal, a culturally diverse country of south Asia with more than 90 language groups. I generated initial research questions on the basis of my history as a student of primary, secondary and university levels of education in Nepal, my Master’s research project, and my professional experiences as a teacher educator working in a university of Nepal between 2004 and 2006. Through an autobiographical excavation of my experiences of culturally decontextualised mathematics education, I came up with several emergent research questions, leading to six key themes of this inquiry: (i) hegemony of the unidimensional nature of mathematics as a body of pure knowledge, (ii) unhelpful dualisms in mathematics education, (iii) disempowering reductionisms in curricular and pedagogical aspects, (iv) narrowly conceived ‘logics’ that do not account for meaningful lifeworld-oriented thinking in mathematics teaching and learning, (v) uncritical attitudes towards the image of curriculum as a thing or object, and (vi) narrowly conceived notions of globalisation, foundationalism and mathematical language that give rise to a decontextualised mathematics teacher education program.With these research themes at my disposal my aim in this research was twofold. Primarily, I intended to explore, explain and interpret problems, issues and dilemmas arising from and embedded in the research questions. Such an epistemic activity of articulation was followed by envisioning, an act of imagining futures together with reflexivity, perspectival language and inclusive vision logics.In order to carry out both epistemic activities – articulating and envisioning – I employed a multi-paradigmatic research design space, taking on board mainly the paradigms of criticalism, postmodernism, interpretivism and integralism. The critical paradigm offered a critical outlook needed to identify the research problem, to reflect upon my experiences as a mathematics teacher and teacher educator, and to make my lifetime’s subjectivities transparent to readers, whereas the paradigm of postmodernism enabled me to construct multiple genres for cultivating different aspects of my experiences of culturally decontextualised mathematics education. The paradigm of interpretivism enabled me to employ emergence as the hallmark of my inquiry, and the paradigm of integralism acted as an inclusive meta-theory of the multi-paradigmatic design space for portraying my vision of an inclusive mathematics education in Nepal.Within this multi-paradigmatic design space, I chose autoethnography and small p philosophical inquiry as my methodological referents. Autoethnography helped generate the research text of my cultural-professional contexts, whereas small p philosophical inquiry enabled me to generate new knowledge via a host of innovative epistemologies that have the goal of deepening understanding of normal educational practices by examining them critically, identifying underpinning assumptions, and reconstructing them through scholarly interpretations and envisioning. Visions cultivated through this research include: (i) an inclusive and multidimensional image of the nature of mathematics as an im/pure knowledge system, (ii) the metaphors of thirdspace and dissolution for conceiving an inclusive mathematics education, (iii) a multilogical perspective for morphing the hegemony of reductionism-inspired mathematics education, (iv) an inclusive image of mathematics curriculum as montage that provides a basis for incorporating different knowledge systems in mathematics education, and (v) perspectives of glocalisation, healthy scepticism and multilevel contextualisation for constructing an inclusive mathematics teacher education program

Aristotle and Augustine on voluntary action and freedom and weakness of the will

Aristotle's remarks on free will suggest, not so much an argument for the existence of free will, as an account of its nature. This account depends on his making no hard distinction between what we call 'free action' and 'voluntary action'. For him, these would be interchangeable terms. The Aristotelian can, then, point out that, if we give up our belief in free will, we must give up many other natural beliefs too. In particular, we must stop believing in voluntary action.There are, in Aristotelian terms, three conditions (not two, as Aristotle himself evidently supposed), which any behaviour must satisfy to count as free/ voluntary action. The behaviour (i) must not be compelled, but must be performed by the agent's own power and desire; (ii) must not be done in ignorance, but must be action on relevant knowledge; and (iii) must not be irrational, but must result from the combination of the agent's own power and desire with the agent's relevant knowledge. (i) leads me to discuss Aristotle's account of what he calls kineseis; (ii) leads me into epistemology; (iii) into an account of Aristotle's theory of proairesis and practical reasoning as the cause of voluntary action.by akrasia, deliberate choice of what I sincerely believe I should not choose. This seems to be voluntary action which is not caused as Aristotle says voluntary action should be. But the three conditions of voluntary action which I say Aristotle should be committed to can be used to show that the existing forms of akrasia make no counter example to Aristotle's theory, but rather an interesting adjunct to it.My study of Augustine's theory of freedom begins with a survey of a crucial text, the de Libero Arbitrio (Ch.5). I then apply an analogous schema to that found in Aristotle. Augustine too depends on the idea that to analyse free action is to analyse voluntary action; he also equates these two types with responsible action. He too believes (i) that ignorance usually makes for involuntariness, and (ii) that there can be no voluntary action which is compelled or which the agent could not have done otherwise. In his later works, these doctrines are often obscured by his interest in original sin and predestination (neither of which topics, be it noted, are focuses of this thesis). But they remain his doctrines. Does Augustine have (iii) any doctrine that voluntary action must be rational? While he does not develop any theory of practical reasoning like Aristotle's, he does develop a theory of practical wisdom. It is an essential feature of all human desire, and hence of all voluntary action, that it aims at happiness, which properly understood is identical with possession of The Good, i.e. of God. From this Augustine draws the conclusion that, to explain any behaviour as a voluntary action or choice, it is necessary and sufficient to specify some good at which it is to be understood as aiming.This sets up for Augustine a problem analogous to Aristotle's problem about akrasia. How is a voluntary choice of evil explicable? Augustine's reply is that human desires have been disordered by the Fall, and so we often choose, not evils per se, but lesser goods than we ought. But this prompts the question: How is a first voluntary choice of evil explicable? Augustine's reply is simply that it is not. Since a voluntary action or choice must be explained by reference to some good at which it aims, a voluntary choice of evil per se cannot be explained at all. This does not mean that there was no voluntary choice of evil; but it does mean that, in principle, that choice is inexplicable- a mystery. Thus Augustine, unlike Aristotle, in this one exceptional case (but in no others) affirms that there can be genuinely voluntary action which is not, in the relevant sense, rational

Uncovering the Patterns of United States Oil Diversification Motivations via a neo-Coxian Interpretation

This thesis develops and applies neo-Coxian analysis to understand patterns of US oil diversification motivations. Because mainstream IR approaches lack a historical perspective and do not consider reflexivity due to their overt rationalism, a historicism method is employed to uncover the motivations for US oil diversification in this research. Critical Theory, which prioritizes a ‘holistic view’ of IR, helps to uncover these motivations through analysis of oil diversification processes, to understand how they have changed when viewed from a duration-based perception which includes a ‘diachronic’ time period and also a ‘synchronic’ one moment snapshot. Whereas rational IR approaches are supported by established methodologies, researching from a reflexivity perspective requires innovative methodological strategies. Here, three cases were chosen to examine US oil diversification motivations, namely the Keystone XL pipeline, the Iraq War and the Arctic Drilling in the context of Energy Revolution. All are considered key cases for illustrating such motivations. Primary data was collected from official archives to identify how political agents have viewed oil diversification, within the three case studies. Semi- structured elite interviews with social actors (e.g. policymakers, business, NGOs) were also conducted to support data collection. The theoretical analysis shows that Coxian Critical theory can explain US oil diversification motivations and can help to uncover the patterns of these motivations through the interaction of ideas, material capabilities and institutions, thereby providing an original contribution to knowledge. However, when a Coxian interpretation is reviewed, social dynamics as a new structural sphere arises as one of the important factors of US oil diversification motivations in the new millennium. The research finds that the patterns of US oil diversification motivations can be classified under: 1. oil politics, 2. domestic politics and 3. foreign policy. Moreover, there are also contradictions (i.e. 1. economy-biosphere, 2. national-state interests and 3. national-transnational benefits) that are the products of the system, which should be accepted as patterns and triggers of the system. However, their existence is not persistent and depends on the context in which they are created